Neopragmatism and the Dual-Use Issue: A Topology of Visions by Walther, Gerald
 University of Bradford eThesis 
This thesis is hosted in Bradford Scholars – The University of Bradford Open Access 
repository. Visit the repository for full metadata or to contact the repository team 
  
© University of Bradford. This work is licenced for reuse under a Creative Commons 
Licence. 
 
  
 
NEOPRAGMATISM AND THE DUAL-USE ISSUE 
 
A topology of visions 
 
 
Gerald WALTHER 
 
 
Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
Division of Peace Studies 
 
School of Social and International Studies 
 
University of Bradford 
 
 
2013 
i 
 
Abstract 
Author: Gerald Walther  
Title: Neopragmatism and the Dual-Use Issue: A Topology of Visions. 
Keywords: Bioethics, Dual-Use, Pragmatism, Philosophy of Science    
In the wake of the 2001 anthrax attacks in the US, States Parties to the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention started to discuss the potential 
malign application of biological research and technology. This thesis 
examines how this issue of dual-use has been developed, discussed, and 
how solutions have been proposed. In order to do so, the thesis follows a 
neopragmatist approach. As a neopragmatist methodology is largely 
underdeveloped, the thesis explores some of the key aspects of 
neopragmatism, specifically its openness to various methods and theories, 
by directly applying it to the topic. As a result of this approach, the thesis 
starts with exploratory empirical research, which follows Bruno Latour’s Actor 
Network Theory. This research reviews how the problem of dual-use has 
been discussed in three communities: politics and security, ethics, and 
science. One of the results is that dual-use has primarily been discussed in 
the security community while the other two were only marginally involved. 
The proposed solution to the problem by the security community is to place 
the burden of responsibility on the scientific community. The second part of 
the thesis then uses theory, Niklas Luhmann’s social systems theory and 
Martin Heidegger’s work on questioning technology, to critically challenge 
this solution developed in the security community. The thesis concludes by 
identifying approaches to help deal with the dual-use issue. It also examines 
how the adoption of a neopragmatist methodology has influenced and guided 
the thesis. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Once upon a time in Italy… 
In 1633, Galileo Galilei recanted his doctrine on the motion of the earth 
before the Inquisition. A few years later, Brecht imagines the following as the 
second to last scene of his book Life of Galileo. (Brecht, 1993) Andrea, a 
former student of Galileo and angry with him for his betrayal of science in 
front of the Inquisition, comes to see Galileo for the first time in many years to 
inquire about his health on behalf of a fellow scientist. Galileo, a prisoner of 
the Inquisition since he recanted, has just handed Andrea his Discorsi – the 
‘Discourses Concerning Two New Sciences: Mechanics and Local Motion’ – 
which he had finished during his imprisonment: 
“Andrea: And we thought you had deserted! No voice against you was louder 
than mine! 
Galileo: Very proper. I taught you science and I denied the truth. 
A: This alters everything. Everything. 
G: Really? 
A: You were hiding the truth. From the enemy. Even in the matter of ethics 
you were centuries ahead of us. 
G: Elaborate that, will you, Andrea? 
A.: Like the man in the street we said ‘He’ll die, but he’ll never recant.’ You 
came back: ‘I’ve recanted, but I’m going to live.’ – ‘Your hands are stained’, 
we said. You’re saying: ‘Better stained than empty’.  
G: Better stained than empty. Sounds realistic. Sounds like me. New science, 
new ethics. 
A: I of all people should have known. I was eleven when you sold another 
man’s telescope to the Venetian Senate. And I saw you put that instrument to 
immortal use. Your friends shook their heads when you bowed to that boy in 
Florence: science gained an audience. Even then you used to laugh at 
heroes. ‘People who suffer are boring’ you said. ‘Misfortune comes from 
2 
 
miscalculation’. And ‘When there are obstacles the shortest line between two 
points may be the crooked one.’ 
G: I remember. 
A: So in ’33 when you chose to recant a popular point in your doctrine I ought 
to have known that you were simply backing out of a hopeless political 
wrangle in order to get on with the real business of science. 
G: Which is… 
A: Studying the properties of motion, mother of those machines which alone 
are going to make the earth so good to live on that heaven can be cleared 
away. 
G: Aha. 
A: You gained the leisure to write a scientific work which could be written by 
nobody else. If you had ended up at the stake in a halo of flames the other 
side would have won.  
G: They did win. And there is no scientific work that can only be written by 
one particular man.  
A: Why did you recant, then? 
G: I recanted because I was afraid of physical pain. 
A: No! 
G: They showed me the instruments. 
A: So it wasn’t planned? 
G: It was not. 
Pause. 
Andrea loudly: Science makes only one demand: contribution to science. 
G: And I met it. Welcome to the gutter, brother in science and cousin in 
betrayal! Do you eat fish? I have fish. What stinks is not my fish but me. I sell 
out, you are a buyer. O irresistible glimpse of the book, the sacred 
commodity! The mouth waters and the curses drown. The great whore of 
Babylon, the murderous beast, the scarlet woman, opens her thighs and 
everything is altered. Blessed be our horse-trading, whitewashing, death-
fearing community! 
A: Fearing death is human. Human weaknesses don’t matter to science. 
G: Don’t they? – My dear Sarti, even as I now am I think I can still give you a 
tip or two as to what matters to that science you have dedicated yourself to. 
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A short pause 
G professorially, folding his hands over his stomach: In my spare time, of 
which I have plenty, I have gone over my case and considered how it is going 
to be judged by that world of science of which I no longer count myself a 
member. Even a wool merchant has not only to buy cheap and sell dear but 
also to ensure that the wool trade continues unimpeded. The pursuit of 
science seems to me to demand particular courage in this respect. It deals in 
knowledge procured through doubt. Creating knowledge for all about all, it 
aims to turn all of us into doubters. Now the bulk of the population is kept by 
its princes, landlords and priests in a pearly haze of superstition and old saws 
which cloak what these people are up to. The poverty of the many is as old 
as the hills, and from the pulpit and lecture platform we hear that it is as hard 
as the hills to get rid of. Our new art of doubting delighted the mass 
audience. They tore the telescope out of our hands and trained it on their 
tormentors, the princes, landlords, and priests. These selfish and 
domineering men, having greedily exploited the fruits of science, found that 
the cold eye of science had been turned on a primeval but contrived poverty 
that could clearly be swept away if they were swept away themselves. They 
showered us with threats and bribes, irresistible to feeble souls. But how can 
we deny ourselves to the crowd and still remain scientists? The movements 
of the heavenly bodies have become more comprehensible, but the peoples 
are as far as ever from calculating the moves of their rulers. The battle for a 
measurable heaven has been won thanks to doubt; but thanks to credulity 
the Rome housewife’s battle for milk will be lost time and time again. 
Science, Sarti, is involved in both these battles. A human race which 
shambles around in a pearly haze of superstition and old saws, too ignorant 
to develop those powers of nature which you people are revealing to it. To 
what end are you working? Presumably for the principle that science’s sole 
aim must be to lighten the burden of human existence. If the scientists, 
brought to hell by self-interested rulers, limit themselves to piling up 
knowledge for knowledge’s sake, then science can be crippled and your new 
machines will lead to nothing but new impositions. You may in due course 
discover all that there is to discover, and your progress will nonetheless be 
nothing but a progress away from mankind. The gap between you and it may 
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one day become so wide that your cry of triumph at some new achievement 
will be echoed by a universal cry of horror. – As a scientist I had a unique 
opportunity. In my day astronomy emerged into the market place. Given this 
unique situation, if one man had put up a fight it might have had tremendous 
repercussions. Had I stood firm the scientists could have developed 
something like the doctors’ Hippocratic oath, a vow to use their knowledge 
exclusively for mankind’s benefit. As things are, the best that can be hoped 
for is a race of inventive dwarfs who can be hired for any purpose. What’s 
more, Sarti, I have come to the conclusion that I was never in any real 
danger. For a few years I was as strong as the authorities. And I handed my 
knowledge to those in power for them to use, fail to use, misuse – whatever 
best suited their objectives.” (Brecht, 1993, pp. 105 – 109) 
1.2. Thesis overview and origins 
The reason to start this thesis with such a long piece of literature is that it 
opens up a space for thought and deliberation instead of proposing a certain 
road to follow in one’s thinking. But to become more orthodox again, here are 
a few questions that it will be helpful to keep in mind while reading this thesis. 
As indicated by Galileo’s monologue, the thesis is concerned with 
technology, ethics, and the responsibility of scientists. More specifically, it is 
concerned with the question if scientists, in the biological sciences and 
particularly neuroscience, are responsible for the results of their research and 
their development of technology. And if they are responsible, what they 
can/should/or have to do about this responsibility. Of course, this research 
topic did not develop in a vacuum and the research interest did not just fall 
into the author’s lap.  
The thesis was written in the Bradford Disarmament Research Centre of the 
University of Bradford, which has been very active in the analysis of the 
developments that have taken place in the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention (BWC). The BWC is an international agreement that prohibits 
States Parties “never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile, or 
otherwise acquire or retain (1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins 
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whatever their origins or mode of production, of types and in quantities that 
have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; 
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designated to use such agents 
or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflicts.” (BWC, 1972, Article 1) It 
is thus only one out of two classes of weapons that is completely outlawed by 
an international agreement (Chemical weapons constitute the other). Chapter 
three will go into more detail on the developments in the BWC arena 
particularly after 2001, when the Convention had to survive a major 
diplomatic crisis, which led to a focus of the Convention on the issue of dual-
use. Dual-use concerns the misuse of research and technology for 
unintended, specifically malign, purposes. 
The thesis’ focus in its scientific domain is the field of the biological sciences 
and, more precisely, neuroscience. The reasons for this interest are 
elaborated on in chapter four. In short though, it first of all pertains to the 
belief that neuroscience might be particularly prone to issues of dual-use. 
And second, the author’s prior university education includes an 
undergraduate degree in biological chemistry with a strong focus on 
neuroscience, including past research experience in neurophysiology. 
Chapter four discusses the developments in the field of bioethics and 
neuroethics with regard to how these two fields have incorporated concerns 
about dual-use and if ethics has any contribution to make to the discussion 
on dual-use. 
In chapter five, the thesis finally engages with those actors that are 
considered to be at the heart of the problem: the scientists.  
As this very short overview of chapter three to five has shown, the thesis will 
start with an empirical account of what is taking place in these three fields, 
i.e. the political/security community surrounding the BWC, the scientific 
community, and the ethics community. This approach does not follow the 
classical road that most theses might follow, which is to pick a topic, engage 
with a theoretical debate of the topic, and then discuss and maybe improve 
theory by analysing some form of empirical data. This thesis also does not 
start with a specific hypothesis and accompanying research question. 
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Instead, as will be discussed in length in chapter two, the methodology 
section, the research is rather exploratory in design. The research follows a 
neopragmatist line of argument when dealing with issues of ontology, 
epistemology, and ultimately methodology. One of the central arguments that 
this thesis attributes to neopragmatism as a philosophy for the social 
sciences is its claim that theoretical frameworks conjure a tautological 
research, which impedes the possibility of discovering something novel that 
lies outside of the realm of the adopted metatheory. Metatheory is the sort of 
grand theory or narrative such as critical realism or social constructivism or 
positivism that research tends to either explicitly follow or unknowingly 
subscribe. Yet, neopragmatism does not deny the utility of theory, in fact, 
neopragmatism endorses theory as praxis. To neopragmatism, theory does 
not determine truth values but it actually does something. This take on theory 
is very unique to neopragmatism, and even though there is no research 
question present at the moment – there will be one later on in chapter six – 
one question the reader should bear in mind right now is to what extend the 
thesis accomplishes to follow its subscription to neopragmatism.    
In the second part of the thesis, this neopragmatic stance is put into practice 
as German sociologist Niklas Luhmann’s Systems Theory is first discussed in 
chapter seven and then the specific system of science in society applied to 
the problem of dual-use in chapter eight. The result is a tale of caution 
against the belief that a panacea exists to solve the dual-use problem. In 
chapter nine, another German thinker, Martin Heidegger, as well as 
American philosopher Richard Rorty are used to show how the current 
debate on dual-use may benefit from an inclusion of a wider discussion base 
than just the security, the scientific and the ethics community. In the final 
conclusion, the question of how neopragmatism had shaped the thesis is 
taken up again. It also highlights some of the insights that were gained during 
the thesis and how this could help in addressing the issue of dual-use.  
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1.3. Questions for the road ahead 
In some regard this introduction has not yet been an introduction because it 
has not answered one question yet: Why should anyone read the thesis? 
One reason has been hinted at in the preceding section, i.e. that the thesis 
follows a rather unique philosophical approach and that it may assist other 
researchers who would like to adopt a similar methodological approach. Yet, 
this is hopefully not the only reason for anyone to read it. And here we can 
come back to Brecht’s Galileo. Life of Galileo was reworked by Brecht twice 
over a course of more than a decade. It was originally written in a time of 
Nazi Germany, then reworked a few years later after the US had dropped the 
first atomic bomb, and then again after a period of prosecution of communists 
in the US and the inverse in Stalin’s USSR. Given this historical background, 
one may find very different messages within the text. One might argue that it 
is a call for the liberation of the people and against any form of 
authoritarianism. Recalling the horrors of the atomic bomb, one might wonder 
if the critique of science as a mere seller of goods without any moral restrain 
is the key issue. Did Galileo redeem himself by producing the Discorsi and 
handing it over to Andrea? Is knowledge the only important goal to science? 
For Brecht, the primary danger appears to come from those in power to use 
knowledge and technology for their own purposes. The danger that we will 
utter a “universal cry of horror” seems linked to that authoritarian use of the 
power of science. (Brecht, 1993, p. 109) In the modern dual-use debate, it is 
not only the danger of this authoritarian misuse of science but also of the 
misuse of science by those beyond, e.g. by terrorist groups. It is the hope of 
this author that the thesis will help the reader understand the difficulties that 
surround the use and regulation of modern science and technology. The 
thesis thus aims to provide an understanding or facilitate a questioning of 
preconceived notions rather than outline and recommend specific policies 
and initiatives, even though the latter may be found as well. 
One question that may arise now is why neopragmatism has been taken at 
all, i.e. will it be somehow useful for addressing the issue? While this issue is 
further discussed throughout the entire thesis, one preliminary answer is that 
the question in itself presupposed that methodologies need to be judged 
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based on their contribution to solving or addressing a problem. Yet, following 
neopragmatism, this thinking is taking the concepts of methodology, 
epistemology and ontology backwards. The thesis does not follow 
neopragmatism because it is useful but rather because based on ontological 
discussions derived from philosophy of language make a strong case for the 
'use' of neopragmatism. While other research has certainly been conducted 
without further elaborations on ontology and epistemology, this thesis argues 
that those reflections should actually matter. One may certainly pick a social 
constructivist, a positivist or a discourse analysis methodology but without 
any basis in epistemological and ontological scholarship, this practice will fail 
to address the issue that our methods need to be based on how we 
understand the reality (or realities) around us. I did not choose to use 
neopragmatism as a philosophical guideline for the thesis, but rather the 
philosophy appears, for lack of a better word, 'true' or correct to me. A 
methodology should be a direct consequence of one's epistemological and 
ontological belief. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
2.1. Introduction 
The underlying philosophical approach of this thesis is neopragmatism, which 
has been championed primarily by Richard Rorty and Donald Davidson. One 
of the major problems with this philosophy as a methodology is the lack of a 
theoretical debate on its application as well as a lack of practical 
implementation. Therefore, the chapter will discuss how the Actor Network 
Theory (ANT) of Bruno Latour could be regarded as congruent with 
neopragmatism. This methodology will therefore discuss ANT and in doing 
so, show its linkages with and philosophical underpinnings of 
neopragmatism. ANT will then be used in the first part of the thesis, its 
empirical part, and then the neopragmatism takes over in the second half by 
allowing the adoption of various social theories. In the conclusion, some of 
the important aspects of neopragmatism are taken up again and it will show 
how this thesis has followed a neopragmatic approach. This way of 
introducing neopragmatism may seem to be contradict what has been stated 
in the introduction, i.e. that methodology is the result of epistemological and 
ontological scholarship. The decision to start with the methodology rather 
than with ontology is an educational one – neopragmatism is very 
philosophical and starting with an analysis of more practical implications 
helps to pave the way for the theoretical underpinnings. However, this 
reversal should not hide the fact that ANT is only discussed because it might 
be reasonably compatible with the epistemological and ontological insights 
provided by neopragmatism. ANT does not justify neopragmatism – 
neopragmatism grants credence to ANT. 
ANT has recently been discussed in Latour’s book Reassembling the Social 
– An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory, published in 2005. (Latour, 2005) 
The book is divided into two parts; the first discusses the methodological 
basis of ANT whereas the second analyses how these considerations impact 
on method. The first part is divided into five chapters on five sources of 
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‘uncertainty’. In this chapter, I will summarize the key elements of each of 
these sources and then use neo-pragmatism to support and supplement the 
analysis. The overall purpose of this chapter is to show what I consider to be 
the role of the social scientists. 
2.2. First source of uncertainty: No group, only group formation   
The idea that actors need to be the starting point of any inquiry is central to 
the first two sources of uncertainty that Latour discusses in his introduction to 
ANT. The first source of uncertainty deals with the attempt of social scientists 
to start discussing what particular group they need to investigate at the 
beginning of their inquiry. Latour contends that this artificial creation of 
groups is counterproductive. The problem is that groups are not absolute 
beings that have a life independent of the actual actors that define the 
group’s identity. Groups have spokespersons who say “who they are, what 
they should be, what they have been.” (Latour, 2005, p. 31) Therefore it is 
impossible to define the group from the outset, as Latour holds social 
scientists repeatedly do, as it will fail to understand how the group was 
actually formed. The advantage of giving the actors the role of defining the 
group is that they do the sociology for the sociologists who learn from them 
about their associations. (p. 32) Practically, there are four elements or 
‘traces’ that can be observed in group formation. 
First, spokespersons from a group define the boundaries that delimit it. Over 
time, these limits may appear to be objective criteria for group membership, 
which masks that original process of debate among the various voices within 
the group. Second, when a group defines itself as a group, an anti-group is 
established as well. In this process, actors define their social context, which 
is helpful to scientists because there is no need for them to define from the 
outside what the group is and how it should be studied. This idea is 
contradictory to standard critical sociology because it allows the actor to have 
a fully informed picture of himself, which is what sociologists of the social 
doubt he can have. Third, the spokesperson for a group will try to 
continuously define and redefine its boundaries. Eventually, this work will 
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result in establishing a ‘finite and sure’ thing, which appears as if the 
definition of the group had never been contested. Fourth, social scientists, 
social statistics, and social journalists belong to the spokespersons of the 
group. “Any study of any group by any social scientist is part and parcel of 
what makes the group exist, last, decay, or disappear.” (Latour, 2005, p. 33) 
The reason for this is because while studying the group, scientists are 
actively involved in the debate of what the group is by tracing social bonds 
between actors. What we have abandoned when following Latour is the 
notion of a fixed group that we as social scientists can grasp from the outset 
of our study. Groups require constant work and any semblance of stability is 
the hard, constant work of members of the group. Scientists of the social 
believe in stability and inertia while scientists of associations, which Actor-
Network Theory wants to train, believe in constant flux. For example, both 
scientists will agree “that popular festivals are necessary to ‘refresh social 
ties’.” (Latour, 2005, p. 37) However, for sociologists of the social, the 
festivals are only an avatar of the underlying social order, “tools with which it 
‘represents’ itself or through which it is ‘reproduced’.” (Latour, 2005, p. 37) 
For sociologists of associations there is no building or structure that is 
represented by actions and events. “If you don’t have the festival now or print 
the newspaper today, you simply lose the grouping, which is not a building in 
need of restoration but a movement in need of continuation. If a dancer stops 
dancing, the dance is finished.” (Latour, 2005, p. 37) What this means is that 
for Latour it is necessary to distinguish between mediators and 
intermediaries. Intermediaries simply transport meaning without contributing 
to any change. Mediators are multitude whose actions always need to be 
taken into account in an analysis. To tie it back to the question of social 
forces, for social theory, actors are generally just intermediaries who just 
transport the hidden social force without effecting any change. For ANT, the 
world consists primarily of mediators who effect change and, simply put, do 
things.    
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2.3. The second source of uncertainty: Action is overtaken 
After having “learned to trace social connections using unexpected trails left 
by the controversies about group formations” (Latour, 2005, p. 43), Latour 
turns to the question of what actors do. His critique of mainstream sociology 
again hinges on the conceptual scheme problem – social scientists explain 
actions by referring to social stuff instead of physical, biological, or 
economical blocks. However, actor-network theory does not get rid of ‘social’ 
completely – rather when ANT talks about ‘social’ it is used to designate a 
binding together of state of affairs. (Latour, 2005, p. 43) For example, why do 
all parents at a school’s open party look “eerily familiar”? (Latour, 2005, p. 
44) The important difference between the sociologies is that the traditional 
version argues that there are social forces that act and make the parents look 
alike whereas ANT only asserts that action is being overtaken, or “other-
taken”, which means that there are communities of people and they take over 
actions from each other. (Latour, 2005, p.45) “We are not alone in this world.” 
(Latour, 2005, p. 45) “An actor in the hyphenated expression of actor-network 
is not the source of an action but the moving target of a vast array of entities 
swarming toward it.” (Latour, 2005, p. 46) Thankfully Latour expands this 
rather cryptic formulation. What is actually at stake is the epistemic validity of 
the voice of the actors. Latour does not believe that the actors can give the 
true answer to why they do certain things. They are ‘actors’ a term taken from 
the stage where multitudes are engaged in the process of the action. “Action 
is located. Action is borrowed, distributed, suggested, influenced, dominated 
betrayed, translated.” (Latour, 2005, p. 46) In this world, there are 
uncertainties about the origin of the action. His critique against the social 
scientists is that they want to replace this uncertainty with a priori social 
categories. He advocates that social scientists take seriously the expressions 
of the actors even if in difficult cases, for example  
“when a pilgrim says ‘I came to this monastery because I was 
called by the Virgin Mary’. How long should we resist smiling 
smugly, replacing at once the agency of the Virgin by the ‘obvious’ 
delusion of an actor ‘finding pretext’ in a religious icon to ‘hide’ 
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one’s own decision? Critical sociologists, will answer: ‘Just as far 
as to be polite, it’s bad manners to sneer in the presence of the 
informant.’ A sociologist of associations meanwhile must learn to 
say: ‘As long as possible in order to seize the chance offered by 
the pilgrim to fathom the diversity of agencies acting at once in the 
world’. If it is possible to discover today that ‘the Virgin’ is able to 
induce pilgrims to board a train against all the scruples that tie 
them to home, that is a miracle indeed.” (Latour, 2005, p. 48) 
For Latour, the reason why social scientists have neglected their duty to 
listen to the actors is because they have tried to simplify the world in order to 
advance their respective political agendas. If the world can be substituted by 
less and less social forces it becomes easier to manage it. This blasphemy of 
science becomes even more apparent in critical sociology where already 
assembled, invisible social forces trump the actual data assembled from the 
actors. Social explanations are the aether of sociology.  
But for Latour, the problem goes even further. What scientists of the social 
lack is an understanding and consideration of the metaphysics of the actors. 
There is no discussion of empirical metaphysics. By clinging to their own 
metaphysics or denying that there is any at all, they do not understand the 
significance of allowing the actors to discuss and present their own 
metaphysics. Latour, of course, does not advocate that metaphysical 
discussion will give social scientists a proper ‘foundation’ or a conceptual 
scheme. But in order to understand the actors it is necessary to take into 
consideration their own metaphysics.  
Latour concedes that “we can never know for sure who and what is making 
us act.” (Latour, 2005, p. 52) But there is “a list of features which are always 
present in contradictory arguments about what has happened.” (Latour, 
2005, p. 52) “First, agencies are always presented in an account as doing 
something… transforming some As into Bs though trials with Cs.” (Latour, 
2005, p. 52, 53) They are visible unlike the sort of social explanations or 
hidden actors that scientists of the social utilize in their explanations. A 
second feature is figuration. “What is doing an action is always provided in 
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the account with some flesh and features that make them have some form or 
shape, no matter how vague.” (Latour, 2005, p. 53) For Latour though, 
figuration does not imply that actors are only people. Statistical data, for 
example, also have a figuration. Even anonymous actors have a figuration. 
Related to agency is the actant, which is a term that originated in the study of 
literature. “For instance in a fable, the same actant can be made to act 
through the agency of a magic wand, a dwarf, a thought in the fairy’s mind, or 
a knight killing two dozen dragons.” (Latour, 2005, p. 54)  
“Third, actors also engage in criticizing other agencies accused of being fake, 
archaic, absurd, irrational, artificial, or illusory.” (Latour, 2005, p. 56) 
Therefore, there will be a constant flux when engaging with actors in what 
agencies are being portrayed as legitimate or not. The role of the social 
scientist is now to understand the “world-making activities of those they 
study” (Latour, 2005, p. 57), their respective metaphysics, in order to “choose 
among these moves the ones that they deem more reasonable.” (Latour, 
2005, p. 57)  
Fourth, “actors… propose their own theories of action to explain how 
agencies’ effects are carried over.” (Latour, 2005, p. 57) Actors will debate 
about which agency acts as well as how it acts.  
The result of accepting the second uncertainty is that any explanation 
working on the model of A leading to or predicting B will inevitably fall short. 
The problem is that this model treats A and B as intermediaries rather than 
mediators. Mediators do not allow for a nomological deduction of actions. For 
ANT, the world is made up of concatenations of mediators, which each act 
fully. Latour gives the example of a puppeteer. In a nomological framework, 
the actions of the puppets are merely the result of the actions of the 
puppeteer. However, this direct causality is challenged when actually talking 
to puppeteers, who “will say queer things like ‘their marionettes suggest to 
them to do things they will have never thought possible by themselves’.” 
(Latour, 2005, p. 59, 60) What determines if a study is indeed in the tradition 
of ANT is the relative share of mediators over intermediaries.  
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Latour’s argument about prioritizing the voice of the actors over any 
explanatory frameworks or the scientist’s ability to rationalize their behaviour 
makes him at first glance side with philosophers like Charles Taylor. The 
claim of Taylor can be best understood in his debate with Richard Rorty, 
whose neopragmatism underscores this entire thesis, which centres on the 
question of whether actors have epistemic priority or not. This specific 
question is a subset of the larger philosophical discussion of subjectivity 
versus objectivity, or put differently, between correspondence theories of 
truth versus coherence theories of truth. This bigger issue will be taken up 
after analyzing the first four sources of uncertainty of Latour. At the moment, I 
will just discuss the question of the role of the subject.  
As indicated, Latour could thus far be considered to be on par with Taylor, 
who believes that the subjects under study need to be given epistemic 
priority because they are humans. According to him, there is a difference 
between the natural and the social sciences because the latter deal with 
humans who have an inherent understanding of their own world and 
therefore have a voice of their own that we need to take seriously when 
analysing them. Taylor’s starting point is an account of how logical 
empiricism with its deductive-nomological rationale has been removed from 
its sacrosanct pedestal not only among the social sciences but also among 
the natural sciences through the work of the defenders of hermeneutics. 
Now, all sciences are hermeneutical. (Taylor, 1980, p. 26) However, Taylor 
does not think this is a reasonable assumption but actually nothing more than 
“a pleasing fancy.” (Taylor, 1980, p. 26)  
His major thrust is that natural science is working with absolutes, which can 
only be stated in terms of being independent of human perception. To 
illustrate his case he cites the 17th century discussion of colour. While in a 
world of blind people, a discussion of colour would be incomprehensible, the 
wavelength associated with colour would still be measurable. “An account of 
things that eschews such subject-related descriptions can be called an 
absolute account.” (Taylor, 1980, p. 31, 32) The difference between the 
natural and the human sciences is determined by the absoluteness variable: 
human sciences are unable to provide absolute accounts. The reason is 
16 
 
because human understanding employs ‘desirability-characterizations’. “To 
use the language made familiar by phenomenology, understanding another 
person is understanding his world; it is grasping the significance of things for 
him. And this can only be articulated in subject-related terms. Consequently 
the only science of man which could meet this requirement of absoluteness 
would be one which could do without this kind of understanding.” (Taylor, 
1980, p. 32) The question is if the human sciences fulfil the absoluteness 
criteria: Can we understand humans without using any subject-related terms? 
 Taylor characterizes how such an understanding could be achieved. First of 
all, any description in terms of subject-related terms needs to be split into two 
components: “a neutral, absolute description of the consummation we seek, 
and a constatation of our inclination, or pro-attitude, towards it.” (Taylor, 
1980, p. 35) However, would such a language really capture feelings? Taylor 
does not believe it can. As an example, he cites the feelings of ‘shame’ and 
‘guilt’. Transcribed into the subject-independent language with its two 
components it appears difficult if not impossible to come up with experience-
independent terms that encapsulate the experience of shame and guilt; in 
particular how would the description for each situation be different? The 
difference between shame and guilt is the difference of being in a situation of 
feeling shame or guilt. Of course attempts have been made to get around the 
problem, as for example in the trend to focus on the behaviour of people, 
which can be described subject-independently. There, the behaviour 
description is complemented by a subjectivist view of culture. Behaviour is 
the neutral reality and culture the reaction, pro or con, to this reality. (Taylor, 
1980, p. 36) The motivation behind these attempts to purge the social 
sciences of desirability-characterizations is partly due to the high esteem with 
which the natural sciences are being held. But, according to Taylor, there are 
also important reasons why we strive for value-freedom and absoluteness. 
The problem is how we can generalize our research findings and how we can 
replicate them if we are employing subjective accounts. Without absolutes 
there is no hope for intersubjective agreements, no hope for universal 
consent because all accounts will be value driven, which is open for dispute. 
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It is therefore not surprising why social scientists have tried to devise 
methods to come up with absolute descriptions for understanding humans.  
It is easy to see that Latour’s ANT allies with those who argue that any 
attempt to utilize absolute terms for understanding human beings falls short 
of the task.  However, as will be seen in his account of the third uncertainty, 
for Latour it is not because of the nature of human beings that we need to 
give epistemic priority to the actor.  
2.4. Third uncertainty: Objects have agency  
“[I]nstead we are going to accept as full-blown actors entities that 
were explicitly excluded from collective existence by more than 
one hundred years of social explanation. The reasons are twofold: 
first because the basic social skills provide only one tiny subset of 
the associations making up societies; second, because the 
supplement of force which seems to reside in the invocation of a 
social tie is, at best, a convenient shorthand and, at worst, nothing 
more than a tautology.” (Latour, 2005, p. 69)  
The actors that Latour wants to bring back into the arena of the social 
scientists are objects. The reason he does so is based on the two prior 
uncertainties. If social ties are not permanent but have to be continuously 
reasserted and maintained then it becomes possible to include objects again. 
The reason is that it is very difficult to maintain social ties without using any 
thing. Given the controversies about actors and agencies, it follows that 
anything that modifies a state of affairs by making a difference is an actor, or 
if it does not have a figuration, an actant. (Latour, 2005, p. 71) Therefore, 
Latour argues that we need to ask two questions: “Does it make a difference 
in the course of some other agent’s action or not? Is there some trial that 
allows someone to detect this difference?” (Latour, 2005, p. 71) Of course 
this does not mean that objects determine actions e.g. that “hammers 
‘impose’ the hitting of the nail. However,  
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“[i]n addition to ‘determining’ and serving as a ‘backdrop for human 
action’, things might authorize, allow, afford, encourage, permit, 
suggest, influence, block, render possible, forbid, and so on. ANT 
is not the empty claim that objects do things ‘instead’ of human 
actors: it simply says that no science of the social can even begin 
if the question of who and what participates in the action is not first 
of all thoroughly explored, even though it might mean letting 
elements in which, for lack of a better term, we would call non-
humans.” (Latour, 2005, p. 72)  
To put objects into the scope of the social scientists is the strength of ANT. 
The question is how to do it? 
At first glance, objects seem to be ontologically different from human actors. 
Their actions may appear to be incommensurable. Latour argues that they 
are only so as long as once focuses on the social interactions. As soon as 
one focuses on human courses of action, it becomes clear that “a shouted 
order to lay a brick, the chemical connection of cement with water, the force 
of a pulley unto a rope with a movement of the hand, the strike of a match to 
light a cigarette offered by a co-worker, etc.” are all part of a collective action. 
(Latour, 2005, p. 74) Latour advocates replacing society for collective, which 
“designate[s] the project of assembling new entities not yet gathered 
together.” (Latour, 2005, p. 75) If one follows an actor it is most common to 
find linkages between human and non-human actors. However, it is not the 
case that Latour reconciles objects and subjects. He does not want to 
separate a priori ‘material’ and ‘social’ ties and then link them together in the 
investigation. This differentiation is artificial. Certainly, humans and objects 
are distinct, because one is capable of intentional movements whereas the 
other is not. However, both can be woven into the same story. (Latour, 2005, 
p. 76, footnote 88)  
We have seen earlier that Taylor advocated the use of hermeneutics for the 
study of human beings because of the specific properties of being a human 
warrants a different method than the objects of study in the natural sciences. 
However, it is clear now that Latour does not take this road in arguing for a 
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hermeneutic method for social studies because the subject-object distinction 
is just a philosophical artefact without justification. He seems to be more 
aligned with Rorty, who argues against Taylor and against the subject-object 
divide in the following way.  
In his A Reply to Dreyfus and Taylor article, Rorty takes up Taylor’s claim 
that the world cannot be understood in terms of absolutes. (Rorty, 1980) 
Taylor argues that the natural and social sciences differ in that humans 
cannot be understood in absolute terms devoid of ‘desirability 
characterizations’. According to Rorty though, this dualism between absolute 
and subjective echoes a Kantian distinction, which William James’ 
pragmatism has shown to be philosophically unfounded. It is the insights of 
pragmatism that Rorty uses to challenge the notions of absoluteness and 
subject-independent reality. What is problematic is the idea that a language 
exists that describes an object as its nature really is. This idea is a survivor of 
16th century pre-Galilean theories about God having planned and created 
nature. Vocabularies were in this mind-set more natural the better their 
congruence with God’s own vocabulary. However, for example, atoms do not 
care more about being described as atoms than about being labelled messy 
or small or ugly. (Rorty, 1980, p. 42) We just describe them as atoms 
because it is silly to ask what they in themselves really are. We use 
descriptions because they enable us to predict and control them – to study 
them. Rorty believes Heidegger to be correct, when he says that the 
fallacious inference from “better for mastering” to “more objective” is just a 
quirky Western metaphysical tradition. (Rorty, 1980, p. 43) To come back to 
the question if objects and subjects warrant different methods, Rorty argues 
that this distinction hinges on a belief in a correspondence theory of truth. 
Thomas S. Kuhn has shown that there has never been a single method of 
the natural sciences and any talk that wants to discern the two methods or 
translate the natural science method into a social science one in order to 
emulate its success will fail. Of course, we can use the language for control 
and prediction, which is most commonly found in the natural sciences and 
apply them to humans. Rorty uses the example of Skinner and Bohr. Skinner 
tries to predict and control humans and pigeons in the same way that Bohr 
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talks about predicting and controlling atoms. The reason why we value Bohr 
over Skinner is actually not due to their accuracy – Skinner’s methods might 
just be the appropriate way to run a totalitarian regime – but because we 
want to know other things about humans than just being able to control them. 
But this is only a preference and not a result of some insight into what 
humans are “in themselves” any more than that atoms in themselves are 
more apt to control and prediction. (Rorty, 1980, p. 44) “In neither case do we 
have the slightest idea what “in themselves” means. We are simply 
expressing a preference.” (Rorty, 1980, p. 44) This lack of ontological 
difference and categorization has the result that if we want to study or do 
things with people we should simply employ different vocabularies. However, 
and this ties back to Latour, the corollary is equally true. Depending on what 
you want from objects, it might be useful to utilize different vocabularies. One 
set might just do fine for predicting and controlling whereas another highlights 
their social nature or their impact on society. They may have a social 
dimension as well which can only be explored when using a vocabulary that 
enables this exploration. Just like Rorty argues we can do different things 
with humans, Latour’s conclusion that we can do different things with objects 
follows – Rorty actually makes the same point in a discussion of the social 
aspects of fossils and how to study them. (Rorty, 1982, p. 199) But although 
both Latour and Rorty draw on pragmatism to support their theory, they 
fundamentally differ on the role of the explanandum, i.e. its epistemic status. 
In order to understand this discrepancy it will be necessary to further 
elaborate on the philosophical principles of pragmatism with particular 
attention to the scheme-content dualism, and the relationship between truth, 
meaning and belief. However, for the sake of coherence, I will first complete 
my account of Latour’s third and fourth source of uncertainty. 
To finish Latour’s third uncertainty, he is obviously aware that it is difficult to 
make the activity of objects visible. However, he believes that there are five 
situations, in which it is possible to do so, which are:  
1) Study innovations where they happen: scientist’s lab, artisan’s 
workshop 
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2) When there is enough distance (due to time, space (ethnology), skill, 
and learning) between them and users 
3) Accidents, breakdowns, and strikes highlight their otherwise hidden 
actions 
4) Use archives, documents, memoirs, museum collections, etc., to bring 
back their novelty and the state of crisis when they were born.  
5) Fiction (Latour, 2005, p. 80 – 82) 
2.5. Fourth source of uncertainty: Matters of fact versus matters of 
concern 
To sum up the first three uncertainties, they are: “groups are made, agencies 
are explored and objects play a role.” (Latour, 2005, p. 87) The fourth 
uncertainty pertains to the question of what constitutes knowledge. First, 
Latour starts by reiterating how social science has tried to substitute social 
explanations for actual responses by people. Latour confronts the notion that 
constructed knowledge has been regarded as artificial and not true. 
However, when studying natural scientists, he came to the realization that 
even those scientists actually construct their knowledge – however, construct 
does not indicate for them that their knowledge is false. It rather connotes the 
specific feature of actually constructing a method or tool to assist in getting 
objective and certified results. The ingenuity of the construction actually 
determines the accuracy of its results. For Latour, constructivism denotes an 
increase in realism. (Latour, 2005, p. 92) However, social scientists do not 
share this view and rather took this use of words to mean that finally natural 
science has been debunked because even they do not find truth but rather 
have to construct explanations. However, it was then for the first time that 
social science had to deal with explananda that were as powerful as it is. 
While cultists, businessman, and other actors were simply upset that their 
words were not taken seriously, e.g. “for a follower of a cult, it’s not the same 
thing to be tied to the existence of a divinity and to be told that one adores a 
fetish made out of wood”, (Latour, 2005, p. 93) the natural scientists were 
actually more powerful than the social scientists. Latour interprets the result 
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of the ‘Science Wars’, the debate between the social and natural scientists 
about their work, as follows: “scientists made us realize that there was not 
the slightest chance that the type of social forces we use as a cause could 
have objective facts as their effects.” (Latour, 2005, p. 100) The result of this 
resistance to social explanation by the natural scientists for ANT was that it 
argues that since social explanations have failed for science, they may have 
also failed everywhere else, i.e. in the social sciences. The critique once 
again centres on the limited utility of social explanation: 
“When I begin to ask naïve questions about what is really meant 
by the social explanation, I am told not to take the existence of 
social forces ‘literally’, since no reasonable sociologists ever 
claimed that they could really substitute society for the object it 
explains. They would rather say that they try to give familiar 
causes to unfamiliar phenomena or, like the natural sciences they 
are so fond of, unfamiliar causes to familiar phenomena. Fine, but 
the difficulty comes from the double meaning of social we have 
already detected: behind the innocuous epistemological claim that 
social explanations have to be ferreted out, lies the ontological 
claim that those causes have to mobilize forces made of social 
stuff. For reasons that will become clearer in the second part of 
the book, to explain is not a mysterious cognitive feat, but a very 
practical world-building enterprise that consists of connecting 
entities with other entities, that is, in tracing a network.” (Latour, 
2005, p. 103)  
The real question that a social explanation as advocated by, e.g. social 
theory, poses is how a single cause can have a million effects. If A causes B, 
C, and D it has to somehow account for the differences between these three 
events. Put concretely, the force of society has been used to explain a large 
variety of seemingly unrelated events, e.g. “the rise of the modern state, the 
ascent of petty bourgeoisie, the reproduction of social domination, the power 
of industrial lobbies, the invisible hand of the market, individual interactions.” 
(Latour, 2005, p. 104) Latour argues that obviously no social theorist would 
ever declare that the forces of society can explain all these causalities: “They 
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would easily grant that social gravitation is not like Newtonian gravitation” but 
rather that the causality is more “fuzzy” and “uncertain.” (Latour, 2005, p. 
105) Latour argues that his distinction of intermediaries and mediators helps 
to highlight the differences between ANT and this type of social theory. If a 
factor is simply transported by some element B, this element is just an 
intermediary because the only important thing about element B is the initial 
factor. However, this means that if society, the factor or cause, explains 
religion, the intermediary, then all we need to study is society. When studying 
science, this ill-fated attempt at understanding came to an abrupt end 
because the factors ran out of steam very early. It is simply not enough 
because, for example, “Pasteur was somewhat reactionary and adored the 
Empress Eugenie but that does not carry you very far through his 
bacteriology, even though ‘it might not be unrelated’ to his rejection, for 
instance, of spontaneous generation.” (Latour, 2005, p. 105) What 
differentiates ANT from social theory is the understanding of the difference 
between translation vs. transportation. When ANT studies objects, it does not 
believe these to be intermediaries but treats them as mediators that actually 
do something. Social forces are not transported but the social is “nowhere in 
particular as thing among other things but may circulate everywhere as a 
movement connecting non-social things.” (Latour, 2005, p. 107) At the 
beginning of any inquiry it is unclear how all the actors are connected but it is 
necessary to keep in mind that they might be associated and make each 
other do things. This agency is not due to the transportation of a cause but 
rather because of a variety of events that are triggered by other mediators. 
Once we are able to describe all the mediators, there is no need to search for 
ulterior forces that lie behind. When Latour thus talks about social, it  
“is neither one actor among many nor a force behind all actors 
transported through some of them but a connection that 
transports, so to speak, transformations, we use the word 
translation – the tricky word ‘network’ being defined in the next 
chapter as what is traced by those translations in the scholars’ 
account. So, the word ‘translation’ now takes on a somewhat 
specialized meaning: a relation that does not transport causality 
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but induces two mediators into coexisting… I can now state the 
aim of this sociology of associations more precisely: there is no 
society, no social realm, and no social ties, but there exist 
translations between mediators that may generate traceable 
associations.” (Latour, 2005, p. 108) 
In the, hitherto classified as opposite, field of ‘Nature’ an equal amount of 
work is needed as well in order to drop the society-nature divide.  Empiricism 
does not create accounts written in stone because once one gets closer to 
the natural objects, it becomes evident that they do not behave in the way 
that positivists would like them to do; for example in discussions about 
biogenetics, where genes do not behave exactly in the nomological way that 
biologists would like them to do. (Latour, 2005, p. 111) But instead of turning 
away from the natural sciences, Latour proposes to get closer to the place 
where objectivity is being made, which are the scientific laboratories. 
Positivists have failed because they chose facts as their building blocks of 
certainty. However, facts are constructed, and thus serve poorly as 
foundations.  Latour’s solution is to get away from the matters of fact focus of 
the early empiricists and rather discuss matters of concern. But what are 
matters of concern? 
Matters of fact are similar to the idea of associations that Latour already 
discussed in his attack on the scientists of the social. In analysing natural 
science, it is necessary to look at the disputes about facts, i.e. matters of 
concern, which dominate the actual work of scientists. “Scientists and 
engineers in their laboratories were every day making the production of facts 
more visible, more risky, more costly, more debatable, more interesting, and 
more publicly relevant as even a cursory look at any technical magazine 
easily showed.” (Latour, 2005, p. 115) This viewpoint does not support the 
idea that there are multiplicities of views of the same issue as postmodernists 
would claim and argue. Rather, it is the thing itself that Latour wants to allow 
to be deployed as a multiple. There are not several viewpoints because of 
truth being subjective to the viewer but rather because the object allows for 
different viewpoints because it is not unified. This unification might come at a 
later stage when the collective manages to synthesize these different 
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viewpoints. Latour obviously enters the terrain of ontology and metaphysics 
now. He believes that focussing on the ‘worlds of matters of concern’ enables 
ANT to get rid of the subject-object dualism, which supported the idea that 
the multiplicity is associated with the social sciences whereas unity was the 
domain of the natural sciences. The former hold a coherence theory of truth 
and knowledge whereas the latter hold a correspondence theory. ANT holds 
neither and can be classified as subscribing to a quietist theory of truth. For 
Latour though, the virtue of ANT in the debate is a negative one. Even 
though there is a reality and a common world out there, it still needs to be 
“collected and composed.” (Latour, 2005, p. 118) What needs to be done is 
to simply assure that dialogue is not prematurely closed by a “hegemonic 
version of one kind of matter of fact claiming to be what is present in 
experience.” (Latour, 2005, p. 118) This method applies to ‘power’ and 
‘society’ as well as to ‘matter’ and ‘nature’. The conclusion of accepting all 
four uncertainties thus far is the following: 
“When we list the qualities of an ANT account, we will make sure that when 
agencies are introduced they are never presented simply as matters of fact 
but always as matters of concern, with their mode of fabrication and their 
stabilizing mechanism clearly visible. In addition, we will be especially 
attentive to counteract the deconstruction mood by making sure that 
multiplicity is not associated with ‘interpretive flexibility’ or with weakening of 
the empirical grasp. Finally, we will be attentive to the procedures through 
which the multiplicity of reality – metaphysics – can be distinguished from its 
progressive unification – ontology.” (Latour, 2005, p. 120) 
Although there is a fifth uncertainty to Latour’s ANT, it may be necessary to 
excise the main arguments out of the first four. The major methodological 
concerns of Latour pertain to the subject-object divide, dualism of scheme 
and content, and a quietist theory of truth and knowledge. The subject-object 
divide is the idea that there are objective elements in the world that exist 
independently of observation and that there are subjective elements within 
the world that are characterized by social interactions. The dualism of 
scheme and content is the idea that there are conceptual schemes that can 
be utilized to explain specific content, for example Plato’s forms or a Kantian 
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a priori principle. Latour’s theory of truth and knowledge is a quietist one, 
which provides an alternative to the two common theories of correspondence 
– truth depends on measuring an objective reality – and coherence – truth is 
what is agreed upon. Those three issues formulate the basis of Latour’s 
method. However, while Latour gives a good description of those three 
principles, with a minor exception of the third one, he does not do much to 
justify the positions. The three issues have not raised their ugly head just 
now but follow a long line of philosophical debate ranging back to Ancient 
Greece. It may help to clarify and justify his views to elaborate the 
philosophical origins, which are located in neopragmatism. Therefore, I will 
summarize the main arguments of neopragmatists like Richard Rorty and 
Donald Davidson in the following section. Similarities between Rorty and 
Latour have already been discussed in the third uncertainty section, 
particularly why humans and non-humans need to be analysed in a similar 
fashion. However, Rorty and Latour actually differ fundamentally on the 
epistemic status of the explanandum, which comes as a surprise given that 
they hold the same positions on the subject-object divide, scheme-content 
dualism, and quietism with regard to theories of truth. The issue is that Latour 
wants to refrain from having the scientists explain the behaviour of the 
subject because he thinks that the scientists will actually just replace the 
sentences and words of the subject with standard sociology of the social 
words, e.g. power or alienation. This view is based on his belief in the non-
existence of the scheme-content dualism. Rorty adheres to this principle as 
well. However, he argues that inviting the psychopath to have the last word in 
a trial is not due to our belief that he will have a better understanding than the 
psychiatrists appointed to the case. Rorty thinks we do out of moral duty, the 
duty to make sure that we don’t “act badly.” (Rorty, 1982, p. 202) There is no 
reason to believe that the actor necessarily has a good account of his 
actions. Asking him is a form of virtue and while it may be helpful because he 
has a good vocabulary for explaining and describing his actions it does not 
discharge the scientists from needing to search for a good understanding. 
Rorty believes the hope of the social sciences lie in enabling us to 
communicate with others with whom it would otherwise be difficult to interact. 
Rorty comes to this conclusion because he also believes that there is no 
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scheme-content dualism, i.e. that there is no vocabulary that is more 
objective in description. Therefore it is absurd to believe that the 
explanandum will do any better explaining their behaviour than social 
scientists will do. It helps to ask but is certainly not the only Method for the 
social scientists that enables a best and most objective understanding. In 
order to understand these two position better – and the difference is 
significant as it directly pertains to how one should approach research – I will 
elaborate on the philosophical premises of both positions by introducing the 
philosophy of Donald Davidson, to whom Rorty is indebted and whose ideas 
Latour also seems to advocate thus far.  
2.6. The neopragmatism of Donald Davidson and Richard Rorty 
One of problems when engaging with Donald Davidson’s philosophy is its 
self-referentiality. His system is highly interconnected, which makes it difficult 
to pick out any single feature. Therefore, even though the purpose of this 
section on Davidson is to support the ideas of Latour and possibly find a 
solution to the epistemic status of the explanandum question, it will be 
necessary to start with an account of what truth is according to Davidson, 
and thus to neopragmatists. The origin of what truth is goes back to the 
inquiries of the early Greek philosophers in Miletus and extends up to our 
modern era. While some schools claim to have found truth or at least claim to 
know how to get to it, e.g. Kant’s concept of reason or logical positivists 
emphasis on the scientific method, others have denied that there is one Truth 
out there but that it is subjective and based on our individual or cultural 
perception of reality. To neopragmatists though the entire way of reasoning 
and discussing if there is Truth and what it is, is misguided. In what follows, I 
will trace the thought processes of Davidson and show how he came to the 
conclusion that we do not need to worry about Truth or even about the one 
Method that uncovers this Truth. The starting point is a critique of empiricism 
– or rather early empiricism as Latour calls his method a second empiricism – 
which calls into question the dogmas this philosophy presupposes. These 
findings support an examination of when something is true, which is basically 
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trivial and non-explanatory and does not serve any higher function, i.e. it is a 
quietist position.  
2.7. Davidson and the scheme-content dualism 
Davidson is a philosopher in the analytic tradition, whose philosophy is 
heavily influenced by his teacher Quine. Quine had already shown in the 
1950s and 60s that empiricism takes two dogmas as granted: a cleavage 
between analytic and synthetic statements and reductionism. (Murphy, 1990, 
pp. 79 – 93) Davidson identifies a third dogma in his seminal paper On the 
Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme: 
“I want to urge that this second dualism of scheme and content, of 
organizing system and something waiting to be organized, cannot 
be made intelligible and defensible. It is itself a dogma of 
empiricism, the third dogma.” (Davidson, 2001b, p. 189) 
In order to understand Davidson’s reasoning, it is necessary to first look at 
his usage of truth. For him, truth is a non-explanatory aspect of language; it is 
in fact very simple. The sentence ‘snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is 
white. This obviously appears rather trivial as Davidson recognizes himself: 
“We recognize sentences like ‘ “Snow is white” is true if and only if 
snow is white’ to be trivially true. Yet the totality of such English 
sentences uniquely determines the extension of the concept of 
truth for English.” (Davidson, 2001b, p. 194)  
He follows Tarski’s Convention T: 
“[A] satisfactory theory of truth for a language L must entail, for 
every sentence of L, a theorem of the form ‘s is true if and only if p’ 
where ‘s’ is replaced by a description of s and ‘p’ by s itself if L is 
English, and by a translation of s into English if L is not English.” 
(Davidson, 2001b, p. 194)   
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Bearing in mind this concept of truth allows for an analysis of why Davidson 
believes that the scheme-content dualism debate is misguided. The idea of a 
scheme has been a dominant feature of philosophy, e. g. that reality itself is 
relative to a conceptual scheme. Davidson gives the example of Kuhn and 
his paradigmatic view of scientific progress:  
“In the transition from one theory to the next words change their 
meanings or conditions of applicability in subtle ways. Though 
most of the same signs are used before and after a revolution – 
e.g. force, mass, element, compound, cell – the way in which 
some of them attach to nature has somehow changed. Successive 
theories are thus, we say, incommensurable.” (Kuhn, 1970, as 
cited in Davidson, 2001b, p. 190)  
‘Incommensurable’, Davidson explains, actually means ‘not translatable’. So, 
the challenge is to find out if it is possible for a language to be either ‘fully not 
translatable’ or only ‘partially not translatable’. The former problem Davidson 
dismisses by utilizing the Convention T: 
 “Since Convention T embodies our best intuition as to how the 
concept of truth is used, there does not seem to be much hope for 
a test that a conceptual scheme is radically different from ours if 
that test depends on the assumption that we can divorce the 
notion of truth from that of translation.” (Davidson, 2001b, p. 195)  
He goes on to discuss partial non-translatability, which “introduces the 
possibility of making changes and contrasts in conceptual schemes 
intelligible by reference to the common part. What we need is a theory of 
translation or interpretation that makes no assumptions about shared 
meanings, concepts, beliefs.” (Davidson, 2001b, p. 195) Meaning and belief 
are essential to the third dogma given that the dogma can be rephrased as 
Murphy has done: 
“It [the dogma] is the belief that we can distinguish changes in 
statements held true due to changes in meaning from those held 
true due to changes in belief. For example, before the work of 
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Benjamin Franklin, most so-called electricians held true the 
sentence ‘Electricity is a fluid.’ After the work of Franklin and his 
immediate successors, the electricians no longer held this. Was it 
because the meaning of the word ‘electricity’ had changed, or 
because beliefs about electricity had changed? According to 
Davidson, the assumption that these questions have determinate 
answers is a dogma of empiricism: Changes in the meaning of 
‘electricity’ would be changes in our conceptual scheme, whereas 
changes in beliefs about electricity would be changes in the 
empirical content that scheme served to organize.” (Murphy, 1990, 
p. 98) 
Davidson believes that his method of radical interpretation, which is based on 
Quine’s radical translator, allows us to see why it is impossible that partial 
failure of translation could happen. Quine introduced the idea of a radical 
translator to show that translation is actually impossible. The thought 
experiment goes as follows: Imagine an anthropologist who travels to an 
island inhabited by people who have absolutely no linguistic similarity with 
any other language. The anthropologist, or radical translator, will have to find 
out how the language works by living with the natives. Using the example of 
a rabbit coming out of the jungle and the native exclaiming 'Gavagai', Quine 
shows that our immediate intuition that 'gavagai' means 'rabbit' is flawed. In 
fact, there is no way to uniquely determine the meaning of gavagai. For 
Quine, the reason behind this experiment is not to show that interpretation is  
impossible but rather that the analytic-synthetic dualism does not exist.  The 
problem is how we can understand other people if we neither know their 
beliefs nor are able to interpret their speech. Meaning, which helps us 
understand speech and whose truth we cannot derive at analytically as 
Quine has shown, (Murphy, 1990, p. 79 – 93) and belief are interdependent. 
Davidson argues that we have to act charitably, that is we have to regard 
other people mostly right in their beliefs: 
“Since knowledge of beliefs comes only with the ability to interpret 
words, the only possibility at the start is to assume general 
agreement on beliefs. We get a first approximation to a finished 
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theory by assigning to sentences of a speaker conditions of truth 
that actually obtain (in our own opinion) just when the speaker 
holds those sentences true. The guiding policy is to do this as far 
as possible, subject to considerations of simplicity, hunches about 
the effects of social conditioning, and of course our common-
sense, or scientific, knowledge of explicable error.  
 The method is not designed to eliminate disagreement, nor can 
it; its purpose is to make meaningful disagreement possible, and 
this depends entirely on a foundation – some foundation – in 
agreement. The agreement may take the form of widespread 
sharing of sentences held true by speakers of ‘the same 
language’, or an agreement in the large mediated by a theory of 
truth contrived by an interpreter for speakers of another language.  
 Since charity is not an option, but a condition of having a 
workable theory, it is meaningless to suggest that we might fall 
into massive error by endorsing it. Until we have successfully 
established a systematic correlation of sentences held true with 
sentences held true, there are no mistakes to make. Charity is 
forced on us; whether we like it or not, if we want to understand 
others, we must count them right in most matters. If we can 
produce a theory that reconciles charity and the formal conditions 
for a theory, we have done all that could be done to ensure 
communication. Nothing more is possible, and nothing more is 
needed.” (Davidson, 2001b, p. 196 – 97)  
Given this methodology of interpretation, Davidson concludes that it is 
impossible to conceive of other people as having beliefs that are radically 
different from our own and therefore it is impossible for a language to be 
partially non-translatable, which was the only criterion that would have 
allowed differing schemes to exist. It also follows that the meaning of 
sentences only gets its meaning from the meaning of all other sentences in 
this language, so Davidson considers language as being holistic. As a result, 
the idea that there are different schemes – and thus conceptual relativism 
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exists – is impossible to maintain. But just because it seems impossible for 
many schemes to exist does not imply that there is just one conceptual 
scheme. “For if we cannot intelligibly say that schemes are different, neither 
can we intelligibly say that they are one”. (Davidson, 1974, p. 198)  
 At the end of the paper, Davidson shortly introduces what the results 
of a lack of scheme-content dualism are. Without something like an 
uninterpreted reality, which lies outside of schemes and science, it does not 
follow that we have to be anti-realist and give up the idea that an objective 
reality exists. Quite the contrary, Davidson argues, because buying into a 
scheme in the first place actually only provides truth relative to that scheme. 
By giving up the idea, “we do not give up the world, but re-establish 
unmediated touch with the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences 
and opinions true or false.” (Davidson, 2001b, p. 198) But to argue that 
Davidson is therefore a realist is equally untenable. For Davidson, it is 
certainly not some objective world that exists independently of our thought 
and language that make true statements true. They simply are if they follow 
Convention T. The implications of Davidson’s rejection of the scheme-content 
dualism for Latour are evident. When Latour attacks the sociologists of the 
social of using social forces or just social stuff, they are buying into the idea 
of a scheme-content divide.  
2.8. Davidson’s coherence theory of truth and knowledge 
But what does this mean for a social scientists search for knowledge? We 
know that Davidson regards truth as trivial and based in language while 
maintaining that there is an objective world out there; a world of which we 
can have justified true knowledge. But can we get any knowledge about this 
world, and if so, how can we do it? Davidson’s “A Coherence Theory of Truth 
and Knowledge”, published in 1983, might indicate a way to go forward for 
scientists, although it primarily addresses the sceptic. (Davidson, 2001a) 
Any kind of positivist philosophy generally subscribes to what are called 
‘correspondence theories’, “which claim that truth is agreement with reality; 
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that is, that truths are true in virtue of a relationship of correspondence 
(differently elaborated by different correspondence theories) they bear to 
some reality (usually said to be a fact).” (Murphy, 1990, p. 108) A coherence 
theory claims that truth is essentially a system. Davidson though believes 
that his coherence theory yields correspondence. (Davidson, 2001a, p. 137) 
The coherence theory Davidson envisions is not exactly a theory but rather a 
test of truth; “a test for judging that objective truth conditions are satisfied.” 
(Davidson, 2001a, p. 137) This test of truth is applicable to beliefs, or 
sentences held true by someone who understands them. “Beliefs… are 
states of people with intentions, desires, sense organs; they are states that 
are caused by, and cause, events inside and outside the bodies of their 
entertainer.” (Davidson, 2001a, p. 138) Of course, people are not universally 
true but a belief being true increases the larger and more significant a body 
of belief it coheres with. (Davidson, 2001a, p. 153)  
Going back to the original question about truth and knowledge, for Davidson 
this transforms into a question of coherence and belief. This is not surprising, 
given that if something is true it is in accord with Convention T. This leads to 
the following first conclusion, or rather the rephrasing of the original problem: 
 “Two interpreters, as unlike in culture, language, and point of view 
as you please, can disagree over whether an utterance is true, but 
only if they differ on how things are in the world they share, or 
what the utterance means. 
 I think we can draw two conclusions from these simple 
reflections. First, truth is correspondence with the way things are… 
So if a coherence theory of truth is acceptable, it must be 
consistent with a correspondence theory. Second, a theory of 
knowledge that allows that we can know the truth must be a 
nonrelativized, noninternal form of realism.” (Davidson, 2001a, pp. 
139 - 140) 
This view is clearly consistent with Davidson’s conclusions at the end of the 
conceptual scheme paper, where he stated that there is an objective world 
out there and that something being true depends on reality. (Davidson, 
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2001b, p. 198) Davidson continues to take on the sceptic who says that 
whatever this belief is grounded on may be wrong, e.g. sensory perception. 
How do I know that my senses do not deceive me? Davidson does not have 
an answer to the sceptic but thinks he found a way to tell the sceptic to ‘get 
lost’: 
 “I suggest we give up the idea that meaning or knowledge is 
grounded on something that counts as an ultimate source of 
evidence. No doubt, meaning and knowledge depend on 
experience, and experience ultimately on sensation. But this is the 
‘depend’ of causality, not of evidence or justification.  
…The search for an empirical foundation for meaning or 
knowledge leads to skepticism, while a coherence theory seems at 
a loss to provide any reason for a believer to believe that his 
beliefs, if coherent, are true. We are caught between a false 
answer to the skeptic, and no answer. 
The dilemma is not a true one. What is needed to answer the 
skeptic is to show that someone with a (more or less) coherent set 
of beliefs has a reason to suppose his beliefs are not mistaken in 
the main. What we have shown is that it is absurd to look for a 
justifying ground for the totality of beliefs, something outside this 
totality which we can use to test or compare with our beliefs. The 
answer to our problem must then be to find a reason for supposing 
most of our beliefs are true that is not a form of evidence.” 
(Davidson, 2001a, p. 146) 
The way Davidson argues against the sceptic is via his radical translator. As 
we have seen, language is holistic, and the radical translator walks the 
hermeneutic circle in trying to understand the native, thus continually revising 
and checking his understanding of the native. The sceptic asks us to step 
outside of our own self and look at us. He believes that such an outside view 
will show us that we can be wrong about most of our beliefs. However, 
Davidson’s radical interpreter is doing exactly this when he encounters the 
native. The native is unknown and there is no further place ‘out there’ from 
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which to look at the native. And the method of radical interpretation has 
shown, given the principle of charity, which we have to subscribe to whether 
we want to or not (Davidson, 2001b, p. 197), that we are still able to make 
sense out of the native. All of our beliefs simply cannot be wrong because if 
someone wants to be understood or even misunderstood he cannot 
systematically deceive the interpreter. Meaning and beliefs are not fixed, as 
we have seen from Quine, and need to be interpreted using the radical 
interpreters method. So the sceptic is on the wrong track to assume that all of 
our beliefs are wrong. So given that most of our beliefs are true while some 
of course may be wrong, what constitutes knowledge? Could pragmatism 
simply be nothing else than just a fancy version of relativism? 
2.9. Method without methodology = relativism? 
One of the central problems pragmatists have to battle with is the claim by its 
critics from the scientism schools that they are simply relativists; that the 
pragmatist credo is ‘anything goes’, which is particularly troublesome in the 
field of ethics. But there is a big difference between saying that there is not 
one single method which is the Method and arguing that every theory or 
result is equally correct. This way of thinking once again falls back into the 
old idea that there is one scheme that organizes the world and understanding 
how this scheme works will tell us everything we need to know about the 
world. When we engage in scientific debate, we are still arguing about 
advantages and disadvantages of two views and eventually come to a 
consensus within the community. What pragmatists emphasize is that not 
one actor within the debate can take the epistemic higher ground and argue 
that their method gives results that correspond to reality. Going back to the 
analogy of a web of beliefs and meaning as a result of the pragmatists 
concept of holism that Davidson has given us, the discourse will reweave the 
web of all parties involved in it, which is consensus. (Rorty, 1991a, pp. 63 – 
77)  
One of the results of the lack of the Method is what Nietzsche calls the loss 
of “metaphysical comfort.” (Rorty, 1982, p. 166) In the religious past, the 
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priest was considered to be the keeper of the Method, who interprets the 
world the way it is and gives us truth. In our post-religious, secular world the 
natural scientist with her talks of truth and knowledge that corresponds to 
nature, has taken over this role. Scientists appear to hold a special status in 
our secular society and are considered to be the authority on how things 
really are. (Rorty, 1991b, pp. 35 – 45) Pragmatists want to replace the 
scientist with nothing, thus prompting Nietzsche to say that we have given up 
the “metaphysical comfort” and are now left all alone out there without hope. 
Pragmatists tend to look at this development or idea as liberating. Rorty 
cheerfully argues that we have actually arrived in a world of solidarity. (Rorty, 
1982, pp. 191 – 210) All of our cultural activity, the poets as well as the 
physicists, can now be part of our social progress on the same level. Neither 
one is deemed to be the authority, which allows for debates and discussion 
freed from dogma. We can tackle our problems straight on without 
succumbing to preconceived notions that prevent us from solving problems. 
For example, in ethics getting rid of the philosophical debate between 
deontological and utilitarian advocates allows us to really focus on the ethical 
problems at hand. And we do this by continuously going back and forth 
between theory and practice. As Rorty points out with regard to Deweys 
ethics: “His central argument was that the use of new means changes ends, 
that you only know what you want after you’ve seen the results of your 
attempts to get what you once thought you wanted.” (Rorty, 1991a, p. 68) 
Although Rorty’s appeal to the solidarity among us and invocation of the 
pragmatist holism simply feels good, particularly compared to a Nietzschean 
view of mankind and cultural activity, it does pose the question of how to 
engage in scientific activity because it seems unrealistic to always analyse 
your research from a holistic point of view. This holism appears to be 
necessary when buying into Davidson’s theory of communication as 
interpretation, to which Rorty subscribes. 
Going back to Latour, it seems that he agrees with all of the rejections of 
philosophical problems like the pragmatists. His emphasis that we need to 
follow the actor is exactly what Davidson’s interpreter does when he follows 
the native around. Both engage in a task of understanding the other.  So why 
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do Rorty and Latour disagree on the epistemic status of the explanandum if 
they subscribe to the same underlying theories? Let’s have a closer look 
again at their claims. 
Latour’s book targets the scientists of the social, with their underlying 
schemes that they utilize to transform any investigation into a tautological 
exercise proving the existence of these social elements, reminiscent of 
Heidegger’s claim that “all proof is always only a subsequent undertaking on 
the basis of presuppositions” – mere tautologies. (Heidegger, 1951, p. 222) 
Latour is concerned that the explanandum is not heard and is not taken 
seriously. Rorty on the other hand is more concerned about putting the 
explanandum on the golden pedestal by granting it the power to truly say 
what is taking place. He makes the statement about the validity of the 
psychopath’s statement because his objections come from his attack on 
Method. He believes that we need to caution against giving anything the 
power to be true and objective in its absolutes, allowing their voices to carry 
the description of the nature of reality. Given the similarity between the 
scientists and the alien interpreter we can maybe shed some light on this 
issue by going through the example again. The interpreter needs to act 
charitably in order to be able to communicate and understand the native in 
the long run. Of course, the interpreter makes mistakes and does not always 
attribute the correct interpretation to the behaviour – speech-behaviour and 
observable behaviour – of the native. But he furthers his understanding by 
continuously walking a hermeneutic circle. What happens when we translate 
this understanding to the role of the scientist and the explanandum is twofold: 
first, meaning is shared between the two intersubjectively. The scientist 
engages in the hermeneutic act and accesses the metaphysical world of the 
explanandum. They create a shared understanding of the meaning of 
language which allows for understanding to take place. However, this 
understanding is between the two and does not equate with an 
understanding between the explanandum, the world (reality), and the 
scientist. Neither has unmediated access to it, i.e. reality, which is what Rorty 
holds. But it is also the case that it is impossible to enter the world of the 
explanandum without any intersubjective agreements on meaning – the 
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principle of charity is not an option but a necessity. The supposed divide 
between Rorty and Latour is just another unwarranted dualism. The 
explanandum does not have a better access to nature than the scientists, 
however, in order to understand him it is necessary to talk to him. Once this 
has been achieved it is still the scientists who do things with this 
understanding. Latour never advocates simply publishing the transcripts of 
the interviews. He still engages in writing an account, which is the source of 
the fifth uncertainty.  
2.10. Fifth uncertainty: Writing down risky accounts 
One of the major problems with ANT as proposed by Latour is its 
applicability. How does one go about writing science if there are so many 
possible mediators who all have to be taken into account? When does one 
have enough information about the topic of interest? Latour believes the 
answer lies in the product of our work itself: the textual account. So what 
makes an account a good or bad one? Some sociologists claim that the 
value of an account depends on its objectivity, where the idea of being 
objective is derived from the natural sciences. Latour, as may be guessed by 
now, rejects the claim that mimicking the natural sciences will lead to more 
objectivity. With shifting from matters of fact to matters of concern, objectivity 
gets a new meaning. Similarly, Latour also argues against those scholars 
who contend that all they write are narratives without any aspirations to truth 
and accuracy because their accounts are artificially created. However, even if 
something is constructed it can still be accurate, interesting, justified, and 
objective. After all, natural scientists always engage in conducting 
experiments that are valued for their sophistication and their ability to 
construct data – and those results are always regarded as objective. The 
experiment of sociologists of associations asks the following: “Can the 
materiality of a report on paper, a story, or rather a fiction – there is no need 
to abstain from a word that is so close to the fabrication of facts – extend the 
exploration of the social connections a little bit further?” (Latour, 2005, p. 
128)  
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So what is a good text? According to Latour it  
“traces a network… A good ANT account is a narrative or a 
description or a proposition where all the actors do something and 
don't just sit there. Instead of simply transporting the effects 
without transforming them, each of the points in the text may 
become a bifurcation, and event, or the origin of a new 
translation.” (Latour, 2005, p. 128)  
This is exactly opposite to standard social theory where the quality of the 
account depends on how few global causes generate many effects. The best 
way to achieve a good ANT account is to follow the actors and describe 
them, deploy them as networks of mediations. However, what about 
explanations? Latour argues that “if a description remains in need of an 
explanation, it means that it is a bad description.” (Latour, 2005, p. 137) If the 
network is sufficiently traced, there should be no reason to ask for any further 
explanation. A result of this method is that any study will be localized and 
restricted and not engage in any meta-narratives or universal explanations. 
This may not appeal to the ego of social scientists who want to revolutionize 
the way we think and understand the world. But to anyone who has ever 
visited or worked in a laboratory it is clear that the success of the natural 
sciences depends on little steps. It may take an entire lifetime to determine 
the shape and folding of a specific protein and despite these restrictions we 
still marvel at the successes of the natural science. Why should it be different 
and why should we try to be different in the social sciences? What is 
important is that our accounts are relevant. 
“Relevance, like everything else, is an achievement. A report is 
interesting or not depending on the amounts of work done to 
interest, that is, to place it between other things. This is exactly 
what the five uncertainties added together might help to reveal: 
What is the social made up of? What is acting when we are 
acting? What sort of grouping do we pertain to? What do we want? 
What sort of world are we ready to share? All those questions are 
not only by scholars, but also by those they study. It is not that we, 
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social scientists, know the answer that would reside behind the 
actors, nor is it the case that they, the famous 'actors themselves', 
know the answer. The fact is that no one has the answers – this is 
why they have to be collectively staged, stabilized, and revised. 
This is why the social sciences are so indispensable to the 
reassembling of the social. Without them we don't know what we 
have in common, we don't know through which connections we 
are associated together, and we would have no way to detect how 
we can live in the same world.” (Latour, 2005, p. 138) 
2.11. Conclusion 
While it may appear slightly out of place to have a conclusion at the end of a 
methodology section, this quite non-traditional one may indeed need some 
concluding remarks. The main goal of this chapter was to introduce the 
ontological and epistemological positions of neopragmatism. This position is 
a defence rather than a prescription. It is a defence against the limitations 
imposed by other philosophies of science. It tries to open up the process 
rather than try to impose limits or, in Latour's words, 'frames'. But this 
opening up comes at the cost of not providing any guidelines, which is what a 
methodology section is supposed to do. One way out of this lack of guidance 
was to show that Latour's ANT aligns itself, albeit not perfectly, with a 
neopragmatist philosophy. Yet, this alliance does not exhaust the freedom 
provided by neopragmatism. As discussed above, ANT is just one theory that 
fits under the umbrella of neopragmatism but this does not imply that it is the 
only theory or approach that works with it. As will be shown in the second 
part of the thesis, walking the ANT will eventually come to an end and 
someone else will take over from there. So will neopragmatism every provide 
anything of its own? No, it should not, at least not as an ontological and 
epistemological position. However, there are theories and points made under 
the label of neopragmatism that extend beyond these philosophy of science 
reflections that will appear towards the end of the thesis. 
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Chapter 3: Dual-Use Actors I: The Security/Political Community 
3.1. Introduction 
“In the beginning was the word.” While this inquiry may not be concerned 
with the same existential problems that Faust encounters in his 
understanding of the “word”, I will humbly take advice from his thought and 
start this empirical exploration with a review of the prime word of this thesis: 
‘dual-use’. The origins of the use of ‘dual-use’ have been described by 
Selgelid (2009), which I will shortly summarize first. Afterwards, in a 
methodological fashion true to ANT, I will follow the steps how dual-use 
involved a variety of actors and how associations and mediators got formed. 
During this process, a variety of tools are introduced that show how ANT can 
be used in actual research and not just be a methodological concern without 
any practical applications.  
3.2. Where does ‘dual-use’ come from? 
The phrase dual-use technology originally encompassed technology that had 
both civilian and military use. It was a non-normative, value-free term and 
could potentially be viewed favourably by those advocating further military 
technology as it created spin-offs for the civilian world as well. (Selgelid, 
2009) As such, dual-use technologies were rather beneficial for the military, 
particularly after the cold war when it was less easy to convince politicians for 
the need for military research. A 1997 paper by Molas-Gallert identified 
several policies for dual-use technology transfer and discusses the benefits 
of each. (Molas-Gallert, 1997) The meaning of dual-use changed significantly 
after the terrorist attacks on the 11th of September, 2001, and the subsequent 
anthrax letter. Dual-use suddenly became a normatively loaded word, which 
was first used in this manner in the National Research Council (NRC) report 
‘Biotechnology research in an age of terrorism’, also known as the Fink 
Report, published in 2004. (NRC, 2004) In the report, dual-use technology in 
the life sciences becomes subject to a dual-use dilemma. The dilemma, 
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according to the report, is that any advances in the life sciences could easily 
be misused for the development of biological weapons by malign actors. 
(NRC, 2004, p. 19) Selgelid further clarifies the problem and argues that 
there are three potential definitions of dual-use science and technology: 
 “1) that which has both civilian and military application, 
2)  that which can be used for both beneficial/good and harmful/bad 
purposes, and 
3) that which has both beneficial/good and harmful/bad purposes – 
where the harmful/bad purposes involve weapons, and usually 
weapons of mass destruction in particular.” (Selgelid, 2009, p. 176) 
According to Selgelid, the debate about dual-use invokes the third definition 
because it implies grave harm and is implicitly used in the international 
community. Of course, these concerns are not entirely new because 
physicists working on nuclear power had to think about the use of their 
research for military purposes, which proved justified when the first nuclear 
weapons were used on Japan. And even among life scientists, there have 
been concerns in the past about the impacts of their research. The Asilomar 
Conference on Recombinant DNA, held from the 24th to 26th of February 
1975, was initiated because “scientists were concerned that unfettered 
pursuit of this research [DNA research] might engender unforeseen and 
damaging consequences for human health and the earth’s ecosystems.” 
(Berg and Singer, 1995)  
Already during the conference, when DNA research was in its infancy, issues 
of dual-use had been discussed. For example, “there were speculations that 
normally innocuous microbes could be changed into human pathogens by 
introducing genes that rendered them resistant to then-available antibiotics, 
or enabled them to produce dangerous toxins, or transformed them into 
cancer causing agents.” (Berg and Singer, 1995) Eventually, a set of 
guidelines was introduced, which are the National Institute of Health (NIH) 
Guidelines for Research Involving rDNA Molecules, which are still in modified 
form in effect. (NIH, 2013) So why were dual-use dilemmas given such a 
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prominent status and deserved so much attention in 2003? The Fink report 
indeed pays attention to the work done at the Asilomar Conference. In its 
section on previous challenges, the Fink report also mentions that the Human 
Genome Research created important ethical challenges as well. One of the 
reasons why the dual-use dilemma had been forgotten, according to the Fink 
Report, is that the NIH Guidelines, which originally addressed dual-use 
dilemmas, were changed several times because despite an increase in the 
number of researchers using rDNA techniques no misuse of the technology 
had been reported, and because of a hope that less strict policies would 
speed up the process of understanding diseases. Eventually, the only 
guidelines that were left dealt with research on molecular manipulation of 
human and restricted plant and animal pathogens. (NRC, 2004, p. 30) The 
Commission therefore had to revisit the life sciences completely anew. 
Given these varied understandings of dual-use, a short note is required on 
this thesis' use of the label dual-use, which will also be referred to as either 
the dual-use problem or the dual-use issue. When the thesis mentions dual-
use from the perspective of the security community, it will always mean 
knowledge and technology within the biosciences that could be misused by 
malign actors, i.e. bioterrorists. This does not include military applications. If 
dual-use is not linked with the security community, i.e. the authors own view 
of dual-use, it will include military use as well. In some cases this distinction 
will make a difference but in understanding the problem itself it won't make 
one. 
3.3. The Fink Committee: origins and events 
But why was the committee charged with its task in 2002 and not earlier? In 
other words, what agencies and events had taken place for this issue to 
become an issue at that moment? The point here is not to try to find a 
teleological explanation of the sort ‘if x then y’ but rather to identify actors that 
will allows us to establish the actor network to understand who comprises this 
security community that sees it as its task to ensure national, international, or 
human security from biological agents. The Fink Committee itself provides an 
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explanation for its existence in its introduction. The argument goes as 
follows: 
In 1972, the BWC entered in force and it prohibited States from development, 
production, and stockpiling of any form of biological weapon. While the US 
complied with the Convention, the Soviet Union aggressively pursued further 
research, for example at its Biopreparat facility.   According to Dr. Ken Alibek, 
the first deputy director of the programme who defected to the US in 1992, 
the facilities employed about 60,000 staff in its heyday and produced a 
variety of highly dangerous weapons, for example vaccine resistant anthrax, 
genetically modified smallpox, including a smallpox-Venezuelan equine 
encephalitis chimera as well as an Ebola-smallpox chimera. (Tucker, 1999; 
Preston, 1998) Against the background of these revelations, US security 
analysts became increasingly concerned that ‘rogue states’ might pursue BW 
research as well. In 1993, the Office for Technology Assessment (OTA) 
produced a study that compared the destructive ability of nuclear, chemical, 
and biological weapons and found that while chemical weapons are not as 
dangerous as a nuclear bomb, biological weapons are capable of killing and 
injuring as many people as a nuclear weapon does. (OTA, 1993) In May 
2000, Matthew Meselson, a renowned molecular biologist, warned against 
the potential misuse of biotechnology. (Meselson, 2000) In June 2001, an 
exercise called ‘Dark Winter’ was held, which simulated a smallpox attack 
infecting a total of 3000 people in three US cities. The analysis of the 
reactions of high-level US politicians and civil servants led to the conclusions 
that policy makers were ill-equipped to deal with this sort of terrorist attack. 
(O’Toole et al., 2002) Of course, a few months later the concerns about the 
use of a biological weapon by terrorists proved true in the aftermath of 9/11 
with the sending of the anthrax letters through the US postal service, which 
not only resulted in several deaths but also cost 320 million US$ to clean up. 
(Schmitt and Zacchia, 2012)  
Besides these national considerations and events, there had been important 
developments with regard to the BWC, particularly the period before the Fifth 
Review Conference in 2001. One of the main impediments to a strong BWC 
had always been the lack of a regime to observe if countries actually comply 
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with the convention. In the period leading up to the 2001 Convention, a 
strong push for a verification instrument had been made, specifically in the 
form of the ‘composite text’ proposed by the Chair Tibor Tóth, which had 
been the result of the meetings of the Ad-Hoc Group (AHG), which had been 
tasked with creating a protocol for verification. The US rejected the text and 
also refused to continue the negotiations completely because it did not 
perceive a verification instrument to be successful in ensuring the goals of 
the BWC. (Rissanen, 2002) While there had been hopes that the Fifth 
Review Conference could ameliorate the situation, several developments 
between the end of the AHG meetings and the Review Conference actually 
worsened the political climate. First, a series of US defence experiment had 
been made public, which some countries considered to be in violation of the 
BWC. The US defended the experiments saying that they were only used to 
find out how to defend against a biological weapons attack. (Miller et al., 
2001) Second, the anthrax attacks subsequent to the 9/11 attacks, raised 
hopes that the US would be more inclined to work towards an international 
verification protocol. However, then President Bush announced in November 
2001 that the US will pursue seven alternative methods to decrease the 
likelihood of BW use. These strategies ranged from some issues that were 
mentioned in the Protocol text such as investigations of treaty violations but 
also included other initiatives such as codes of conduct for scientists. Many 
commentators felt that these measures did not add up to what the proposed 
Protocol had offered. (Rissanen, 2002)  
After the failed AHG meetings, the climate at the Review Conference in 
November 2001 was already far from ideal but it got even worse when the 
US Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton 
explicitly accused four State Parties – Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Libya – as 
well as Sudan and Syria of pursuing BW research. He also argued that the 
US would never accept such a flawed text like the draft protocol. The 
disagreement of the US with the result of the work of the AHH became even 
more evident when the US delegation tabled new language on the AHG two 
hours before the end of the Conference. The US agreed to hold annual 
meetings to allow establishing expert groups if the AHG got terminated in 
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return. In order to be able to deal with the chaos resulting after this proposal, 
the Chair adjourned the Conference until November 2002. 
Within this array of national and international events, the ‘Committee on 
Research Standards and Practices to Prevent the Destructive Application of 
Biotechnology’, the full title of the Fink Committee, worked between April 
2002 and January 2003 to produce the Fink Report. (NRC, 2004) The 
committee itself comprised of a mix of academics from the natural sciences, 
security studies, and law. Its aims were threefold:  
1. “Review the current rules, regulations, and institutional 
arrangements and processes in the United States that provide 
oversight of research on pathogens and potentially dangerous 
biotechnology research, within government laboratories, 
universities and other research institutions, and industry. 
2. Assess the adequacy of current U.S. rules, regulations, and 
institutional arrangements and processes to prevent the 
destructive application of biotechnology research. 
3. Recommend changes in these practices that could improve U.S. 
capacity to prevent the destructive application of biotechnology 
research while still enabling legitimate research to be 
conducted.” (NRC, 2004, p. 2)  
 
While a review of the first and second topics may be useful for assessing and 
understanding the issue of how to prevent and deal with bioterrorism, the 
purpose of this chapter is to identify the actors that have been mobilised in 
this larger endeavour of regulating the biological sciences - or if not 
regulating at least reducing their potential harmful effects. Therefore it may 
be more useful to look at the recommendation of the reports and how they 
assumed this field could be brought forward. Specifically, to use an ANT 
term, their interdefinition of actors. (Callon, 1986) Interdefinition means how 
the committee has defined other actors and how they consider these new 
actors to be necessarily concerned by the report, or rather by the problem 
described in the report. It is the first step in the process of ‘problematization’, 
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which in itself is the first ‘moment of translation’. So which actors does the 
committee bring into the story and how are they defined?  
a) Terrorists: The most elusive group are the terrorists, which 
presumably are interested in pursuing developing or deploying a 
biological weapon of sort. They remain voice- and faceless and do not 
ever enter as actual entities. They are spectres in the background, 
whose motivations are unknown and even their existence unconfirmed. 
They are also presumably not interested in the fruitful work of the 
committee.    
b) Knowledge and technology: The source of danger. Both can be used 
by the terrorists, or other malign actors, to cause havoc and threaten 
national and human security.   
c) Scientific colleagues: Members of the life science community. They 
are the producers of knowledge and technology. They are considered to 
be interested in this topic given that the impact of their work is being 
discussed and evaluated.   
d) Policymakers: The Fink Committee did not assemble on its own but 
rather this group of people is interested in findings solutions to minimize 
the danger of knowledge and technology via the terrorists. Presumably, 
they hope to get recommendations from the committee that are 
tangible, i.e. that they can set up a new agency or make a new law 
regulating behaviour.  
e) A last group is the Fink committee itself, who see it as their task of 
reducing the potential misuse of biological science and technology by 
malign actors. In their effort to pursue this question, they hope to make 
recommendations to the policy makers and also assist scientists in 
reducing the potential negative impact of their research.  
The central element that links all the actors in the committees view is the 
question of how one can prevent scientific misuse. Finding an answer to this 
question should help all the actors, with the exception of the terrorists of 
course. Answering this question is the ‘Obligatory Passage Point’ (OPP). 
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(Callon, 1986) However, while on paper this definition of all the actors 
appears rational, subsequent developments have shown that the actors do 
not subscribe to their definition and particularly not to the prescription to 
alleviate the problem. Reality did not conform to the way the Fink committee 
had thought it did. This difference between expectation and observation is a 
prime example of Latour’s analysis of the mistake of sociologists of the 
social, who from an elevated position know what their actors do and think – 
of course, in this case the sociologists of the social are the Fink committee 
members. (Latour, 2005, chapter 2) However, before action and thus dissent 
can take place, there are more steps that take place beforehand. According 
to Callon, after the first moment of translation – problematization – during 
which actors were defined, and a network created that centered around the 
Fink Committee, the next moment is “‘interessement’ or how the allies are 
locked into place.” (Callon, 1986) “Interessement is the group of actions by 
which an entity… attempts to impose and stabilize the identity of other actors 
it defines through its problematization.” (Callon, 1986) Again going back to 
Latour’s observation, actors are never stable but constant work is needed to 
maintain any group identity. (Latour, 2005) Any group A is constantly 
exposed to pulls by other entities B, C or D that want to link themselves to A 
and thereby define what A is. What B, C or D employ to consolidate or 
redefine properties or the identity of A happens during the process of 
interessement, which can take any form of domination or persuasion. Let’s 
have a look at what interessement devices have been deployed by the Fink 
Committee.  
With respect to the life sciences community, the interessement takes a two-
step approach. First, the report mentions the great success of the community 
in producing “advances in agriculture and industrial processes” and how they 
have “revolutionized the practice of medicine.” (NRC, 2004, p. 15) In fact, 
these are the opening lines in the introduction of the report. These attributes 
of the life sciences are further stressed in the second section of the 
introduction, which discusses the state of and, once again, the achievements 
of the life sciences at the writing of the report, i.e. 2002. Thus, one 
interessement device is the repeated view that science, and thus scientists, 
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produces beneficial goods to society and does not intend to produce harm. 
But the report also cites the use and research of biological weapons. 
However, these research programmes are not associated with scientists, i.e. 
that scientists produce biological weapons, but rather it was specific 
programmes by countries that are potentially harmful to human beings and 
society. For example, the report cites the US and UK concerns about Iraq’s 
biological weapons projects, or that the former Soviet Union had a large 
biological weapons research facility. By citing the positive aspects of 
research in forms of medicine the connection of ‘scientist/science’ and 
‘beneficial’ is already made. If science is misused it is countries that do so but 
not scientists. Once this connection is made the report can drag the scientist 
further towards it by highlighting that scientific devices will be soon available 
to everyone and that therefore the scientists, aka the good people who are 
beneficial to society, are needed to prevent tainting their subject with 
unethical behaviour, i.e. making bioweapons.   
A second device is the reference to past ethical behaviour in the form of the 
Asilomar Conferences on Recombinant DNA techniques, where the scientists 
using these new tools stopped their research in order to discuss behavioural 
codes and guidelines that regulate the use of these techniques. Thus, past 
success in dealing with ethical issues is a further inducement to show 
scientists that they are useful and needed in this discussion on reducing the 
malign potential of scientific research. 
The political community, the policymakers, are enrolled because it has in the 
past been their behaviour in allowing or even promoting biological weapons 
programmes. Therefore they need to be the ones to help in reducing the 
likelihood that biological weapons are developed. They are also the ones 
who are instrumental in achieving international consensus and developing 
international guidelines, as they have done with regard to biological weapons 
research in the BWC.  
Terrorist are also needed in the story because without any credible threat 
that these people could be interested in misusing science to develop 
bioweapons, the whole issue becomes a no-issue. Thus while not actually 
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being present, the past actions of terrorist groups utilizing bioweapons are 
mentioned, alongside the past use of bioweapons by states. While actual use 
of biological weapons by terrorist groups are very few (Wheelis and 
Sugishima, 2006), the issue becomes bigger by aligning them with states, 
which have used these weapons much more extensively. (Wheelis et al., 
2006) This link thus presents terrorists as much more threatening as they 
might be on their own, i.e. without examples of state use.  
Science and technology are generally portrayed as positive by the report, 
which is the same as how scientists are portrayed. These two are practically 
interchangeable. However, in the discussion of ‘contentious research’ (NRC, 
2004, p. 24) science and technology acquires that unfortunate trait that it 
does have a worrisome side, i.e. that it can indeed be misused. This trait 
couples then with the terrorists and the abundance of biological research 
devices worldwide to picture a world in peril over bioweapons.    
But no matter how ingenious the interessement techniques and devices, 
success is never assured. Enrolment, the fourth moment of translation, 
describes the actual formation of alliances. Callon argues that the best way 
to understand enrolment is to transform a question into a series of 
statements, e.g. in this case: Scientists want to reduce the likelihood of 
misuse of their research; policymakers want to regulate science and 
technology. The description of enrolment, according to Callon, is “to describe 
the group of multilateral negotiations, trials of strength and tricks that 
accompany the interessements and enable them to succeed.” (Callon, p. 10) 
After enrolment has been achieved, the last movement is to ask the question 
if the spokesmen that have been enrolled as allies are representative for their 
constituents. It is at these two stages that our current story becomes 
muddled and complicated.  
The major issue is that the Fink committee itself is already an alliance of 
actors. The innocent list of who the people within the committee are becomes 
noteworthy now. As said, the committee consisted of a variety of people with 
various, mainly academic, backgrounds. The process that led to the eventual 
publication of the report consisted of six meetings between April 1, 2002, and 
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January 29, 2003, during which “representatives from the National Institutes 
of Health, the Executive Office of the President, governmental and non-
governmental technical and policy experts, and educators and private 
consultants briefed the Committee.” (NRC, 2004, p. viii) We have to 
understand the report therefore already as an outcome of negotiations. This 
does not imply that the analyses of the report via the first two moments of 
translation – problematization and enrolment – are flawed. However, a 
discussion of enrolment is limited as we have only the results of the 
negotiation. The last issue about the representative nature of the allies can 
still be tackled though. However, it may be more suitable to link it to the last 
analysis that Callon identifies as necessary, which is the problem of 
‘dissidence’.  
One way to find out if someone is a good representative is to see if their 
opinions or solutions to a problem are shared by members of the group that 
she belongs to. Presumably, if the recommendations are turned into actions 
then the allies were useful. If one encounters heavy resistance, then the 
‘wrong’ people were enrolled. In this case, we should look at how people in 
the sciences as well as policymakers and even the executive branch have 
reacted to the recommendation. What we have to keep in mind though is the 
fact that the Fink Committee has not been the only actor working on the issue 
of regulation of science, or prevention of malign use of scientific research and 
technology. The Fink report may have been among the first to use dual-use 
in its new, normative, fashion. But other actors had been interested in the 
problem of science and technology oversight and regulation after the Anthrax 
letters and after the failed Fifth Review Conference of the BWC as well. 
Therefore the reaction to the issues and also to the recommendation could 
also be clouded by the interessement devices deployed by other actors in the 
field. So what did the Fink Committee actually recommend?  
The committee based its recommendation on the conclusion that they drew 
based on the analysis of the then current state of regulation of science and 
technology. There were two major findings.  
First,  
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“existing domestic and international guidelines and regulations for 
the conduct of basic or applied genetic engineering research may 
ensure the physical safety of laboratory workers and the 
surrounding environment from contact with, or exposure to, 
pathogenic agents or “novel” organisms.” (NRC, 2004, p. 107)  
Second, these guidelines and regulations  
“do not currently address the potential for misuse of the tools, 
technology, or knowledge base of this research enterprise for 
offensive military or terrorist purposes. In addition, no national or 
international review body currently has the legal authority or self-
governance responsibility to evaluate a proposed research activity 
prior to its conduct to determine whether the risks associated with 
the proposed research, and its potential for misuse, outweigh its 
potential benefits.” (NRC, 2004, p. 107) 
The committee’s way to address this problem is to engage the life scientists 
in a dialogue to raise awareness to the dual-use issue. The way to open 
these channels or communication is to develop a system for communication 
as well as oversight. The central idea is that this system involves a number of 
stages at several levels of research that would review research and consider 
its potential dual-use implications. The system would rely mainly on self-
governance by the scientific community. In order to assist the scientists a set 
of guidelines should be set up to help identify potential experiments of 
concern.  
The first recommendation by the committee was to educate the scientific 
community. The education should be carried out by international and national 
organizations and institutions. This education should encompass both to give 
scientists the tools to identify potential research of concern but also to teach 
them of the responsibility that they have with regard to the impact of their 
work. Professional organizations could help to develop this culture of 
responsibility by holding seminar series or incorporating this education in 
their already existing meetings. In addition, both industry and higher 
education could also assist in this teaching. While knowledge of the risks is 
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one aspect, the committee also came to the conclusion that simple 
awareness is not enough. In their view, scientists have a “moral duty to avoid 
contributing to the advancement of biowarfare and bioterrorism.” (NRC, 2004, 
p. 112) The scientists are also expected to pass on this moral duty to the 
next generation. Finally, scientists should also “be willing to assist efforts to 
integrate the advancement of knowledge with the protection of national 
security by volunteering their time to sit on relevant peer review committees 
and national bodies.” (NRC, 2004, p. 112)  
The second recommendation of the report entails extending already available 
oversight mechanisms, such as those in existence on recombinant DNA 
experiments, to cover seven classes of experiments that involve microbial 
agents that the committee had determined to raise concerns about their 
potential for misuse.  
The third recommendation again pertained to the duties of the scientists. At 
the review stage for publication, papers should be checked for their potential 
security risks. The committee considers this mechanism only to be a last 
resort tool because by the time that a paper reaches publication, details 
about the experiments are generally already available. The earlier an 
experiment of concern is identified the better it is. However, this last step may 
still prevent the widest dissemination.  
The fourth recommendation was to establish a National Scientific Advisory 
Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), whose task it will be to provide advice, 
guidance, and leadership for the proposed systems of review and overview. 
The board would work together with both the scientific community as well as 
the government and serve as a tool to foster and encourage dialogue 
between these two groups. Its members would be drawn from both the 
scientific community and national security experts.  
Recommendation five asked the government to rely on the implementation of 
their legislation and regulations in order to provide protection of biological 
weapons and supervision of personnel working with these agents.  
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Recommendation six asks for scientists and the security and law 
enforcement communities to open channels for dialogue to discuss how to 
mitigate the risk of bioterrorism. Specifically, how the scientific community 
can assist in biodefense research and to share their expertise and 
information about the future of possible bioweapon threats.  
 The final recommendation involves the creation of an international forum on 
biosecurity to develop and harmonize national, regional, and international 
legislation to develop counterparts to the system proposed for the US.  
The Fink committee was a singular entity that only served the purpose to 
analyse the current situation and propose ways to go forward. As such, its 
identity was from the beginning temporary. Keeping this in mind, one of the 
striking aspects of the recommendations, number four, is to establish a 
permanent body to discuss the issues that the Fink committee has worked 
on. Besides the creation of this new body the recommendations mainly target 
the scientific community who are charged with enlarging their education to 
include the ethics of dual-use (recommendation one), to modify their current 
way of publishing (recommendation three), and to create communication 
channels with security and law enforcement community (recommendation 
six). The extension of oversight committees (recommendation two) as well as 
the creation of an international forum (recommendation seven) both falls 
within the domain of the government. Working as an ANT, following these 
links should allow us to identify additional actors that make up our web. The 
recommendation of the Fink Committee are reflected in the so called web of 
prevention, a terms first used in an International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) publication in 2003. (ICRC, 2003) The ICRC envisaged that a web of 
prevention “should serve to prevent advances in the biotechnology being 
used for poisoning or the deliberative spread of disease.” (ICRC, 2003, p. 6) 
The web should draw in several different types of actors, which is similar to 
the Fink’s committee analysis. 
“Those in a position to help prevent biotechnology from being used for hostile 
purposes too often focus on only one aspect of the solution, such as the 
Biological Weapons Convention, bio-safety rules, disease surveillance or 
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countering ‘bio-terrorism’. Seldom is the synergy of action achieved between 
the different entities concerned.” (ICRC, 2003, p. 6)  
In the next part, I will look at the elements within this web of prevention and 
how actors pushing for the web are attempting to create alliances.  
3.4. The web of prevention 
As already mentioned the ICRC was the first actor to use the phrase ‘web of 
prevention’ in 2003. (ICRC, 2003) However, the phrase quickly took hold and 
was used in further publications and debates, as well as being the title of a 
book on biological weapons, the life sciences and the governance of 
research, edited by Brian Rappert and Caitriona McLeish. (Rappert and 
McLeish, 2007) One of the central pillars within this web of prevention is the 
responsibility of scientists to pay attention to potential dual-use misuses of 
their research. In order to achieve this behavioural change within the 
scientific community, dual-use education of scientists as well as the 
development of codes of conduct were promoted as catalysts. The following 
section will identify some of the key players within this community of actors. 
(as well as follow the linkages their strategies are trying to create, i.e. their 
interessement devices)  
Following the recommendation by the Fink Committee, a National Scientific 
Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) was established in 2004. According 
to its renewed charter from 2012, the board is charged with the following 
tasks: 
 “Recommend strategies and guidance for enhancing personnel 
reliability among individuals with access to biological select 
agents and toxins.  
 Provide recommendations on the development of programs for 
outreach, education and training in dual use research issues for 
scientists, laboratory workers, students, and trainees in relevant 
disciplines.  
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 Advise on policies governing publication, public communication, 
and dissemination of dual use research methodologies and 
results.  
 Recommend strategies for fostering international engagement on 
dual use biological research issues.  
 Advise on the development, utilization and promotion of codes of 
conduct to interdisciplinary life scientists, and relevant 
professional groups.  
 Advise on policies regarding the conduct, communication, and 
oversight of dual use research and research results, as 
requested.  
 Advise on the Federal Select Agent Program, as requested.  
 Address any other issues as directed by the Secretary of HHS.” 
(NSABB, 2012) 
In order to achieve these tasks the board is supposed to meet twice a year 
and for additional meeting if requested by the director of the board or the 
designated federal officer. It is important to note that the board does not have 
any power in terms of making policies; it is exclusively a recommending and 
advising entity. The duties outlines above are congruent with what the Fink 
report had already recommended. It contains elements of education of 
scientists as well as supervision of research, albeit without any power to 
actually stop publications. A look at the list of reports that have been written 
by the NSABB as of September 2013 indicates where the focus lies. 
(NSABB, 2013) Table 1 lists all the titles of the reports.  
Title Publication date 
1. Addressing biosecurity concerns related to the Synthesis 
of Select Agents 
2. Proposed Framework for the Oversight of Dual Use Life 
Sciences Research: Strategies for Minimizing the Potential 
Misuse of Research Information (The ‘Responsible 
Communication of Life Sciences Research with Dual Use 
Potential’ report is just an excerpt from this larger report) 
3. Strategic Plan for Outreach and Education on Dual Use 
December 2006 
 
June 2007 
 
 
 
 
December 2008 
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Research Issues 
4. Enhancing Personnel Reliability Among Individuals with 
Access to Select Agents 
5. Addressing Biosecurity Concerns Related to Synthetic 
Biology 
6. Strategies to Educate Amateur Biologists and Scientists 
in Non-life Science Disciplines About Dual Use Research in 
the Life Sciences  
7. Guidance for Enhancing Personnel Reliability and 
Strengthening the Culture of Responsibility  
8. Enhancing Responsible Science Consideration for the 
Development and Dissemination of Codes of Conduct for 
Dual Use Research 
 
May 2009 
 
April 2010 
 
June 2011 
 
 
September 
2011 
 
February 2012 
Table 1. Titles and publication dates of reports of the NSABB until September 
2013. (NSABB, 2013) 
 
Out of these eight reports seven specifically address the work and behaviour 
of scientists. Report number two on the development of a framework for 
oversights targets policymakers rather than scientists. The seven reports can 
be further classified in their approach. Number one and five target specific 
areas of research and identify work that can be misused. Both reports are 
therefore rather technical. The central theme in the remaining five is 
education. Three and six directly use the phrase education while four, seven, 
and eight stress ‘enhancing’ either ‘reliability’ or ‘consideration’. But they all 
hint at a lack of deliberation about their work within the current practice of 
science. So who else has been involved in this debate about the education of 
scientists and what activities, if any, have taken place? 
The Fink committee convened in 2002, its report was published in 2004, the 
first NSABB meeting, which was also open to the public, took place in July 
2005, with its first report published in 2006. Between these dates, a variety of 
actors engaged with the topic of education of scientists and developing codes 
of conduct.   
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Already in November 2002, the BWC started to engage with the topic of a 
code of conduct for scientists when its then president Tibor Tóth argued for a 
series of meetings of experts and State Parties for the following years in the 
run up to the Sixth Review Conference in 2006. The discussion of the 
development of a code of conduct for scientists had been included as one of 
five items on the list for the intersessional process that the State Parties had 
agreed to in their final declaration of the Fifth Review Conference. After the 
disaster of that Conference, a less contentious topic such as education and 
codes of conduct for scientists may have been chosen in order to smooth 
over things from the Review Conference. Dual-use was only one among a 
variety of possible ways forward that a UK briefing paper to the BWC 
identified. (UK, 2002) As a result, once in each of the next three years, both 
at the meeting of the States Parties as well as at the Meeting of Experts, 
codes of conduct for scientists were discussed. But what exactly is a meeting 
of experts? Or rather, who are experts? And to be even more specific, who 
were the experts discussing the education and development of codes of 
conduct for scientists? 
Table 2 gives an overview of all attendants at the first Meeting of Experts that 
took place from 18 – 29 of August, 2003. (BWC, 2003a) The largest number 
of participants is the States Parties. In addition to the States Parties, 
International organizations, primarily UN organizations, also participate and 
are the second largest group. The last group are a few non-governmental 
organizations, mostly from academia.  
Type of participants Numbers 
States Parties 83 
Signatory States that did not ratify it yet 2 
Observer States 1 
UN Department/Committee/ Programme 4 
International Organization 9 
NGOs and Research Institutes 15 
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Table 2. Distribution of actors at the Geneva Meeting of Experts, 18 – 29 
August 2003. 
While table 2 only gives an overall picture of the participants but given that 
the topic of interest is science education and scientist’s work ethics, it might 
be useful to see who the people were that comprised the States Parties, the 
IO delegations and the group of NGO’s. Given that 83 States Parties 
attended, it is unfeasible to list all the members of their delegation. Table 3 
thus only lists the delegated from the UK group. (BWC, 2003b) Table 4 
shows the results of the same method applied to various other countries. 
While the combination of these countries does not exclude the possibility that 
other countries include a large number of delegates with a science 
background, the countries chosen represent a good regional balance and 
include States Parties that have historically been very active in the BWC and 
have a relatively large number of delegates.   
Name  Position 
H.E. Mr David Broucher Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the 
Conference on Disarmament 
Mr. Michael Clark Permanent Representation to the Convention 
Mrs. Elizabeth March Permanent Representation to the Convention 
Mr. Nicholas Joseph Permanent Representation to the Convention 
Dr. John Walker Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit, 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 
Mr. Louis Taylor Counter-Proliferation Department, FCO 
Mr. Andrew Holbrook Counter-Proliferation Department, FCO 
Ms. Helen Upton Legal Advisor, FCO 
Dr. Lorna Miller Defence Science and Technology Laboratory 
Dr. David Coates Defence Science and Technology Laboratory 
Mr. Rob Hunt Ministry of Defence 
Mr. Chris Goostrey Ministry of Defence 
Mr. Martin Rudduck Department for Trade and Industry 
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Mr. Ian Grimley Department for Trade and Industry 
Mr. Richard Binder Home Office 
Mr. Brian Howat Home Office 
Dr. Stephen Kinghorn-
Perry 
Health and Safety Executive 
Mr. David Elbourne  Department of Transport 
Dr. Tony Phillips Health Protection Agency 
Table 3. Members and positions of the UK delegation at the Geneva Meeting 
of Experts, 18 – 29 August 2003.  
Country Type/background of delegate 
Political Military Science 
Background 
Science 
Practitioner 
Other 
Australia 4  1   
Brazil 5 2    
Canada 2   1  
Japan 7     
South 
Africa 
3  1   
Table 4. Background/position of delegates from Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
Japan, and South Africa at Meeting of Experts, 18 – 29 August 2003. 
What a look at table 3 reveals is that besides the two members from the 
Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, Dr. Miller and Dr. Coates, and 
with the possible inclusion of Dr. Phillips of the Health Protection Agency, the 
UK delegation did not include any scientists. And even those three are not 
actively doing laboratory research: Dr. Philips is a member of the Health 
Protection Agency and mostly works on health policy while Dr. Miller and Dr. 
Coates’ work pertains mostly to the BWC. Thus, the UK delegation did not 
contain any practicing scientists. Furthermore, given that the meeting also 
specifically discussed education, the lack of any specialists on education is 
noteworthy as well. Table 4 support the results of the UK delegation. Only 
three out of the 27 delegates from these countries had any sort of science 
background or were actual science practitioners at the time of the meeting. 
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Dr. Geoffrey Shaw from Australia had received a PhD in chemistry from the 
Australian National University in 1990 and then went on to work for the 
government on issues of disarmament and compliance with international 
conventions, e.g. implementing the CWC in Australia. Dr. Ken Johnson of 
Canada served as the Director of the S&T Human Performance of Defence 
R&D Canada, which is an agency of the Department of National Defence of 
Canada. Dr. Ben Steyn, a medical doctor, from South Africa had in 1993 
taken over ‘Project Coast’, South Africa’s biological weapons programme, 
which he shut down soon after. By the time of the meeting, he was working 
as an advisor to the Surgeon General of South Africa. The above data 
suggest that the number of scientists that were present in the early ‘creation’ 
of the topic of the dual-use potential of scientific research had been minimal. 
Going back to Callon’s discussion of the creation of alliances with actors, it is 
surprising that barely any interessement devices were employed to draw the 
scientists into the alliance to improve education and develop codes of 
conduct. A similar analysis, i.e. of lists of participants, of the meetings in 2004 
and 2005 gives the same picture. So if scientists were not present in 
abundance within the States Parties, what about the other organizations that 
were there? The four UN agencies that attended were the ‘Counter-Terrorism 
Committee of the Security Council’, the UN Department for Disarmament 
Affairs (UNDDA), the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), UN Institute for 
Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), all of whose representatives did not entail 
any scientists or education specialists. Among the NGOs and IOs, a few 
scientists attended the conference; in particular, the delegation from the 
Federation of American Scientists included Dr. Rosenberg, a research 
professor of natural science, as well as the then director of the Karl 
Landsteiner Institute, Vienna, Dr. Jack Melling. In addition, Dr. Nyxdorff, the 
chair of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global 
Responsibility’s Working Group on Biological and Toxin Weapons Control, 
was also a practicing scientist. The prevalence of scientists among the NGOs 
was higher than among the States Parties. 
Of course, the BWC was not the only forum or organization where the topic 
was debated in these early stages of the debate on the issue of biosecurity 
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and dual-use. In 2003, a UN InterAgency Consultative Meeting discussed 
dual-use and codes of conduct for scientists while the British Society for 
General Microbiology issued a Policy on Scientific Publication, Security and 
Censorship. (SGM, 2003) In the UK, the House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee debated the issue of a code of conduct and 
eventually the UK government initiated a series of workshops involving 
scientific, medical and industrial communities on this topic. (UK, 2003) At the 
end of 2003, the UNESCO’s World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific 
Knowledge and Technology (COMEST) discussed the introduction of a code 
of conducts for scientists, with particular reference to biological weapons. 
(COMEST, 2003) In Asia, members of the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation also discussed the introduction of a code of conduct for 
scientists. (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, 2003) 
In 2004, the number of actors discussing codes of conduct and biosecurity 
increased even further. Actors included UK’s The Royal Society and the 
Wellcome Trust (The Royal Society and Wellcome Trust, 2004), the 
American Medical Association (AMA, 2005), the InterAcademy Panel 
(Interacademy Panel on International Issues, 2005), OECD’s International 
Futures Programme (OECD, 2004), the British Medical Association (BMA, 
2004), and the International Committee of the Red Cross. (ICRC, 2004) Also, 
the UN adopted Resolution 1540, which asked all states to develop oversight 
committees “to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological 
weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing controls over 
related materials.” (UN Security Council, 2004) 
In July 2005, the International Union of Microbiological Societies (IUMS) held 
a meeting where they discussed a ‘Code of Ethics Against Misuse of 
Scientific Knowledge, Research and Resources’, which was finally adopted 
by the General Assembly in October 2006. (IUMS, 2005) This code of ethics 
was primarily based on work of the American Society for Microbiology on this 
topic. Also in 2005, Somerville and Atlas proposed a Code of ethics for the 
life sciences (Somerville and Atlas, 2005), which was published in Science 
and therefore presumably reached a wide audience of scientists.  
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After this initial burst on activities in the form of workshops, committees, and 
reports, the issue received less attention in the following years, which 
however does not imply that no work was done. For example, at the 6th 
Review Conference of the BWC in 2006, India, Japan, Pakistan, and the UK 
all out forward statements in support of codes of conduct. During the 6th 
Review Conference, a new set intersessional meetings was agreed on, which 
included the topic ‘Oversight, education, awareness raising, and adoption 
and/or development of codes of conduct with the aim to prevent misuse in 
the context of advances in bio-science and bio-technology research with the 
potential of use for purposes prohibited by the Convention’ for 2008. (BWC, 
2006) During the 7th Review Conference in 2011, the State Parties agreed to 
“include in the 2012-15 intersessional programme a standing agenda item on 
review of developments in the field of science and technology related to the 
Convention.” (BWC, 2011, p. 10)   
The debate about science and technology primarily focussed on the field of 
synthetic biology because their research was deemed to be more prone to 
dual-use issues. However, recently neuroscience has started to receive 
attention as well, for example a publication by UK’s The Royal Society 
focused specifically on the security and conflict implications of neuroscience 
research. (The Royal Society, 2012) In the US, the National Research 
Council also identified neuroscience as a very important topic for future 
research for the military. (NRC, 2008) 
3.5. Conclusion 
In summary, the description of the activities within the international security 
community to deal with the problem of dual-use research, gives a picture 
where the main participants are security experts and policymakers, with 
actual scientists playing minor roles. Of course, as specifically mentioned, 
some associations of scientists, e.g. the International Union of 
Microbiological Societies, discussed he problem as well. Also, this current 
overview of the work on the dual-use issue is necessarily limited, i.e. there 
may have been smaller initiatives in some countries that may have included 
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scientists. However, at least on the larger scale, scientists did not participate 
in the security discussion in large numbers. Remembering Callon, the reason 
for looking for any interessement of scientists was to find out what and how 
alliances were formed between the security community and the scientists. 
The success of the ‘mission’ of the security community depends on the ability 
to alter the behaviour of scientists at large. The final moment of translation in 
Callon’s analysis is to address the question of the mobilisation of the allies, or 
put differently: “Are the spokesmen representative? Who speaks in the name 
of whom? Who represents whom? These crucial questions must be 
answered if the project led by the researchers is to succeed. This is because, 
as with the description of interessement and enrolment, only a few rare 
individuals are involved.” (Callon 1986, p. 12, 13) Unless the scientists 
enrolled in the debates are actual able to speak for their communities, the 
project will fail. And even if these scientists are representative and speak for 
their communities, as Callon points out, there is always one final problem: 
“Dissidence: betrayal and controversies.” (Callon, 1986, p. 15) Some of the 
members of the various science communities may just not abide by what 
their representatives have agreed to. Their personal convictions about what it 
means to be a scientist might be at odds with what the security community as 
well as their own representatives believe scientists should and should not do. 
Particularly in this case, which discusses codes of conduct and how to 
behave ethical, it is quite likely that dissidence will arise. Since the enrolment 
of scientists and thus alliance formation was relatively limited in the past 
debates, it might be hypothesized that the impact on the scientific community 
at large has been rather marginal. Chapter five will address this issue by 
looking at what ethical training is currently given to neuroscience students, 
specifically if there are any dual-use ethics components in it. But before 
looking at the neuroscience education, the next chapter will address a further 
enrolment hole that has not been addressed at all thus far: alliances with 
ethicists/bioethicists. Although ethics in the form of codes of conduct has 
been frequently mentioned as a topic of discussion, ethicists have been even 
more notably absent from the debate than the scientists. Presumably though, 
bioethicist should have been included in the alliance as well, given their 
expertise on ethics and science. Therefore, the following chapter will look at 
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the involvement of bioethicists in the debate and specifically address how the 
neuroethics community has reacted to the problem. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 
 
Chapter 4: Dual-Use Actors II: The Ethics Community 
4.1. Introduction 
In the preceding chapter we saw that the international security community 
had started to debate codes of conduct or codes of ethics for scientists 
starting in 2004. The primary actors in these debates were security experts 
and policymakers, while scientists only played a marginal role. But even 
more surprising than the lack of enrolment of scientists was that ethicists 
were notably absent in these debates. In fact, it took until 2009 for Dando to 
exclaim in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that the “[b]ioethicists enter 
the dual-use debate.” (Dando, 2009) In this chapter, I will first look at who 
these bioethicsts are and give a short overview of their proposed ‘solutions’ 
or panacea for the dual-use problem. In the second, and larger, part, the 
focus will be on the origins and development of the field of neuroethics. The 
purpose will be to understand why there has been so limited engagement 
with the dual-use issue by the neuroethicists by looking at the current 
activities and debates within the community. The goal is once again to trace 
the activities of the actors. 
4.2. Bioethics I: The responsibility of scientists  
The bioethicists that Dando pronounces to have entered the debate are 
Kuhlau et al. (2008), Ehni (2008), and Miller and Selgelid (2008). Kuhlau et 
al. (2008) and Ehni (2008) start their discussion of the topic of dual-use by 
addressing the topic of the moral responsibility of scientists with regard to the 
outcomes of their research.  
Ehni (2008) approaches the issue by looking at the philosophical positions 
that support the two sides of the argument, which are on the one hand that 
science is value-free, neutral, and therefore the scientist has to take no 
responsibility with regard to what is done with his research findings, and on 
the other hand the view that he is responsible because he provided the 
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knowledge tool that ultimately led to a harmful application. “The question 
here is not how far a scientist is responsible for the intended effects of his 
action, but how far he is responsible for the foreseen effects of his research, 
for their prevention and also for the effort to predict certain effects.” (Ehni, 
2008, p. 148) Ehni utilizes the bioethics of Hans Jonas in order to arrive at an 
imperative of responsibility. (Ehni, 2008) This reading of Jonas eventually 
leads Ehni to come up with four imperfect duties: (1) stopping research in 
some cases, (2) systematically explore dangers of dual-use in some cases, 
(3) inform public authorities about possible dangers resulting from research 
and the application of its results, and (4) not publish results and descriptions 
of research results and possible dual-use applications. (Ehni, 2008) 
Eventually, Ehni arrives at the conclusion that it can only be a mixture of 
authorities, partially derived from the scientific community itself, as well as 
from the public, i.e. political authorities that will be able to deal with the issue 
of dual-use. These authorities will take up the individual responsibility of 
scientists, which is why scientists should be open to the formation of them. 
Ehni points out that “it is necessary to create such authorities, not at least to 
discharge scientists from a responsibility which might be of low degree, but 
have far too heavy a weight for individuals.” (Ehni, 2008, p. 151) Ehni points 
out that it is very difficult to organise such authorities, which has been done 
by Miller and Selgelid, as we will see in the Bioethics II section further below. 
Kuhlau and her colleagues (2008) take a rather different route to this 
problem. They presuppose that all scientists have the moral obligation not to 
cause harm. While the problem for dual-use is no the intentional cause of 
harm by scientists, the problem that their research can put people at risk 
gives scientists a specific responsibility and demands their awareness with 
regard to obligations and regulations. Kuhlau et al. (2008) suggest five 
criteria for the obligation to prevent harm, for which researchers could 
reasonably be asked to be morally responsible: 
1. Within professional responsibility 
2. Within professional capacity and ability 
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3. Reasonably foreseeable – reasonable implies active engagement from 
scientists to seek knowledge and consider potential misuses of 
research  
4. Proportionally greater than benefits 
5. Not more easily achieved by other means   
 
These criteria provide the backbone for an analysis of three distinct 
obligations that have been discussed in legal discourses on the topic. The 
first aspect is the obligation of scientists to prevent bioterrorism.  
Kuhlau et al. start their analysis with a quotation from Resnik and Shamoo, 
who argue that scientists “have an obligation to help prevent terrorism.” 
(Kuhlau et al., 2008, p. 483) In the following passages, this sentence is 
modified by dropping the word ‘help’, which makes it easier for Kuhlau and 
her colleagues (2008) to argue their point that scientists cannot prevent 
bioterrorism because it is unfeasible.  However, what is actually bioterrorism? 
Terrorism and therefore bioterrorism as well, is an over-defined and thus 
actually ill-defined term. Presumably its definition could range from the act 
itself, i.e. the release of a dangerous biological agent into the world, to the 
intent of a specific researcher, i.e. him thinking about making a biological 
weapon. So because this lack of precision muddles the argument, the 
conclusion that Kuhlau et al. (2008) draw from this analysis appears even 
more striking: “Misapplication of peacefully intended research may cause 
moral distress among scientists; however, it is difficult to argue that 
researchers should be held morally accountable for harm caused by 
unforeseen acts of misuse. It is equally difficult to argue that they are 
responsible for preventing these acts.” (Kuhlau et al., 2008, p. 483) This 
conclusion comes as a surprise given the first criteria that Kuhlau et al. have 
identified, where they argue that “[t]he life science research profession… has 
a collective responsibility for the potential harm caused by their research.” 
(Kuhlau et al., 2008, p. 481) Can there really be a difference between 
“unforeseen acts of misuse” (Kuhlau et al., 2008, p. 483) and “potential harm 
caused by their research”? (Kuhlau et al., 2008, p. 481) Is the community 
responsible but not the individual scientist? Kuhlau et al. continue arguing 
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that the “[f]ocus should be on how to conduct ethical research for the purpose 
of marginalizing unwanted consequences, rather than threats of misuse such 
as bioterrorism.” (Kuhlau et al., 2008, p. 483) Is bioterrorism not an unwanted 
consequence? “Preventing misuse is a moral reason for why scientists 
should be engaged rather than an obligation in and of itself.” (Kuhlau et al., 
2008, p. 483) It is difficult to see how preventing misuse could be a moral 
reason. If I let go of an apple in my hand and it falls to the ground, the reason 
of the apple hitting the ground is not my act of dropping it. I was the cause of 
the apple’s drop but gravity is the reason why it dropped. An action such as 
preventing misuse cannot be a reason. A moral reason is situated within the 
belief system of a person. In the case of bioethics, my moral reason is my 
conviction that I am a member of the human race and I feel solidarity with 
other people and thus do not want other people to suffer. Alternatively, I may 
believe in a certain religion that claims that life is sacred and should not be 
harmed. So preventing misuse is not a moral reason but rather an action that 
I can do or not do. Given the ambiguity of what misuse, and thus also 
bioterrorism, constitutes it appears more practical to speak of degrees of 
preventing misuse. 
Kuhlau et al. (2008) consider several other duties that scientists might be 
expected to follow. Throughout the paper, they continue to remain guarded 
against any strong levels of responsibility and duty for scientists, while 
acknowledging that some of these duties are reasonable. For example, 
scientists could be asked to consider whether or not to publish and share 
sensitive data or that scientist can only be asked not to share information 
with people or organizations where reasonable grounds for concern about 
their motivations exist.  
4.3. Bioethics II: The inductive approach  
Whereas Ehni (2008) and Kuhlau et al. (2008) approach the problem from 
ethical perspectives and then try to make recommendations about what 
should be done, Miller and Selgelid (2008) analyse several experiments of 
concern that the US National Research Council had identified as problematic. 
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(NRC, 2004) These experiments inform their debate about moral 
considerations as well as policy options.  The latter are presented in a matrix 
with the ‘options’, which range from least to most intrusive (complete 
autonomy of scientists up to governmental control) on the horizontal axis and 
the ‘decisions’, e.g. “should dual-use technology be licensed”, on the vertical 
axis. (Table 4) Miller and Selgelid eventually come to the conclusion that the 
best options for human security are either “institutional & governmental 
control” or “an independent authority.” (2008, pp. 63, 64) 
Besides these policy suggestions, Miller and Selgelid mention an idea they 
call “designing-in ethics.” (2008, p. 4, 32) This concept involves going beyond 
a zero-sum game and finding a third or fourth option that allows us to 
reconcile both goals, gaining knowledge and ensuring security. Obviously, 
there is no clear method to find these options and they need to be explored 
with regard to the individual problem. This ethical approach has been 
identified by Keulartz et al. as one of the four pillars of pragmatist ethics, 
which Dewey had originally called “dramatic rehearsal.” (Keulartz et al., 2004, 
pp. 19 – 21) It asks for exploring future new worlds and finding new 
vocabularies that can be used to deal with these worlds. Initial work of this 
type has already been done with regard to the issues of parenthood, family, 
and medicine raised by in-vitro fertilization. (Keulartz et al., 2004)  
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In 2010, Douglas and Savulsecu from the Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics 
took up the questions of a dual-use ethics as well. Or rather, they stressed 
the importance of a continued debate within the bioethics community of an 
‘ethics of knowledge’. (Douglas and Savulescu, 2010) The fact that both are 
from the Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics is noteworthy when looking at 
their paper because the paper is rather theoretical in outlining the potential 
ethical aspects that synthetic biology brings up. In this first analysis they 
conclude that indeed the only new ethical topic is the one of dual-use ethics 
or ‘ethics of knowledge’. They then continue to defend the call for this new 
ethical field against potential critiques. While the paper is useful in 
reasserting the importance of this field of ethics, it actually offers little in 
terms of helping the field to move forward, i.e. to become relevant. Thus far, 
all of the attempts to engage with dual-use ethics have remained very 
theoretical, even if Miller and Selgelid started with actual examples.   
Thus it can be concluded that the discussion of the dual-use problem among 
ethicists has been marginal at best. But what about neuroethicists? Have 
they engaged with the topic thus far? 
In the second volume of the American Journal of Bioethics – Neuroscience, 
Jonathan Marks wrote an article titled A Neuroskeptic’s Guide to Neuroethics 
and National Security which, as is the general outline of the journal, was 
followed by 13 commentaries. (Marks, 2010)  So while there has been one 
debate of the issue of security and neuroscience, what else are 
neuroethicists doing and working on? In order to answer this question, I will 
first briefly summarize the origins and development of the field of neuroethics 
and then follow what the actors are currently doing. Describing the origins of 
the field of neuroethics could be done in two different ways. On the one hand, 
one could look at the conceptual origin, while on the other one could focus on 
the technical inception.  
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4.4. Origins of neuroethics 
Some of the issues that are currently being discussed in neuroethics have 
been around for millennia, for example questions of free will, responsibility, 
the mind-body problem, and how to behave ethically. Therefore, some 
elements of neuroethics can be said to have already been discussed by the 
Ancient Greeks. However, the first issues of actual neuroscience research 
that has relevance for ethics could be the experiments of Jose Delgado on 
bulls used for bull fighting. Delgado implanted electrodes into the brains of 
the bulls and by pushing his remote control prevent the bull from continuing 
its charge during a bull fight. Concurrent with Delgado’s experiments, project 
MK Ultra was run by the US intelligence service as well as the armed forces 
in order to find out if it is possible to actually mind control people. While most 
records about the specific activities and experiments had been destroyed, the 
existence of the program was discovered eventually. According to Alberto 
Carrara in an article written for the neurobioethics section of the UNESCO 
Chair in Bioethics and Human Rights, Louis West, an American psychiatrist, 
made “the first serious attempt to evaluate, from an ethical viewpoint, the 
modern advances and discoveries in the field of the neurosciences” in the 
60s. (Carrara) The first use of the term ‘neuroethics’ comes from Harvard 
physician Anneliese A. Pontius in the early 70s. (Racine, 2010, p. 23) Pontius 
investigated how early efforts to improve walking in infants could have 
detrimental effects later in life. (Pontius, 1973) She concluded her paper 
arguing that “[b]y raising those questions, attention is focused on a new and 
neglected are of ethical concerns – neuroethics. In the present context, this 
concept stresses the importance of being aware of neurological facts and 
implications while experimenting with the newborn’s motility.” (Pontius, 1973) 
The term was taken up again in the 80s by American neurologist Ronald 
Cranford, who argued that a neuroethicist designates “a neurologist who has 
taken as specific interest in the bioethical issues and becomes an active 
member of [is] IEC [Institutional Ethics Committee] or becomes an individual 
consultant.” (Cranford, 1989, in Racine, 2010, p. 29)  
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While the aforementioned people or activities present either what may be 
considered the first experiments of concern for neuroethics, or activities by 
individuals to coin the term neuroethics they do not constitute any 
comprehensive attempt to develop a field of neuroethics. Therefore, the 
programmatic origin of neuroethics took place in the new millennium. It was 
the 2002 conference in San Francisco called Neuroethics: Mapping the field, 
which was organized by the Dana Foundation. (Dana Foundation, 2013) 
Chairman of the conference was William Safire, a political scientist/journalist 
of the New York Times. At the meeting, Safire defined neuroethics “as a 
distinct portion of bioethics, which is the consideration of good and bad 
consequences in medical practice and biological research. But the specific 
ethics of brain science hits home as research on no other organ does.” 
(Safire, 2002 in Racine, 2010, p. 30) Although this meeting had not been the 
first of its kind because one similar one had occurred in Europe and its 
proceedings published in 1996 by Gerard Huber, it kick-started the field and 
several papers on the issue appeared shortly afterwards in a variety of 
journals. Specifically, Adina Roskies was the first to define the scope of the 
field in an article in Neuron. (Roskies, 2002) Roskies distinguished between 
the “ethics of neuroscience” and the “neuroscience of ethics.” The ethics of 
neuroscience contains two further divisions: “the ethics of practice” and the 
“ethical implications of neuroscience.” (Roskies, 2002) The former comprises 
all the clinical aspects of neuroscience, for example the right to privacy and 
how it pertains to neurological testing. The latter deals with the impact of 
neuroscientific results for our society. The second section of neuroethics, the 
neuroscience of ethics, deals with question of free will, self-determination, 
and personal identity and how neuroscience can improve our understanding 
of these concepts using, for example, neurogimaging. The rationale is that 
the more we understand and learn about the brain the easier it will be to 
refine out methods of understanding and teaching ethics. Eric Racine argues 
that Roskies espouses a ‘knowledge-driven perspective’ and contrasts it with 
a ‘technology-driven perspective’ and a ‘healthcare driven perspective’, 
championed by Wolpe and by Racine and Illes, respectively. (Racine, 2010, 
p. 33) To Racine, Roskies’ characterisation of the field relies on the “belief 
that neuroethics is a legitimate endeavour that can extend beyond the 
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reaches of traditional philosophical ethics to foster interdisciplinary 
collaboration and public debate.” (Racine, 2010, p. 31) The field thus 
attempts to bridge the gap between the humanities and the biological 
sciences.  
According to Racine, another view is the technology-driven perspective, 
which bioethicist Paul Wolpe has championed. To him, neuroethics is simply 
a field that is “defined by the technologies it examines rather than any 
particular philosophical approach.” (Wolpe in Racine, 2010, p. 32) By 
focussing on the technology, Wolpe excludes the whole ‘neuroscience of 
ethics’ field that Roskies had identified as the second topic of concern for 
neuroethics. What distinguishes and sets apart neuroethics from bioethics is 
the fact that neuroethics deals with the brain, which is the seat of personal 
identity and the controlling organ for the human organism. A third perspective 
is emphasized by Racine and Illes. They focus primarily on the practical 
aspects of neuroethics, which is to improve “patient care for specific patient 
populations.” (Racine, 2010, p. 34) However, while practical aspects are 
important Racine contends that it has two additional features. First, it tries to 
“consolidate some of the earlier historical meanings (e.g., Pontius and 
Cranford) focusing on the clinical aspects, with some of the contemporary 
views (e.g. Roskies, Wolpe) that emphasize the philosophical challenges of 
neurotechnology use.” (Racine, 2010, p. 34) Second, it considers neuroethics 
to be “a scholarly and a practical endeavour, akin to medicine, which 
attempts to understand and intervene.” (Racine, 2010, p. 34)  
Of course, being an ANT, it does not suffice to lean back now but rather to 
delve further among the people of neuroethics. After all these negotiations 
and discussion about the how to define and delimit neuroethics are a good 
example of the First Uncertainty of Latour, as discussed in the methodology 
chapter. Just as the dance is over once the dancers stop the field of 
neuroethics could be considered healthy because of these efforts to define it. 
As a next step in understanding what is going on in neuroethics, it would be 
helpful to see in what activities its practitioners engage.  
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4.5. The ‘bread and butter’ of academics: The written word 
As can be seen in the previous sections, the field of neuroethics is primarily 
negotiated by academics. One way to understand the field is therefore to look 
at what these academics have written. Ideally, there would be a book that 
provides an overview of the variety of literature that has been written in 
recent year. Fortunately, in 2011 The Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics edited 
by Judy Illes and Barbara J. Sahakian was published by Oxford University 
Press. (Illes and Sahakian, 2011) The book is close to 1000 pages long and 
consists of 51 chapters in 7 sections. Of course, given that Illes has been 
identified by Racine as one of the two people that advocated the ‘healthcare 
driven perspective’, it is possible that the book does not address the same 
issues that it would have had if the book had been edited by either Roskies 
or Wolpe. Nevertheless, these sections will cover a substantial portion of 
current research in neuroethics. In the following section, I will describe the 
different section headings (see Table 5 for an overview). Afterwards, I will 
use these headers to categorize all of the articles that have been published in 
the two journals that are dedicated to the issue of Neuroethics, which are the 
journals Neuroethics and the American Journal for Bioethics – Neuroscience.  
Section headings 
1. Consciousness and Intention: Decoding Mental States and Decision 
Making 
2. Responsibility and Determinism 
3. Mind and Body 
4. Neurotechnology 
5. Aging and Dementia 
6. Law and Public Policy 
7. Science, Society and International Perspectives 
Table 5. Section headings of the Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics. (Illes and 
Sahakian, 2011) 
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Consciousness and Intention: Decoding Mental States and Decision Making: 
The first section deals with our understanding of mental states and how we 
biologically make decision. Topics are, for example, how we can ‘read’ the 
brain, which means how we can understand what mental states correspond 
to what brain activities. (Haynes, 2011) Based on this research, scientists try 
to understand pleasure and happiness (Kringelbach and Berridge, 2011) or 
how we make ethical decisions. (Suhler and Churchland, 2011) Other 
aspects covered in this section deal with how we can understand the 
sometimes erratic or irrational behaviour of adolescents in terms of their brain 
development (Beauregard, 2011), how we consciously manage to control our 
emotions (Luciana, 2011), and what our brain tells us when we deceive 
others. (Ganis and Rosenfield, 2011) Finally, what are disorders of 
consciousness (Chatelle and Laureys, 2011) and how does brain injury 
impact on our ability to be conscious. (Owen, 2011)   
Responsibility and Determinism: If we are our just our brains, to what degree 
are we responsible for our actions? And are we actually able to make 
choices? Determinism, the view that do not have free will, seems to be 
supported by neuroscience research. However, as discussed in this section, 
the implication of neuroscience for our views on personal responsibility is 
less clear as neuroessentialists claims. One specific region of research 
covers the issue of addiction, asking the question to what degree, if any, 
people are actually responsible, and can thus be blamed, for their addiction.  
Mind and Body: Neuroenhancement, or cognitive enhancement, deals with 
the question of the ethical implications of using drugs to improve our 
cognitive abilities. For example, drugs have been developed to negate the 
negative effect of lack of sleep, which therefore allows its users to sleep less 
and thus for example improving their competitiveness in the work place. 
What are the ethical implications of cognitive enhancements? Is it ok for 
healthy humans to take medication to increase their performance? These 
questions are also linked to our understanding and classification of mental 
health, for example, when is a child suffering from attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder. (Swanson et al., 2011) If it is unfair for healthy 
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individuals to take medication event though it improves their performance, at 
what point is it justified, i.e. at what point is a human unhealthy?  
Neurotechnology: This section covers all varieties of technologies that are 
used by neuroscientists and neurosurgeons. As such, there are overlaps 
between this section and for example the first one on consciousness 
because of the use of imaging technology. However, there are also specific, 
independent issues such as the ethical implications of the use of invasive 
technologies like deep brain stimulation or functional neurosurgery. It also 
coves the convergence of neuroscience with other fields, for example 
nanoscience. (Khushf, 2011)  
Aging and Dementia: As our society is progressively becoming older it is and 
particularly neurological disorders increase among the elderly, for example 
Alzheimer’s or Parkinson’s, it is important to understand how to treat these 
people ethically, i.e. an issue of clinical ethics. But also, ethical issues can 
arise in the diagnosis and early detection of these disorders.  
Law and Public Policy: Advances in neuroscience may fundamentally change 
the structure of our legal systems (Wolf, 2011) or may not change anything at 
all. (Greene and Cohen, 2011) Besides the impact on the legal system, 
questions are raised about our social system actors (e.g. politicians, 
policymakers, lawyers, lobbyists, journalists) ability and use of neuroscientific 
knowledge (Brown and McCormick, 2011), how neuroscience influences 
gender politics, and its implications for national security. (Moreno, 2011)  
Science, Society, and International Perspectives: In terms of science and 
society, the section comprises essays on neuroscience and the media 
(Racine, 2011), how our understanding of culture could be improved by 
looking at neuroscience and particularly the concept of neuroplasticity 
(Wexler, 2011), a general outlook for neuroethics in the 21st century (Farah, 
2011), and how to raise children in an age of neuroscience. (Stein et al., 
2011) The international perspective field covers the topics of ethical issues 
about drug trials in developing countries (Van Dyke, 2011), how to work 
towards a ‘global health ethics’ (Evert et al., 2011) and the globalization of 
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neuroethics (Chen and Quirion, 2011) and the use of online education for 
disseminating neuroethics to health sciences. (Tairyan and Frank, 2011)  
If one were to assume the number of chapters on each section to be an 
indicator for its relevance to the field, the Handbook does not lend itself to 
any analysis of this type because all section are nearly equally weighted. 
Sections 1, 4, 5, and 7 all have eight articles, sections 3 and 6 have seven 
articles and section 2 has five articles. However, this may not be surprising 
because the idea of the handbook is to give an overview of current topics and 
themes in the field. In order to get a better idea of what the field focusses on, 
an analysis of the field’s academic journals might be more beneficial. This 
analysis is rather straightforward because there are only two dedicated 
journals covering the topic of neuroethics. These two are Neuroethics 
published by Springer Science + Business Media and The American Journal 
of Bioethics – Neuroscience (AJOB-N) published by Taylor & Francis Group. 
Neuroethics was established in 2008 and AJOB-N in the beginning of 2010. 
All journal articles from the journal’s start up to middle of 2012 were 
categorised according to the topics that the Oxford Handbook has identified 
as relevant topics for neuroethics. The full method of the research and 
analysis is described in Appendix A.  
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Figure 1. This figure shows the relative weights of several topics that the 
articles in both journals have covered. A value of 1 would indicate that all 
articles in all volumes of the journal deal with that specific topic.  
Figure 1 gives the results of this survey. First of all, the seven categories of 
the Oxford Handbook had not been sufficient to cover all the articles in the 
two journals. The categories that were needed are Philosophy & Neuroethics, 
which covers the implications for philosophy, particularly ethics, from 
neuroscience. It is congruent with Roskies second aspect of neuroethics – 
the neuroscience of ethics. In addition, clinical ethics aspects were frequently 
discussed. A third one is neuroeducation, although this may possibly be 
subsumed under the Science, Society and International Perspectives banner. 
Finally, some articles were published on the ethical concerns and 
implications of developmental neuroscience. Both of the last two topics were 
only marginally represented though while both ‘philosophy & neuroethics’ as 
well as ‘clinical neuroethics’ were more dominant issues. Conversely, ‘Aging 
and Dementia’ did not feature as a specific topic in any of the articles in the 
journal. This does not imply that there are no papers at all that discuss issues 
of aging or dementia but rather that it was not the major focus of any of the 
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papers. In terms of the major aspects that neuroethicists have engaged with 
as part of their written work, the top five issues are: consciousness and 
intention, responsibility and determinism, mind and body, neuroetechnology, 
and philosophy and neuroethics. As to the topic of this thesis, the dual-use 
issue has only been discussed in AJOB – Neuroscience. This finding 
supports the picture that the dual-use debate has only been going on within 
international security communities such as the BWC.  
Of course, while publishing is a major aspect of any academic, it is not the 
only activity that research institutes and universities engage on. Holding 
conferences and workshops as well as participating in initiatives are also the 
domain of scientists, including neuroethicists. In order to get a better picture 
of what is currently going on in the field of neuroethics it may therefore be 
advantageous to have a look at what its institutions do besides their 
members publishing in journals.  
One way of identifying institutes and centres is to do an online search using 
the phrase ‘neuroethics’. While there were about 360,000 hits using Google, I 
will restrict my analysis to the first 50 entries. Out of those 50 entries, those 
were discarded that were books, journal articles or videos. The remainder, 25 
entries, consisted of academic and private research institutes, educational 
programmes, e.g. PhD programmes in Neuroethics, as well as a few blogs 
and a professional society, which is the International Neuroethics Society. 
Table 6 gives the numbers for each of those categories.  
 Research Institute Education 
programme
s/webpages 
Blogs Societies Webpag
e 
(private) 
Other 
University  Other 
# of 
entries 
11 2 1 5 1 3 2 
Table 6. Classification of first 50 entries of Google search using the word 
‘neuroethics’.  
Not unexpectedly, research centres and projects affiliated with universities 
dominate the neuroethics online landscape. Given the young age of the field 
it is also not surprising that not many neuroethics degree programmes have 
yet been established, although the number is probably higher because some 
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of the research programmes also have education components. Presumably, 
these did not show up on Google because the main page of the project is 
valued higher by the search engine’s heuristic. What is interesting is that 
blogs come in second after the research projects. It appears that the use of 
modern communication tools such as a blog features highly among the new 
field. While in terms of political blogs, despite their small size, they have been 
shown to be very effective in participating in politics, it is yet unclear how 
effective they are in raising awareness of a new issue such as neuroethics. 
(Woodly, 2008) Since research institutes and projects dominate neuroethics, 
let’s follow their activities and see what they do besides publishing journal 
articles. In the following section, the first five centres and institutes of the 
Google search will be discussed. These are: the Neuroethics Centre, Oxford 
University; the Centre for Neuroscience & Society, University of 
Pennsylvania; the Program in Neuroethics, Stanford Centre for Biomedical 
Ethics, Stanford University; The National Core in Neuroethics, University of 
British Columbia; and the Neuroethics Program, Emory Centre for Ethics, 
Emory University. 
The very first hit of the Google search was the Neuroethics centre at Oxford 
University in the UK (http://www.neuroethics.ox.ac.uk/). The centre’s focus on 
neuroethics made it the first of its kind in the UK and, according to its 
website, one of just a few ones worldwide. On the website they have tabs for 
both current and past ‘events’ and for ‘centre output’. On the 6th of 
September, 2012, the events page lists a lecture on the ‘brain disease model 
of addiction’ and a conference on the ‘normative significance of cognitive 
science’. The lecture by visiting scientist Wayne Hall from the University of 
Queensland Centre for Clinical Research, Australia, deals with the 
implications of the new models of addiction as a brain disease and the 
implications of this model for drug treatment policies. The conference 
description gives two questions to provide an idea of its topic: “What is the 
relationship between normative ethics and scientific research on moral 
judgement and decision-making? What potential is there for drawing ethical 
implications from such empirical investigations?”  
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The ‘centre output’ tab links to a further website that lists a variety of 
‘products’ that the centre has delivered since 2009. These products are 
grouped into the following categories: Publications and High Impact 
Publications, Media, Talks, Clinical Input, Input to Government/Policy, Events 
organized, and Annual Reports. Media and Talks have been updated from 
2009 through 2012, Publications from 2009 to 2011, and the others cover 
2009 and 2010. Particularly the section on ‘Input to Government/Policy’ is 
useful to find out if and how neuroethics tries to guide policy decision, which 
is particular relevant when trying to understand the interaction of neuroethics 
with the security community and their concerns. For 2010, there are a total of 
nine entries. (Table 7) There are no events listed after July.  
Input to Government/Policy 2010 
January Julian Savulescu co-authored a second paper submitted by the 
Oxford Geoengineering Institute in response to oral evidence 
presented to the Science & Technology Select Committee in 
which there was much discussion of the set of principles laid out 
in the first paper, on the collaborative development of 
international regulation for the conduct of geoengineering 
research.  Of particular focus is the role of the private sector in 
such research and deployment. 
February Barbara Sahakian is a member of the Medical Research Council 
Mental Health Review Group, and authored in May a Lancet 
article, volume 375, 1854-1855, A UK Strategy for Mental Health 
and Wellbeing. 
March Anders Sandberg participated in the Drugs Landscape 2030 
Scenario Planning Workshop, organized for the Home Office, 
Wokefield Park, Reading 
Alastair Buchan attended the 2nd March Clinical Advisory 
Commision Group Meeting for the Shadow Health Team for the 
Conservative Party, Parliament Street, London 
April Barbara Sahakian is a member of the scientific advisory board for 
the Grand Challenges in Global Mental Health Initiative, led by 
the US National Institute for Mental Health, the Global Alliance for 
Chronic Disease, the Wellcome Trust, the McLaughlin-Rotman 
Centre for Global Health and the London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine  
May Barbara Sahakian and Irene Tracey are both members of the 
steering committee of the Royal Society Brain Waves Project, 
investigating advances in Neuroscience and their implications for 
society. It contains the following modules: Module 1: 
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Neuroscience, insights for policy; Module 2: Neuroscience, 
education and lifelong learning; Module 3: Neuroscience, conflict 
and arms control; Module 4: Neuroscience, responsibility and the 
law; Module 5: Lessons for the governance of novel areas of 
science and new technologies. Barbara Sahakian is also a 
member of the Working Group for Module 2 , and Modules 1 & 2 
are due to launch in January or February 2011. 
June Guy Kahane participated in the Nuffield Council on Bioethics' 
Annual Forward Look Seminar, in a session on 'Neuroimaging' 
July Tom Douglas contributed material to a presentation by Allen 
Buchanan and Russell Powell to Obama’s Bioethics Commission 
on the ethics of synthetic biology 
Alastair Buchan attended the Ceremony for the Publication of 
The White Paper ‘Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS’ for 
the Conservative Government, Department of Health, Richmond 
House, London 
Table 7. Activities titled ‘Input to Government/Policy’ by the Oxford Centre of 
Neuroethics for 2010. 
In comparison, in 2009 there were a total of 10 entries. But how do these 
‘input to government/policy’ activities compare with the other activities in 
2010? Under ‘publications’, there are more than 100 entries; ‘media’ lists 69 
entries; ‘talks’ 77 entries; ‘Clinical output’ 5 entries; ‘events organized’ lists 4 
‘conferences’ and 1 ‘workshop and symposia’. The difference in numbers of 
activities between the ‘input to government/policy’ and ‘publications’, ‘media’, 
and ‘talks’ suggests that policy initiatives are not very common in the daily 
working life of the centre. Only ‘clinical output’ displays the same level of 
activity. The events organized section may list even fewer entries but the 
work required to organize a conference or workshop outweighs the amount of 
work required to give a talk, for example. It is noteworthy though that the first 
July entry of Tom Douglas actually pertains to the issue of science and 
security. But what about the other centres?  
The next entry of the Google search was the ‘Centre for Neuroscience & 
Society’ which is located at the University of Pennsylvania, US 
(http://www.neuroethics.upenn.edu/). Unfortunately, it does not offer a similar 
centre output overview as the Oxford centre. In terms of the history of the 
centre, it was originally only a website on neuroethics, created in 2004, in 
addition to the Penn Neuroethics Program. In 2009, these were transformed 
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into the current Center for Neuroscience & Society. As such, according to its 
website the centre works on the “ethical, legal and social implications of 
neuroscience.” (Centre for Neuroscience & Society, 2013) Evidence of this 
wider focus can for example be seen in two initiatives: a student led Law and 
Brain group, which runs a seminar series with a wide variety of researchers 
working on the legal implications of neuroscience research; and a conference 
on clinical neuroscience and society that is directed specifically to healthcare 
providers. In terms of the security implications of neuroscience research, very 
little can be found on the webpage. Under ‘Resources’ and ‘Open 
Publications’ there is a paper written by Michael Tennison and Jonathan 
Moreno on Neuroscience, Ethics and National Security: The State of the Art. 
(Tennison and Moreno, 2012) Jonathan Moreno is also the author of Mind 
Wars: Brain Science and the Military in the 21st Century and is listed as a 
faculty member of the Centre. (Moreno, 2012) But despite his affiliation with 
the Centre and his interest in military application of neuroscience research, 
there are no teaching resources on this topic and no event in 2011 or 2012 
mentions security or the military.  
The Program in Neuroethics is part of the Stanford Centre for Biomedical 
Ethics, which is located in their School of Medicine 
(http://neuroethics.stanford.edu/). According to their programme overview, 
they are primarily interested in issues on the intersection of “medical imaging 
and biomedical ethics” that present ethical, medical and legal challenges. 
(Stanford Program in Neuroethics, 2013) In September 2012, eight current 
research projects were listed on their website: the topics cover neuroimaging, 
“mindful incisions” (no further information available on the specific aspect but 
presumably it might cover ethics and neurosurgery), genetics and ethics, 
ethics and regenerative medicine, ethnic differences and marketing, public 
understanding of neuroscience, physician training and decision-making for 
neurologic patients, and a comparative analysis of how ethical and social 
issues of neurotechnology are addressed in the press. Their completed 
programmes covered neuroimaging issues, neuroenhancement, marketing, 
and neurotechnology developments. Security and military implications of 
neuroscience are not mentioned on their website. The phrase ‘policy’ comes 
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up once in a book title that was edited by Judy Illes, who in 2007 moved on to 
her current position with ‘The National Core for Neuroethics’ at the University 
of British Columbia. 
‘The National Core for Neuroethics’ is an interdisciplinary research group that 
focusses on the “ethical, legal, policy and social implications of frontier 
technological developments in the neurosciences” according to its website. 
(National Core for Neuroethics, 2013) But despite this inclusion of policy in 
their mission statement, the word policy is actually only mentioned twice in 
their annual report 2011 - 2012. Once with regard to one of their projects and 
how they are “working to identify and respond to the unique ethical, social, 
legal, and policy challenges faced by children and families affected” by some 
neurological disorders. (National Core for Neuroethics, 2012) The second 
time it is mentioned, it pertains to a project on ‘knowledge translation and 
neurodegenerative diseases’, specifically how the centre hosted educational 
activities and interactive programs on policy making. This project embodies 
the idea to do research and then use the results to have an impact on a 
political/policy level. In the area of military and security, the report does not 
mention these issues. 
The final centre for discussion is the Neuroethics Program at the Emory 
Centre for Ethics of Emory University 
(http://ethics.emory.edu/pillars/health_sciences/neuroethics.html). The three 
main initiatives of the programme are ‘Education and Outreach’, ‘Research 
and Scholarship’, and ‘Advising and Consulting’. The last aspect is the most 
interesting one for the current analysis because according to their website, 
the program wants to “provide neuroethics consultations for policy and 
lawmakers, corporate and not-for-profit organizations, and scientists and 
clinical service providers.” (Emory Neuroethics Program, 2013) 
Unfortunately, the website does not offer any other information about the 
actual work of the program. There is a link to a blog, which lists thoughts 
about specific topics within neuroethics or neuroethical perspectives on 
contemporary events or activities. But it does not mention any actual policy 
work being done and it may also not be the place to list it. 
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In conclusion, this short overview of neuroethics programmes provides a 
rather mixed view. Two out of the five programmes and centres explicitly 
mention policy as part of their main mission or how they understand their 
work. All of them give some sort of reference in their documents to policy 
work. Of course, assessing the impact of any academic initiative is highly 
contentious. But the amount of work that involves or engages actual policy-
makers seems to be rather limited, as can be specifically seen in the 
example of the Oxford Neuroethics centre. This finding is in line with the 
research at the beginning of the chapter that looked into the number of 
articles that are published and deal with policy work. The picture is clearer in 
the case of the neuroethicist interest in biosecurity, the dual-use problem or 
the military involvement in neuroscience at large. Only the University of 
Pennsylvania Neuroethics Programme mentions this arena, which is due to 
the fact that Jonathan Moreno is affiliated with it. The final section of the 
chapter will look into why there has been so little interest in these topics thus 
far. 
4.6. Conclusion 
The goal of this chapter from the outset was to understand the interaction of 
ethicists with the dual-use problem. The first approach was to identify current 
scientific bioethics journal articles that directly engage with the issue. This 
approach yielded only 3 articles, whose results were discussed 
subsequently.   The thesis then asked if nueorethics as a special subfield of 
bioethics has had more interaction with the questions of dual-use. The 
reason why it may have done so is due to neuroescience long history of 
interaction and use by the military. A bibliometric analysis of the major 
neuroethics journals showed limited work on this by the community. This 
analysis was supported by further investigation into the activities of major 
neuroethics centres in the world. While these data suggest that ethicists, 
either 'bio' or 'neuro' ones, do not engage with with dual-use under the label 
of dual-use, it does not exclude the possibility that they discuss questions 
that are of direct relevance to the issue of dual-use. Yet, words matter and 
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keywords even more so. Creating linkages between ethics scholars and 
security experts is difficult. A philosophical reflection on science is useful to 
advance our understanding of science but its ability to affect discussions 
about dual-use in the security community will be limited unless it utilizes 
some of the language used within this arena or is eventually translated into a 
more 'user-friendly' language. Unless this translation takes place, scholarship 
will not make it into practical discourse even though it may contribute 
substantially to the discussion and provide novel ways of understanding. The 
second part of this thesis will actually engage in this type of work.   
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Chapter 5: Dual-Use Actors III: The Science Community 
5.1. Introduction 
While our journey thus far has taken us from the realm of international politics 
to the academic battlefield of bioethics and neuroethics, it is finally time to 
start following the people about whom all the fuss is made: the actual 
scientists in their laboratories. But where and how does a social scientist start 
asking them about their attitude towards bioethics, the dual-use issue and 
their actual behaviour in their professional life? One approach is obviously to 
go and ask them. However, there are several pitfalls with this method as 
Rappert found out in his attempt to interview them about their views of the 
dual-use debate. (Rappert, 2007) 
The main goal of Rappert’s study was to assess the extent to which scientists 
had heard and had been exposed to dual-use bioethics problems. In a prior 
study where he “sought to determine how scientists defined the possible 
bioweapons applications of their research and what they thought of ongoing 
debates about security oversight measures” he engaged with neuroscientist 
in one-to-one interviews. (Rappert, 2007, pp. 59, 60) He realized that these 
interviews were a form of education in itself because only a small minority of 
the interviewees had ever thought about the weaponisation or the potential 
misuse of their research. Secondly, the interviews “repeatedly bordered on 
the awkward” because there were two clear tendencies for the interviews; 
they either turned into a sort of grilling exercise where the respondents 
repeatedly were unable to answer the questions because of a lack of prior 
deliberations on the matter or they alternatively turned into very high 
technical interviews, which the interviewer was unable to follow because of 
the technical complexity and his lack of knowledge. (Rappert, 2007, p. 60) 
Additionally, the interviews became a duel because the scientists would often 
give general blank reasons against any further security measures, arguing 
that further control would restrict the progress of science and scientists alike.  
This confrontation was also nearly always between a junior social scientist, 
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i.e. Rappert, and mostly senior natural scientists about the implications of 
their work. Due to these problems, Rappert decided to adopt a different 
approach in the form of a series of seminars held at various universities for a 
new study on scientists understanding of dual-use bioethics.  
So if interviews are less than ideal for junior social scientists, how does one 
go about understanding the behaviour and views on science and ethics of 
natural scientists? Well, one solution is to adopt what Rappert did, which was 
to hold informal seminars where a variety of natural scientists could attend. 
These seminars presented the issues with science as debated within the 
international community to the attendees who in turn were allowed to 
respond to these questions. Another option is to look at how scientists are 
‘created’, i.e. looking at the ‘breeding grounds’ of scientists, which are 
universities. Scientists undergo a rigorous training before becoming actual 
members of their individual communities. The values inherent in those 
communities are inscribed into young scholars in their university education. 
Therefore, the value of ethical considerations can be measured by looking at 
student’s exposure to ethical training. This approach is in line with the ANT 
methodology because it emphasizes the activities of the actors in the science 
community. While there may be no direct link between ethics education and 
the interaction with the security community on the dual-use issue, education 
will directly affect the future of the possible dialogue between these actors as 
well as how scientists will behave when confronted with a dual-use issue in 
their own work. But the investigation in the science community does not stop 
with just scientists. As will be seen, scientific associations, e.g. the Society 
for Neuroscience, as well as scientific journals play a role in how the dual-use 
problem can be approached. 
5.2. Ethical training in neuroscience: Empirical data 
A recent informal survey about ethical training in neuroscience curricula at 
UK universities indicates that there is limited, if any, training available. 
(Morein-Zamir and Sahakian, 2010; Sahakian and Morein-Zamir, 2009)  In 
contrast, a survey in Canada concluded that a very large proportion of 
91 
 
programs feature ethical training. (Lombera et al., 2010) The following 
survey, conducted by the author as part of the thesis, tends to support the 
view that ethical training is rather limited and its availability does not 
significantly differ between the investigated countries, which are Australia, 
Canada, Germany, the UK, and the US. Information about the method can be 
found in appendix B. 
5.2.1. Results 
The following graphs list the responses to the survey while table 8 shows the 
response rates to the survey. 
Country # of course (total) # of responses Response rate (in %) 
Australia 9 4 44 
Canada 23 9 35 
Germany 15 6 40 
UK 26 12 (survey)  
7 (questionnaire) 
46 (survey) 
27 (questionnaire) 
US 33 15 45 
Table 8. Response rates for questionnaire by country. For explanation of why 
the UK has two numbers, refer to Appendix B.   
Figures one to ten give the responses to the survey questions by country. 
Figure 11 and 12 are based on all country data. Figure 13 and 14 compare 
undergraduate and postgraduate courses and tables 9 and 10 summarize all 
the data.  
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Figure 1. Australia: ethical training based on websearch and survey 
responses. 
 
 
Figure 2. Australia: ethical training based only on surveys responses. 
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Figure 3. Canada: ethical training based on websearch and survey 
responses. 
 
 
Figure 4. Canada: ethical training based only on survey responses. 
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Figure 5. Germany: ethical training based on websearch and survey 
responses. 
 
 
Figure 6. Germany: ethical training based only on survey responses. 
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Figure 7. UK: ethical training based on websearch and survey responses. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. UK: ethical training based only on survey responses. 
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Figure 9. US: ethical training based on websearch and survey responses. 
 
 
 
Figure 10. US: ethical training based only on survey responses. 
 
18
11
12
11
2
4
29
4
5
2
4
Is there any ethics
training?
Is this training
mandatory?
Does the course feature
a dedicated, mandatory
ethics module?
Is dual-use a topic? Is it
mentioned anywhere on
the website?
yes
no
n/a
12
11
10
0
3
1
2
15
0 0 0 0
Is there any ethics
training?
Is this training
mandatory?
Does the course feature
a dedicated, mandatory
ethics module?
Is dual-use a topic? Is it
mentioned anywhere on
the website?
yes
no
n/a
97 
 
 
Figure 11. Countries combined (Australia, Canada, Germany, and US): 
ethical training based on websearch and survey responses. 
 
 
Figure 12. Countries combined (Australia, Canada, Germany, and US): 
ethical training based only on survey responses. 
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Figure 13. Countries combined (Australia, Canada, Germany, and US), 
undergraduate courses only: ethical training based only on survey 
responses. 
 
 
Figure 14. Countries combined (Australia, Canada, Germany, and US), 
postgraduate courses only: ethical training based only on survey responses. 
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Country Do you have 
ethics 
training? 
(‘yes’ answer, 
in %) 
Is it 
mandatory? 
(‘yes’ answer, 
in %) 
If you have 
ethical 
training, is it 
a dedicated 
module? 
(‘yes’ answer, 
in %) 
Is dual-use 
taught? (‘yes’ 
answer, in %) 
Australia 100 75 25 25 
Canada 75 83 43 11 
Germany 67 75 75 0 
UK 73 88 0 8 
US 80 92 83 0 
Total (all data 
except UK 
data) 
79 85 63 6 
Table 9. Country comparison based on survey responses. (n/a results are 
excluded) 
 
Country Do you have 
ethics 
training? 
(‘yes’ answer, 
in %) 
Is it 
mandatory? 
(‘yes’ answer, 
in %) 
If you have 
ethical 
training, is it 
a dedicated 
module? 
(‘yes’ answer, 
in %) 
Is dual-use 
taught? (‘yes’ 
answer, in %) 
Australia 57 75 25 14 
Canada 40 71 38 5 
Germany 53 80 75 0 
UK 50 No data 5 13 
US 62 85 75 0 
Total (all data 
except UK 
data) 
52 82 60 3 
Table 10. Country comparison based on survey and websearch. (n/a results 
are excluded)  
In terms of the overall question of the survey, to what extent is ethics being 
taught in neuroscience programs, figures 11 and 12 provide the answer. 52% 
of the courses in the survey provide some form of ethical training to their 
students. This number is higher when only those courses are considered for 
which the questionnaire was completed (79%). The discrepancy between 
these two numbers could be due to several factors. First, it is possible that 
websites are simply unreliable in providing information about such a specific 
issue as ethical training in a course. It is possible that if everyone had 
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returned the questionnaire, there would have been no difference between 
these two numbers. However, there is an alternative explanation. It may be 
that course coordinators were more likely to respond to the survey if they 
actually have something positive to say about their course. In this case, that 
they provide ethical training. Course coordinators whose courses do not 
include ethics may be reluctant to reply because they don’t want to admit that 
their course lacks something or they do not consider ethics to be important, 
which would both explain why they do not respond to a survey about ethics – 
they have no interest – and why they have no ethical training – it is not 
important. Unfortunately, it is impossible to verify which of these two 
explanations holds true as the only way to test for them is to ask those who 
did not respond as to why they did not respond, which is a catch-22. 
To get back to the survey results, if ethical training is given, it is mostly 
mandatory (85%) and predominantly in the form of a full course (63%). The 
latter result requires further elaboration. Figure 11 and 12 do not include the 
UK data because of the differences in gathering the data as explained in 
Appendix B. In the UK, the results are very different. There, none of the 
courses that teach ethics have a stand-alone ethics module. The answers to 
the questionnaire showed that in the UK the course coordinators are 
concerned that by teaching ethics in a stand-alone module the pervasive 
nature of ethical principles in neuroscience is lost to the students. Instead, 
they advocate ‘mainstreaming’ ethics throughout the entire programme. As 
coordinators responded: 
“Ethics underpins so much of what we teach it is intrinsically built 
into many sessions.” 
“We have opted for the little & often approach… because we 
believe this better achieves our objectives/learning 
outcomes/benchmark statements.” 
 
The concept of ‘mainstreaming’ has first been advocated for business 
schools because educators realized that students understand ethical 
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principles and pass an ethics class but then do not transfer this knowledge 
into other courses and eventually into their work environment. In business 
education the idea of mainstreaming is to embed issues of CSR into all 
aspects of management training. (Russell, 2006) A 2007 survey of the top 50 
business schools showed that out of 44 responding schools, 11 schools had 
a stand-alone ethics module and 24 schools integrated, or mainstreamed, 
ethics into the modules in the programme. (Christensen et al., 2007) The 
goal of mainstreaming is to make ethics more relevant and less theoretical. 
The question is if this approach can be transferred to teaching ethics to 
scientists as well. Is teaching ethics to scientists the same as teaching ethics 
to business students? Johnson argues that there are indeed significant 
differences. (Johnson, 2010) The problem is that science is culturally very 
different from philosophy/ethics and both require very specific skill sets that 
are not congruent. For example, in science, students are expected to provide 
a correct answer. In ethics, students are expected to reflect on their own 
behaviour and then develop an argument as to why they hold certain 
opinions – there is no correct answer. Science students tend to have a 
difficult time understanding what their ethics teacher want them to do and 
‘get’ precisely because of these disparate views of what teaching is all about. 
This problem raises the question of whether science students, who already 
have a hard time understanding this humanities culture and discourse, will be 
able to learn ethics if it is dispersed among their science courses? The 
negative result could be that scientists are unable to learn the critical 
reflection skills that a single module on ethics could provide and continue to 
stay within the rather positivist mind-set associated with learning science. On 
the other hand, the diffusion of ethical training throughout the curriculum 
might decrease student’s fear or depreciation of these issues. This disregard 
is due to a prevailing attitude among scientists that the humanities are inferior 
to the sciences because the humanities do not produce results and give 
‘correct’ answers. (Johnson, 2010) Discussing ethics with their science 
professor could show them that ethics is not useless but rather necessary in 
order to become a good scientist.  
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A further point about mainstreaming is that it may not necessarily be an 
intentional move to do it this way. In the UK, but also in all of the other 
surveyed countries, one of the major problems with teaching ethics is time 
constraints. Coordinators explained that further ethical training is not an 
option because curricula are already strained and it is impossible to give 
ethics a higher priority. Therefore, arguing that ethics has been 
mainstreamed may be used as an excuse not to have any ethical training or 
leaving it to the discretion of the individual faculty members rather than 
developing a departmental policy on the issue.  
In response to the last question of the survey about the specific topics that 
they teach in their ethics course, some of the respondents indicated that 
ethics may be more appropriate or necessary to teach at the postgraduate 
rather than at the undergraduate level. This bias in favour of delaying ethics 
until postgraduate education matches the survey data. Of the undergraduate 
programs that provided data, 9 out of 13 [69%] said that they give ethical 
training, whereas among the postgraduate programs 17 out of 20 [85%] do 
so. The explanation why they do not have mandatory ethical training from 
one of the postgraduate program coordinator was that they are a purely 
research based program and therefore do not provide any coursework or 
training. The undergraduate program coordinators argued that ethics may not 
be as applicable and useful to the students because they are not engaged in 
research work. This perception of when ethics is a necessary teaching 
component may create a loophole where undergraduates are exempt 
because of lack of research and postgraduates are exempt because they 
only do research and there is not time for further training. While this problem 
may be considered negligible because of the high percentage of 
postgraduate programs that provide training, it is only that high among those 
programs that completed the survey. (Table 9)  Among all programs, the 
numbers are lower and this ‘small’ issue may indeed be a larger problem. 
(Table 10)  
One additional difference between undergraduate and postgraduate 
programs is the way ethics is taught. Only 2 out of 10 [20%; Figure 13] 
undergraduate programs that teach ethics have a dedicated ethics module 
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whereas among postgraduate programs 15 out of 17 [88%; Figure 14] have 
one. While this may be indicative that a sort of mainstreaming of ethics is 
taking part in a similar way that the UK universities are approaching ethics in 
this manner, the responses from the undergraduate programs suggest that it 
is more of a reaction to the lack of a dedicated ethics program rather than the 
implementation of a new strategy. For example, the following responses were 
given for question 1 (‘Why is there no mandatory ethics course?’): 
“We deal with this on a one by one basis. We are working on 
changing this regulation to make an ethics course mandatory.” 
“Our program is relatively young, and we do not have the staffing 
for a bioethics course.” 
And for question 2 (‘Obstacles to an ethics course?’): 
“Just meeting the number of required course for the BSc leaves 
little flexibility in the program.  Also the Ethics course is not offered 
every year as there is no one person dedicated to offering the 
course.” 
“Someone to teach it and resources to support it.” 
5.2.2. Obstacles to teaching ethics to scientists 
These responses highlight another problem with teaching ethics: lack of 
trained faculty members and ethicists. Should a political decision be reached 
to increase ethical training or make ethical training mandatory, the impact of 
this effort will be stymied by the lack of trained staff to actually deliver the 
training. The Bradford Disarmament Research Centre at the University of 
Bradford, UK, has identified this problem to be the major factor determining 
the way that dual-use bioethics can be dealt with. As a result, they started a 
train-the-trainer course that provides scientists with the tools to understand 
and to deal with the dual-use problematic. (Whitby, 2012) However, in total 
less than 100 scientists have completed the training thus far and even 
though these alumni are supposed to pass on their knowledge and skills to 
their colleagues, the impact on the scientific community is as yet limited. 
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Furthermore, both Johnson’s (2010) and Gooday’s (2010) analysis of the 
challenges of teaching ethics to science students indicate that it takes 
considerable training to be able to communicate effectively with science 
students and teach them how to view a problem from an ethical perspective. 
The question arises how institutions that are not equipped with an ethics 
research centre or do not have philosophy/ethics departments that employ 
professional ethicists are able to cope with the demands of teaching ethics to 
science students? Will they be required to employ ethicists that just teach 
ethics? While having an ethicist on board might help in delivering better 
ethical training, this option may not be feasible because of budgetary 
constraints. Universities are increasingly judged by their ability to deliver 
products that extend beyond the traditional role of education. (Benneworth 
and Jongbloed, 2010; Arts & Humanities Research Council) In this climate of 
‘academic capitalism’ (Slaughter and Leslie, 2001), it is difficult to argue for 
the utility and necessity of ethicists in science departments. While a report of 
the Arts & Humanities Research Council (AHRC) in the UK argues that the 
humanities and social sciences are able to provide “research that holds 
significant value to the wider economy and to areas of public policy”, the 
need of having the AHRC lobby for these academic fields shows that their 
contributions might not be as obvious as those of the natural sciences. (Arts 
& Humanities Research Council) Department heads will thus be less inclined 
to hire an ethicist. One of the questionnaire respondents was quite frank 
about what s/he thought of the usefulness and necessity of ethicists: 
Does your ethical teaching cover the topics of dual-use bioethics, 
biosecurity or the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention? 
“Again the ethics is integrated into Brain and Behavior, 
Neuropharmacology, and the Behavioural Neurobiology courses. 
The issues of biological welfare and population control are central. 
We also cover the issue of ethics as a pretense to control thinking 
and the pursuit of specific ideas under the guise of “care for the 
public.” That ethicists are in fact unemployed philosophers is a 
central topic.” 
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Have students asked for further training in ethics?  
“No, they think the entire concept is based upon the same type of 
propaganda that dominated the communist party in the Soviet 
Union. Ethics Boards and “Ethics Committees” are effectively 
analogues of “Members of the Party” that are there to insure 
government agendas and how to think and behave are enforced. 
The process is functionally totalitarian. Anyone who has studied 
fMRI or Source localization data know that moral and ethical 
decision is a component of ventromedial prefrontal activity and 
that the details are arbitrary contrivances of the society in which 
the activity occurs.”  
What ethical issues (e.g. each chapter of On being a scientist lists 
an issue) do you think your graduates will be able to identify and 
deal with in their future careers? 
“The major ethic issue is the obsession with ethical issues rather 
than solving primary problems, such as cures for Alzheimer’s 
disease, cancer. Or genetic-determined diseases. Most students 
realize that “ethical guideline” are contrived rules to control 
behaviour, punish creativity, and allow hypermoral mentalities to 
push their own brain [brand] of parareligious concepts on to the 
general population. The term “unethical” is nothing more than a 
term that is employed by people who are really saying they do not 
agree with the research because they don’t like the research.” 
While this respondent may certainly be considered to hold an extreme 
position with regard to the utility and function of ethicists, the gist of dislike 
might be more prevalent among natural scientists. As discussed earlier as to 
the differences in results between those that are response-based compared 
to the websearch-based ones, it might be that the issue of ethics is just not 
deemed important by natural scientists and therefore their programmes do 
not offer any ethical training. Ethical consideration might in effect be 
regarded as detrimental to the effective functioning of science and any 
limitations imposed on research might stifle future advances. Although not all 
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ethics seem to fall under that category: even in this extreme case, the 
respondent said that they do discuss “biological welfare and population 
control” as well as “the essence of the Nuremburg Code and the Declaration 
of Helsinki” (this answer was given for the first survey question). Ethics is 
also mandatory in their clinical programmes. Therefore, even though ethicists 
are a red rag to the respondent, some ethical guidelines are still taught and 
followed.  
5.2.3. A case of miscommunication? 
The anger rather seems to be directed at the ethics committees that rule in a 
“totalitarian” way. The problem is therefore one of communication, which 
could be a result of the cultural difference between natural science and 
humanities, as described earlier by Johnson (2011) and Gooday (2011). If 
this is indeed a more prevalent problem, it may be necessary to review both 
the way that current ethics committees are set up as well as how their top-
down nature incites resentment rather than open up the discourse. But the 
argument also extends beyond the immediate ethics committees of the 
university. The top-down nature of legislation on science creates an 
environment where regulations at a high political level may not be able to 
consider all the implications for the local level. In the recent case of the 
transfer of H5N1 to ferrets in a Dutch laboratory, the outcome of a long 
debate about the legal nature of the experiments and their harm-benefit 
implications ultimately resulted in a US political debate about passing new 
laws for science. As Whitby (2012, prepublication manuscript) argues 
though, top-down legislation cannot be in the interest of the scientists as it is 
too rigid to allow a case by case analysis. If the Dutch scientists had debated 
the potential societal and security implications of their research prior to their 
attempt to publish it, the matter could have been handled with more 
discretion and thus not resulted in new laws and top-down regulation.  
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Topic Number of universities  
that teach it 
Human participants and animal subjects 
in research 
16 
Research misconduct 15 
Treatment of data 12 
Authorship and allocation of credit 10 
The researcher in society 9 
Mistakes and negligence 8 
Intellectual property 7 
Responsible conduct of research  6 
Responding to suspected violations of 
professional standards 
6 
Sharing of research results 6 
Competing interests, commitments, and 
values 
6 
Advising and mentoring 5 
Laboratory safety 5 
Table 11. Overview of topics that are taught as part of the ethical training in 
the universities that completed the survey based on question 4 of the 
questionnaire. (all countries, n = 19) 
In terms of the actual topics that are being taught as part of the ethical 
training, table 11 lists a variety of topics and the number of universities that 
teach these topics. These topics are taken from On being a scientist, which 
is a joint publication by the US Committee on Science, Engineering, and 
Public Policy, the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of 
Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine that is intended as a guideline for 
responsible and good behaviour by scientists. (US National Academies, 
2009) Not surprisingly for a field like neuroscience that uses both animal 
subjects and human participants, regulations about their ethical treatment 
are taught in nearly every ethics course. Research misconduct, which 
includes plagiarism, and treatment of data, for example how do I accurately 
present my information or when can I exclude data points, placed second 
and third. One of the specific focuses of this research was to find out if dual-
use, the potential danger of a malign application of technology and 
knowledge, is taught at all. While as a specific item in the questionnaire the 
number of universities that teach it was very low – 6% among those that 
responded to the survey (table 9) – the number of universities that include 
the topic of ‘the role of the researcher in society’ was very high and came in 
fourth of all topics. This discrepancy could be due to two factors. First, ‘the 
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role of the scientists in society’ encompassed more than just the dual-use 
problematic. In On being a scientist, the concept includes how the scientists 
should behave when engaging in discussions with the public because s/he 
might be viewed as an expert because they are scientists. However, 
scientists are also citizens with the right to work for social change. But when 
they become advocates it may appear as if they are biased, which would 
undermine their professional status. The solution to this problem as 
advocated by On being a scientist is that they need to be honest and open 
and committed to objectivity when they present results in their professional 
capacity. (US National Academies, 2009, p. 48) The second explanation for 
the discrepancy is a linguistic one. In addition to a theoretical introduction to 
the ethical issues, On being a scientist also gives a case study for every 
topic. In case of ‘the role of the researcher in society’, the case study is about 
Arthur W. Galston, whose early work in botany in the 1940s was later utilized 
by the US military to produce Agent Orange, the herbicide that was used in 
the Vietnam War. (US National Academies, 2009, p. 49) This scenario is a 
prime example of the dual-use problem where benign research – the 
chemical he invented actually improves plant growth – was misappropriated 
and caused harm, e.g. health risks associated with the use of the chemical. 
However, the phrase dual-use is never used in the example or anywhere 
else in the entire publication. The reason why the respondents argue that 
they do not teach dual-use is because they have never come across the term 
before. Dual-use is primarily used in debates on the international political 
levels like the conferences associated with the BWC. While there are 
scientists present at these meetings and conferences, their numbers may 
have not been high enough to actually introduce the word to their colleagues 
and introduce it into course curricula. While this problem may at first glance 
not be severe, it does restrict communication between politicians and natural 
scientists and lead to confusion as to what is actually discussed.   
Finally, with regard to safety and security, it was a surprise to see laboratory 
safety mentioned least of all issues. It is possible though that laboratory 
safety is discussed in other classes or some introductory lecture as it might 
not be considered a traditional topic for ethics.  
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In terms of the interest of students for additional training, 27 out of 33 [84%] 
respondents said that they have not been asked to deliver further ethical 
training by their students. Four of remaining five answered that students 
have made such a request, where in one case an ethics course had actually 
been devised and offered for future classes. The final respondent said that it 
happens ‘rarely’ that students request additional training. Some respondents 
argued that students prefer to do their own research and do not want to be 
subject to further training in ethics. It was also mentioned, from those 
coordinators whose ethical training is quite extensive, that they already cover 
everything that can be taught. One response was that it is most likely that 
students are not interested in further training because faculty members are 
equally non-sensitized to ethical issues. Students therefore are unaware of 
the wide range of ethical issues and thus unable to show any further interest.     
Earlier research had indicated that in the UK training is very sparse while in 
Canada a survey came to the opposite conclusion, i.e. neuroscience 
curricula are abundant with ethical training. The current study supports a 
position in the middle between those two. When taking into consideration 
only the responses to the surveys, the picture is similar to what Lombera et 
al. (2009) have found in Canada. Their data show that 62% of Neuroscience 
program directors and 91% of Strategic Training Initiative in Health Research 
principal investigators offer formal ethical training. The present study found 
that based on the survey responses, 79% of all courses provide ethical 
training, with 85% of this training being mandatory either in the form of a 
dedicated ethics course (63%) or dispersed throughout the curriculum (37%). 
(Table 9) However, when the surveys are combined with data gathered from 
the websites of all universities in the sample, the picture looks different. 
Then, only 52 % of all courses teach ethics, with 82% of it being mandatory 
and with 60% of the training being a dedicated module on ethics. (Table 10) 
The ethical training numbers for Canada alone were 40% based on all data, 
and 75% based on survey responses. (Figures 3&4) The numbers in the 
Lombera et al. (2010) article are derived from 24 participants that were 
available for a 20 minute phone interview. However, 42 individuals were 
originally approached for the interviews. The reason why 18 individuals did 
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not participate may be similar to the reasons why coordinators did not 
respond in the present study, i.e. lack of interest in the topic, lack of positive 
things to say about their course. Lombera et al. (2010) do cite this lack of 
information about non-participants as a limitation of the study. Sahakian and 
Morein-Zamir’s informal survey of 20 major research-intensive universities in 
the UK found that eight of them give formal neuroethics training (40%) and 
only five of them mention it on their website (25%). (Sahakian and Morein-
Zamir, 2009) These numbers are lower than the current results for the UK 
(72% for surveys; 50% for combined data; Figures 7 & 8). 
Dual-use as a special topic is rarely taught in ethical training. Overall only 6% 
according to survey responses (Table 9) and 3% based on all data (Table 
10) incorporate it in their ethics training. However, the topic of the role of the 
researcher in society, of which dual-use might be considered a sub-topic, is 
more prevalent and ranked fourth out of all topics that are taught in ethics 
modules (Table 11). This finding suggests a disconnect between the debate 
about ‘dual-use’ on political levels and how the issue is framed and worded 
within the scientific community.  
5.3. What lies beyond the university? 
While university education provides the basis for becoming a scientist, it is 
possible that ethical issues, and dual-use specifically, are only introduced to 
the scientists in their career as scientists. Agencies that might raise 
awareness of ethical issues could be professional organizations, which in the 
case of neuroscience are the International Brain Research Organization 
(IBRO), the Society for Neuroscience (SfN), or the Federation of European 
Neuroscience Societies (FENS), which is an umbrella organization for the 
various European country societies, e.g. the British Neuroscience Society, 
the German ‘Neurowissenschaftliche Gesellschaft’, or the French ‘Societé 
des Neurosciences’. However, neither IBRO nor the German or British 
associations have any information, guidelines, or policies with regard to 
ethical issues. The FENS has a committee on animals in research (CARE) 
but this is the only ethical topic that they address. The SfN on the other hand 
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provides a range of information and policies on ethical issues. Under their 
section on ‘Professional Conduct’ on their website, the SfN offers a variety of 
documents on both professional guidelines and policies that its members are 
required to conform with. (SfN, 2013) These policies and guidelines cover a 
variety of issues: Guidelines for Responsible Conduct Regarding Scientific 
Communication, Procedures Dealing with Allegations of Unethical Scientific 
Conduct, Policies on the Use of Animals and Humans in Neuroscience 
Research, Guidelines for Meetings and Conferences, and NIH Public Access 
Policy. (SfN, 2013) 
Under its ‘Ethics Policy’, SfN members are required to assume several 
possibilities. These duties are listed in table 12. (SfN, 2013) With regard to 
the issue of dual-use though, none of the proposed responsibilities match 
those required from scientists by the dual-use issue. For example, nothing 
comparable to the precautionary principle or the duty to prevent harm is 
mentioned (Ehni, 2008; Kuhlau et al., 2011). 
Table 12. Responsibilities of scientists according to SfN policy. 
Since dual-use specifically pertains to the issue of how to publish the 
‘Guideline for Responsible Conduct Regarding Scientific Communication’ is 
of particular relevance. The guideline contains chapters on five specific 
aspects of scientific communication, which are: authors of scientific 
communications, reviewers of manuscripts, editors of scientific journals, and 
communication outside the scientific literature. In the first chapter on 
Responsibilities 
The integrity of the scientific mission is a collective responsibility 
Data must be original and accurate 
Priority of data and ideas must be respected 
Authorship should reflect a significant intellectual contribution 
Original data should only be published once 
Every author shares responsibility 
Conflict of interest must be declared 
Pre-published material is confidential  
Research using animals and human subjects must be conducted ethically 
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authorship, the guideline highlights the duty to present data accurately and 
not to engage in forms of plagiarism, i.e. data need to be original. Authors 
should also have made substantial intellectual contributions to the paper, 
which does not permit honorary authorships. While most of these points may 
be considered rather obvious and straightforward, some of the 
recommendations could be considered as an obstacle to improve biosecurity 
and reduce the dual-use risk. For example, number 1.5. demands that “all 
data should be presented so as to minimize the possibility of 
misinterpretation.” (SfN, 2013) The fear among biosecurity experts is actually 
this commitment to publish all the information about the data because it 
increases the ease with which findings could be used for malign purposes. 
Even more problematic than the reporting of all the data are points 1.10, 
1.11, and 1.12, which are listed below in full:  
“1.10. Methods and materials should be described in sufficient 
detail to permit evaluation and replication. In science it is 
essential that other researchers be able to evaluate and, if they 
wish, to replicate published observations. This enables 
researchers to build on the work of each other, thus permitting 
the efficient use of resources. 
1.10.1. A research article should contain sufficient detail and 
reference to public sources of information in a format appropriate 
to the journal’s style and policy to allow a knowledgeable 
scientist to evaluate and replicate the work reported. 
1.10.2. The source of any materials and equipment thought to be 
crucial to the replication of the experiment should be clearly 
identified, and authors should provide details on any materials 
and protocols upon request. 
1.10.3. Any known unusual hazards inherent in the chemicals, 
equipment, or procedures used in an investigation should be 
clearly identified in the manuscript reporting the work. 
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1.11. Data sharing is encouraged. When data are published in a 
peer-reviewed journal, authors should deposit associated data in 
a suitable publicly accessible repository, when available. This 
includes nucleic acid and protein sequence data, expression 
data, neuroimaging data, and other data types currently available 
or become available in the future. Authors should, when 
possible, honor requests for access to any form of published 
data for appropriate scientific use. 
1.12. Unique and propagatable materials used in studies being 
reported must be made available to qualified scientists for bona 
fide research purposes. In some cases, the replication and 
extension of published work may require materials that are not 
readily available. In such instances, the authors must make 
every effort to provide those materials to other qualified 
scientists. Indeed, the failure of authors to provide such materials 
greatly reduces the value of their work. As noted in guidelines 
prepared by the National Institutes of Health (1990), “this 
principle requires that any unique materials . . . that are essential 
for repetition of the published experiments be available to other 
qualified scientists.” In general, editors should not accept a 
manuscript for publication unless the authors agree to the above 
conditions. 
1.12.1. Once a manuscript has been published, authors must 
promptly make available to qualified scientists for bona fide 
research purposes all materials that were used in the reported 
research and are not otherwise readily available. This includes 
propagatable research materials (such as monoclonal 
antibodies, transgenic mice, and DNA probes and constructs) 
and, where possible, non-propagatable materials (for example, 
serum antibodies). Reasonable costs associated with the 
production and transfer of these materials should be provided by 
the recipient if the authors so request. 
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1.12.2. Such materials must be provided without restrictions, 
such as the requirement that they not be used for a particular 
type of experiment. Likewise, the person providing the materials 
should not make future authorship a condition for this provision. 
Reasonable mutual agreements to avoid unnecessary overlap of 
research are encouraged. 
1.12.3. These guidelines apply equally to those in academia and 
in the private sector, except that when an individual in the private 
sector requests materials that are intended to be used for 
commercialization, it is appropriate that the individual requesting 
the materials be asked to provide a fee. 
1.12.4. Authors should try to arrange to provide these materials 
for a significant period of time after a paper has been published, 
even if the material is not in current use. 
1.12.5. Authors may, if possible, arrange to distribute materials 
through entities such as the American Type Culture Collection 
(Rockville, MD), data banks (e.g., for DNA sequences), or the 
Jackson Laboratory (Bar Harbor, ME). 
1.12.6. Authors who use materials that they obtain from another 
source should endeavor to have those materials made available 
to other researchers. 
1.12.7. In rare instances, considerations of time, money, or 
personnel may make sharing of materials impossible. In each 
such case the authors must explain these circumstances in a 
cover letter submitted with the manuscript, indicating that the 
authors are prepared to make every effort to assist others in 
creating their own materials. The editors of the journal may then 
determine whether or not to accept the manuscript for review. 
1.12.8. Certain considerations may lead authors, particularly 
those in the private sector whose work is not supported by public 
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funds, to wish to delay providing compounds being developed as 
therapeutic agents. These instances must be explained and the 
period of delay defined in a cover letter submitted with the 
manuscript. In addition, the authors might offer to supply closely 
related materials (e.g., an analog to a compound). The editors 
can then determine whether to accept the manuscript for review. 
1.12.9. If it is demonstrated that an author has failed to abide by 
these guidelines, SfN will refuse to publish any communication 
involving that author until the matter is corrected.” (SfN, 2013) 
Taken together, these three policies, while propagating the free exchange of 
ideas and openness in the scientific community, pose a serious challenge to 
biosecurity initiatives to reduce the malign use of research. While the 
provision of all the data and the information on how to repeat an experiment 
are already be enough to create the threat of a malign use of research the 
provision of all of the material used in research increases this risk even 
further. What is surprising is that authors are expected to provide their 
materials to other scientists no matter what those scientists intend to do with 
it as explained in 1.12.2. The only restriction or concern about sharing 
material pertains to issues of commercial interests in which case the 
requesting researcher should be expected to pay a fee, see 1.12.3. The 
document is therefore not only completely devoid of any concerns about the 
role of the research in society, the implications of their research for society, 
and the potential of misuse of scientific findings and technology, but the 
openness it encourages heightens security concerns about misapplication. 
This lack of awareness of biosecurity is a surprise when taking into 
consideration the joint statement by the editors of several scientific journals 
about their commitment to biosecurity, published in a Nature editorial in 2003. 
(Nature, 2003) While the editor of the Journal of Neuroscience, which is 
published by the SfN, was not a signatory to the editorial, it is hard not to take 
notice of a joint statement by a number of editors of very prestigious journals.  
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5.4. Conclusion 
The purpose of the chapter was to provide a topography of ethics among 
neuroscientists. Instead of asking and confronting neuroscientists directly, 
which Rappert found out to be counterproductive, the issue was approached 
by looking at how neuroscientists are trained at the universities. Specifically, 
what ethical training they are given and what issues are addressed in this 
training. Overall, ethical training is given in about half of the courses that 
were surveyed. The specific issue of dual-use bioethics was only mentioned 
in 3% of all courses. However, the topic of the role of the researcher in 
society, ranked fourth among all topics discussed in the ethical training. Of 
course, the latter issue deals with potentially contains more issues besides 
dual-use, for example, how the researcher is supposed to behave in public 
debates and how to deal with the responsibility of being considered an expert 
on some issues. So biosafety and biosecurity issues, e.g. the potential 
negative implications of research on society, do not feature prominently 
among the training of neuroscientists. It is therefore not a surprise to see 
none of the biosecurity concerns discussed in the ethical guidelines set by 
the Society of Neuroscience, one of the premier professional associations for 
neuroscientists. The other major organization, the International Brain 
Research Organization, does not even feature any guidelines on ethics at all. 
Neuroscience as a field is therefore ill-equipped to understand and deal with 
the security and ethical implications of its research.  
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Chapter 6: Interval 
6.1. The story thus far… 
The thesis initially set out to look at the issue of the dual-use problem by 
following the actors that are involved in the debate. Starting with the security 
community, and specifically the actors working on the Biological Weapon 
Convention, the thesis painted a landscape of all the elements that are 
involved in the discussion. In the course of this portrayal, the picture that 
unfolded was one in which the security community was interested in 
addressing the problem of dual-use by debating how science could be 
regulated and how a political solution could be found and how it could be 
implemented. The most surprising aspect in following the actors was that 
links with the scientific community were rather weak. For example, among 
the UK delegation that attended the Review Conference of the BWC no 
actual practising scientists were included. It appears as if the security 
community is discussing a problem that is deeply situated in the scientific 
field, yet the scientific community has only been marginally included in 
debating the problem. Of course, it may be argued that the security 
community has been aware of this lack of involvement and therefore has 
stressed the importance of awareness and education among scientists. Yet, 
despite repeated pledges to work towards dual-use awareness and 
education by States Parties, chapter five of this thesis has shown that 
success of any initiatives by the security community have been marginal at 
best. While there is some ethics education for neuroscientists, even if not in 
the majority of cases, the issue of dual-use is practically not existent in 
course curricula, let alone a discussion or debate on the Biological Weapons 
Convention. The situation in general life sciences is similar. Neuroscience 
was initially picked as a focus for the thesis because of the relative proximity 
of neuroscientific research for society, e.g. it might be easier to think about 
the societal and security implications when working on fear compared to 
working on some enzyme mechanism.  
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Yet, the neuroscience profession does not include considerations of the 
societal impact of its research and subsequent technologies as a necessary 
tool. In contrast to what the security community has tried to accomplish, i.e. 
limiting access to research that could easily be used for malign purposes, the 
Society for Neuroscience explicitly states in the rules for publishing in their 
premier Journal of Neuroscience that any materials used in research needs 
to be made available to others scientists without any reservations unless 
there are business or financial interests at stake.  
Subsequently, the thesis discussed the current interest of Neuroethics in the 
topic of dual-use bioethics. The rationale behind analysing this field was that 
that the security community may have utilised or created interest among 
ethicists. Creating linkages with the ethicists may have helped the security 
community to better understand how to raise awareness and create interests 
in ethical issues. However, as seen in chapter four, the interest and 
awareness of the dual-use issue in the ethics community is rather limited as 
well. In general, there is little interaction between neuroethicists and any 
policy-makers.  
So after following the actors, the inquiry has come to a halt and a question 
has crystallized: Why is there so limited interaction between these three 
communities? Why has the security community in the more than ten years 
after the disaster in 2001 and the reorientation towards the problem of dual-
use been unable to introduce the topic to the scientific community and 
initiated a shift in education, publication policies, and professional codes of 
conduct? Why have ethicists not been involved? What have been the 
obstacles to such developments? How could the interaction be improved? 
Looking in closer detail, there are several issues that might be pursued 
further independently of each other. As each community could be linked with 
every other, each of these interactions could be discussed and analysed 
further. At this point, the thesis has to choose which linkage (or lack thereof) 
to investigate further: between security and science, security and ethicists, or 
ethicists and scientists? As the initial push for a discussion of dual-use 
originated in the security community, the security community seems to be the 
best starting point. And given that the security community locates the 
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problem in the scientific community, it seems most reasonable to try to 
understand why the connections and pushes for change from the security 
community have has such limited impact to the work of scientists. 
But how is the thesis, whose methodological approach was based on 
Latour's Actor-Network Theory supposed to understand or discuss this lack 
of connections? Latour holds that one should follow the actors in order to find 
out what is going on in a field. After having done this and having found barely 
any linkages, the question looms: and what now? To adopt Latour's 
language, the ANT has walked in the security, science and ethics 
communities  trying to understand their involvement in the problem of dual-
use. It found very limited interaction between the members of these groups. 
There are now two alternatives for the continuation of the thesis: either to be 
more of a social activist, i.e. to change behaviour, and try to understand how 
interaction between these groups could be improved; or to understand why 
the interaction is so limited and in this process reflect on what sort of problem 
the dual-use issue is. Both are equally tenable and laudable. The 
philosophical reflections in the methodology chapter do not help in choosing 
between either course of action – it is a matter of personal preference and 
interest. And the choice is for the latter. One reason is that during the work 
leading up to this chapter, I have read up on various social theorists and 
philosophers interested in understanding social interaction. Additionally, the 
limited discussion of dual-use under the label of dual-use, i.e. the papers 
discussed in the ethics chapter 4, might benefit from further discussion. On a 
level of personal interaction, the way in which the dual-use problem is being 
over-simplistically portrayed as a problem for scientists at conferences also 
creates an interest to ask if it is really just a problem for scientists. 
In order to do so, it is necessary to go back to theory, and more specifically 
theories that discuss change in and interaction between social communities. 
One particular theory that has argued for the difficulty of one social system 
influencing and determining the role of another social system can be found in 
the Social Systems theory of German sociologist Niklas Luhmann. Thus, the 
second part of the thesis will show what utility in the sense of helping to 
understand a problem Luhmann's theory may offer to the security and 
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science communities for the dual-use issue. However, before engaging with 
Luhmann directly, it is necessary to address in the remainder of this chapter 
a complaint that could be lodged against this approach: Does the thesis 
violate its own methodology by using Social System theory? 
The complaint in the longer form could take the following route: In its 
methodological section, the author argued that he will not engage in any 
meta-theoretical debate but will try to follow actors and not take anything for 
granted. He will not fall back to some a priori concepts but rather stick to the 
field, walk with the actors, and treat their ontologies and metaphysics with 
sincerity. And now, suddenly out of nowhere, some grand theory such as 
Luhmann's is suddenly walking in blatantly through not even the back door 
but is invited straight in via the Grand Foyer. In other words, how can 
discussing Luhmann be compatible with Latour? 
6.2. Flirting with methods: What neopragmatists think we can do 
It is now time to revisit the methodology chapter of the thesis (chapter two) 
and remind us of the actual origins of the philosophical deliberations within 
that chapter. The question at the end of the last section presumes that this 
thesis works according to the philosophical programme set discussed by 
Latour in the first half, i.e. the four ‘uncertainties’, of his book Reassembling 
the Social. (Latour, 2005) Yet, the actual philosophical arguments of the 
methodology section were based on Donald Davidson and Richard Rorty, 
specifically their treatment of the concept of truth. Latour was only 
introduced, even though he takes up the most space in the chapter, because 
he could be considered to have a methodology that aligns with the discussion 
of these two analytical philosophers. The thesis thus does not follow Latour, it 
only applies Latour as long as it is useful. Latour was only helpful because 
neither Davidson nor Rorty have anything to say about actually conducting 
social science research. So the real question is the following: Can I use 
Luhmann given the neopragmatist current that pervades the thesis? 
Presumably, this question might only be answered after a thorough review of 
what Luhmann actually advocates in terms of theory. Yet, neopragmatism 
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might be capable to help in understanding the way in which we will 
understand Luhmann, i.e. the utility of using his theory, even before having 
said anything about him. How can this be done? Well, the argument goes 
back to the original question of what truth is. Or more specifically, as Rorty 
puts it as a title for one of his essays: Is Truth a Goal of Inquiry? (Rorty, 
1998) 
As indicated in the methodology chapter of this thesis, it should come as no 
surprise that Rorty does not believe that truth can be a goal of inquiry. In this 
essay, which has the subtitle Donald Davidson versus Crispin Wright, Rorty, 
using Davidson’s theory of truth (or lack thereof; i.e. his quietism), to engage 
with Wright’s criticism of pragmatism’s minimalism with regard to truth. 
(Rorty, 1998) Most of the arguments have already been discussed in the 
sections on neo-pragmatism and Davidson in the methodology section, i.e. 
Davidson’s discussion of truth and his defence against accusations of being 
a relativist. This short section thus primarily serves as a reminder about the 
implications of not having a theory of truth, or rather only a theory of truth that 
is non-epistemic. As Rorty has pointed out in Science as Solidarity the best 
we, i.e. scientists, can do is to engage in a rhetoric of social solidarity with 
our colleagues. (Rorty, 1991b) Yet, this should not be understood that truth is 
coherence among the actors. Truth is simply not a goal of inquiry. It does not 
serve any epistemic purpose. As Rorty points out: 
“If Dewey and Davidson were asked, “What is the goal of inquiry?” the best 
either could say would be that is has many different goals, none of which 
have any metaphysical presuppositions – for example, getting what we want, 
the improvement of man’s estate, convincing as many audiences as possible, 
solving as many problems as possible.” (Rorty, 1998, p. 38, 39)  
So what does this ‘quietism’ about truth do to the problem about the 
incompatibility of Latour and Luhmann? The defence against claims of 
methodological incongruence could be something like this: While the 
methodology chapter asserted that Latour’s ANT theory was compatible with 
neopragmatism as an approach to an issue, Luhmann is useful in that his 
theory is compatible with an approach towards understanding the problem of 
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dual-use, or more specifically that Luhmann might help to understand why 
the solutions to the problem of dual-use have been problematic. Neither 
Latour nor Luhmann are true, at least not true in the sense of congruence 
with metaphysical claims or with reality. Yet, neither is false either. Truth is 
simply not a goal of inquiry. In a more traditional thesis, the following 
chapters would explain Luhmann and then critique and verify his theory. In a 
neopragmatist study, Luhmann is simply useful because he provides a new 
perspective. But why pick Luhmann in the first place? Well, Luhmann has 
claimed, based on his theory, that science is resilient to change from the 
outside and this claim seems to be mirrored in the empirical data that were 
gathered and analysed in the previous three chapters. But this overlap 
should not indicate that the data validate his theory. Luhmann might be still 
be ‘wrong’ (although this claim would have no real meaning to a neo-
pragmatist). As Rorty puts it: “This is also his [Davidson's] attitude toward the 
difference between the manifest and the scientific image: use whatever 
image is handy for the purpose at hand, without worrying about which is 
closer to reality.” (Rorty, 1991c, p. 156) 
Neopragmatism is concerned with real problems. In the present case, dual-
use and the unsatisfying solutions to dual-use are problems. If these 
problems are looked at through a Luhmannian lens, there are certain 
outcomes and insights, which could help us (‘us’ being all actors involved in 
and affected by the debate) to get a different, hitherto unseen, picture of the 
problem. And potentially, the insight might even help us to come up with a 
new approach to the problem. This is the goal of this thesis: to enable actors 
to think about their work in a way that they have not done before.  
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Chapter 7: Systems Theory: From General Systems to Social Systems 
7.0 Introduction 
Systems Theory, or more specifically general systems theory, emerged at the 
beginning of the second half of the 20th century. According to Ludwig von 
Bertalanffy, who first developed the idea and also published the standard text 
on ‘General Systems Theory’, which this introduction heavily draws upon, the 
theory developed as a response to advances in technology, particularly 
computers and automation. (Von Bertalanffy, 1973) With the ability to 
produce ever more sophisticated, self-controlling machines, the focus of 
research in this area has shifted from understanding single machines to 
those in ‘systems’. He cites ballistic missiles and space vehicles as 
technologies that are beyond the ability of a single engineer, unlike a radio or 
automobile. These modern technologies encompassed specialists from the 
fields of chemistry, mechanics, electronics and others. Von Bertalanffy 
argues that this increased complexity requires us to think about the relations 
between man and machine, and how it gives rise to financial, economic, 
social and political problems. (Von Bertalanffy, 1973, p. 2) What systems 
theory tries to accomplish is to provide the tools to specialists, or teams of 
specialists, to understand and develop systems that relate to these diverse 
fields in order to come up with solutions to optimize efficiency. Even though 
systems theory originated in the fields of technology and cybernetics, it was 
taken up in a number of other fields, e.g. psychology, biology, sociology.  
Von Bertalanffy was the first author to argue for a general systems theory. 
While theoretical precursors to the theory can be found in the writings of a 
large variety of authors in several fields, e.g. biology, economics, 
mathematics, the project of a general systems theory was initiated during a 
meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in 
1954, where von Bertalanffy, K. Boulding, an economist, A. Rapoport, a 
biomathematician, and R. Gerard, a physiologist, decided to establish a 
Society for General Systems Research. The Society had several functions: 
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“(1) investigate the isomorphy of concepts, laws and models in various fields, 
and to help in useful transfers from one field to another; (2) encourage the 
development of adequate theoretical models in in the fields which lack them; 
(3) minimize the duplication of theoretical efforts in different fields; (4) 
promote the unity of science through improving communications among 
specialists.” (Von Bertalanffy, 1973, p. 13) Concurrent with their efforts, other 
important contributions were made in the field of cybernetics, information 
theory, and game theory. These present specific instances of parts of general 
systems theory, but do not constitute the building blocks of the theory itself. 
According to von Bertalanffy, general systems theory is an example of a 
Kuhnian scientific revolution, in which a field is transformed entirely and new 
questions, problems and methods replace old ones. “The systems problem is 
essentially the problem of the limitations of analytical procedures in science.” 
(Von Bertalanffy, 1973, p. 16) Of course, analysis, derived from the Greek 
ana, meaning ‘up’, and lysis, ‘loosen’ or ‘rupture’, thus implies a ‘breaking up’ 
of things into its constituent parts is the opposite of what a general systems 
theory that synthesizes from a variety of field does. In metaphysical 
language, the theory applies the notion that ‘the whole is greater than the 
sum of its parts’, which has been attributed to Aristotle. Classical science has 
been engaged in a reductionist method, which is to understand the greater by 
breaking it apart and trying to understand the ever smaller, e.g. 
understanding molecules based on elements, which are broken into particles 
and eventually down to electrons and quarks. Or in biology, the organism is 
understood by analysis of its cells. Of course, this method has been highly 
successful. However, it can only be successful if two conditions are met: first, 
the interaction between parts has to be non-existent or weak enough to be 
negligible. If one believes to be able to understand the organism by looking 
only looking at its cells, these cells had better not communicate with each 
other to a large degree. If they do, one needs to understand these 
interactions and the organism can no longer be considered as the collection 
of individual cells but rather as the interaction of cells. The second restriction 
is that the “relations describing the behaviour of the parts be linear;… an 
equation describing the behaviour of the total is of the same form as the 
equations describing the behaviour of the parts; partial processes can be 
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superimposed to obtain the total process.” (Von Bertalanffy, 1973, p. 17) On 
the other hand, systems are non-reductionist. “Systems or ‘organized 
complexity’ (Von Bertalanffy, 1973, p. 33) may be circumscribed by the 
existence of ‘strong interactions’ (Rapoport, 1966) or interactions which are 
‘nontrivial (Simon, 1965), i.e., nonlinear.” (Von Bertalanffy, 1973, p. 17) 
Therefore, systems theory engages with problems that require methods that 
go beyond the analytical tools of classical science. Von Bertalanffy gives a 
wide variety of approaches that have been used to deal with those kind of 
problems. For example, classical mathematics has been the field that tries to 
find general principles that can be applied to specifics, for example how 
kinetics can be used to understand populations of molecules, or diffusion 
equations from chemistry can be used to predict the spread of rumours. (Von 
Bertalanffy, 1973, p. 17, 18) Cybernetics deals with control systems which 
use communication between the system and its environment and within the 
system for the control of the system. (Von Bertalanffy, 1973, p. 19) Even 
game theory, which discusses the behaviour of supposedly 'rational' actors 
might fall into the systems sciences. (Von Bertalanffy, 1973, p. 20)  
One of the major problems is that even though these mathematical tools are 
very sophisticated, their applicability to actual problems is doubtful. For 
example, game theory has been applied to war and politics but it does not 
appear as if political decision-making and the state of the world has actually 
improved. (Von Bertalanffy, 1973, p. 21) The fundamental issues that while 
these approaches are useful in describing the maintenance of systems, they 
are unable to account for change, evolution, or creativity. What is needed is 
not only an account of homeostasis but also of heterostasis. Open systems 
theory tries to account for the latter as it allows for the introduction of things 
from the environment into the system. Von Bertalanffy warns that even 
though open systems theory has had some success in biology, it should 
neither be applied to other fields for which it was not intended nor be 
transformed into some metaphysical reality. (Von Bertalanffy, 1973, p. 21) 
While mathematical models are useful in their precision and can be falsified 
by observable data, in the absence of adequate models, it may only be 
possible to utilize verbal models. He cites psychoanalysis or the theory of 
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selection as examples. (Von Bertalanffy, 1973, p. 22) Verbal models are 
simply models expressed using our ordinary language and can still be cited 
among systems theory because of their value as guiding principles. The 
issue of the when mathematical models start to fail is one of numbers. “The 
fundamental statement of automata theory is that happenings that can be 
defined in a finite number of 'words' can be realized by an automaton (e.g. a 
formal neural network..., or a Turing machine).” (Von Bertalanffy, 1973, p. 23) 
However, what happens if the number is not infinite but still very large? 
Rapoport (1959) discussed the following scenario: Imagine a directed graph 
containing N points. Each pair can either be connected or not. The number of 
possibilities is 2N(N-1) to connect N points. For N = 5, there are more than 1 
million ways; if N = 20, there are 2.46 * 10114, or put more imaginable, more 
than the estimated number of atoms in the universe. Of course, writing in 
2013, more than 50 years after Rapoport, we have computers that far exceed 
what could have been considered possible for automatons in the 50s or 60s. 
Nevertheless, even for modern computer technology, the issue of high 
number is still a problem as insurmountable as 50 years ago. For example, 
towards the end of the last century, the Chess Computer Deep Blue 
managed to defeat then World Champion Garri Kasparov. Some wondered if 
this defeat heralded some new age of artificial intelligence or that computers 
have finally surpassed human intelligence. However, what is hardly noticed in 
the Western World is that there is a similar game to Chess in Asia, called Go, 
which has fewer rules and presumably easier to learn than chess. Go is 
played on a board that contains a 19x19 grid of intersecting lines. A turn 
consists in putting a stone, just like chess there are black and white stones, 
on an intersection. If a stone is surrounded on all four adjacent spaces by 
enemy stones, it is removed from the game. In Go, no computer has ever 
been able to defeat a professional Go player. In fact, most players with about 
1 year of experience will be able to defeat the most sophisticated Go 
computers. The problem is twofold. First, there are way more possibilities to 
place a stone compared to Chess (the first player has 361 (19*19) options, 
the next 360 option, and so on until stones actually get taken off the board). 
Deep Blue was able to calculate up to the next 14 moves in chess. If Deep 
Blue had tried to calculate the next 14 moves ahead in Go before making his 
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move it would have taken him 1.5 years for every move. (Johnson, 1997) The 
second problem is that unlike chess, where winning a pawn is a big success, 
in Go there is no easy way measure what is a success, what leads to a win 
or even knowing who is ahead at all. In Go, one has to understand the wider 
picture of the game. It is more about territories than about individual battles. 
Chess by comparison is more of a single battle. The conclusion to draw from 
these practical limitations is that the idea that automatons of any sort will not 
be able to provide us with a model to understand all types of systems in our 
world.  
The issue of large numbers (events, possibilities) as well as of arbitrary 
disturbances, which equally make modelling impossible for automatons, 
pertain to a larger concept underlying the general theory of systems: 
hierarchic order. Von Bertalanffy argues that our science subscribes to a 
vision of the universe that is hierarchically ordered. We argue that our 
particles make up atoms, which in turn make up elements, then molecules, 
cells, organisms, and supra-individual organisms. While Von Bertalanffy does 
not mention Carnap, this position aligns with Carnap's The Logical Structure 
of the World. (Carnap, 1928) Due to this ordering, there exist a variety of 
system models with concepts, models, and principles for various fields. 
However, it was the goal of von Bertalanffy to understand and describe the 
general concepts than any other specialised model has to subscribe to – a 
general theory of systems. This chapter will point out these general criteria in 
order to understand how Luhmann derived his theory of social systems 
based on these general criteria. 
7.1. The concepts behind a general systems theory 
Why is a theory of general systems needed? Von Bertalanffy argues that 
modern science is more and more subject to specialisation. The reason for 
this trend is that as we try to understand anything better, we are presented 
with increasing complexity. Our way to deal with this complexity is to 
specialise and split into smaller and smaller sub-disciplines that are gradually 
less and less capable of talking to each other. What Von Bertalanffy found 
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surprising in this development is that at the same time various scientific 
communities tended to discuss a similar issue: that these fields instead of 
pursuing a reductionist, analytic course, suddenly became aware that the 
whole cannot be explained by just its parts. For example, in quantum 
physics, it became clear because of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle that 
one needs to look at the whole rather than try to follow the singular entity; In 
biology, instead of just looking at the individual cells, one needs to 
understand the interaction between the cells; And in sociology, studying the 
individual was no longer enough in order to understand society. The shift in 
focus opened up the way towards more generalized systems. Unlike before, 
attempts to develop exact laws outside the physical sciences gained 
recognition. Alongside this interest, theory has been expanded to deal not 
only with closed systems but with open systems, which are characterized by 
an exchange between the system and the environment, which is what 
organisms do. Other elements that have been incorporated and discussed 
are irreversible processes as well as disequilibrium. (Von Bertalanffy, 1973, 
p. 31) As generalized systems have become fashionable, there have to be 
some universal principles that apply to systems in general. The advantage of 
identifying these principles is as follows: [“A]n exponential law of growth 
applies to certain bacterial cells, to populations of bacteria, populations of 
bacteria, of animals and humans, and to the publications in genetics or 
science in general.” (Von Bertalanffy, 1973, p. 32) Even though all entities 
are very different, the mathematical law applies to all of them. Or some laws 
to describe competition in animals and plants are applicable to physical 
chemistry as well as economics. The advantage of studying general systems 
theory is to avoid that similar laws are found in distinct academic fields that 
express the same underlying principle. If these laws were suggested as 
generalizable, it would speed up research in the specialised fields. A second, 
very important advantage of general systems theory pertains to the issue of 
the organization of complexity.  
In the physical sciences, there is only organized complexity, e.g. gas 
behaviour is organized by the laws of thermodynamics. However, in the 
biological, behavioural, and social sciences, unorganized complexity is to be 
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found, which is based on chance as well as the second law of 
thermodynamics. (Von Bertalanffy, 1973, p. 33) Von Bertalanffy claims that 
“[g]eneral systems theory is, in principle, capable of giving exact definitions 
for such concepts and, in suitable cases, of putting them into quantitative 
analysis.” (Von Bertalanffy, 1973, p. 33)  
One criticism against general systems theory is that it just tries to apply 
mathematics to a variety of problems. However, as Von Bertalanffy argues, 
this is a misconception. As explained earlier, it may be true that mathematics, 
for example simple differential equations, enable us to predict very different 
phenomena, e.g. radioactive decay and extinction of human populations with 
insufficient reproduction. However, as discussed earlier, these simple 
mathematical models fail in cases of large phenomena or in open systems. 
General systems theory wants to develop a new mathematical thinking that 
takes into consideration issues of organization or systemic openness. A 
second issue that might be raised is that if this is indeed the goal of general 
systems theory, it may simply provide meaningless analogies. Von 
Bertalanffy holds that it is not analogies that are sought but rather 
understanding abstractions and conceptual models can be applied to 
different phenomena. It is thus not different from the general scientific 
method, where the laws of gravity hold true for the planetary system, tidal 
waves and objects falling. And these cases are certainly not analogies. A 
third contention that can be raised is that general systems theory lacks 
explanatory value as we are yet unable to provide full accounts of the 
phenomena that go beyond classical mathematical explanations. But, as Von 
Bertalanffy claims, even if it is not yet possible to provide full explanations, it 
is nevertheless useful to provide, borrowing from economist Hayek, 
'explanations in principle'. What Hayek argues is that economists might not 
be able to predict in changes in the stock market with regard to specific 
shares and stock (as evidenced by the fact that not all economists are 
millionaires). However, they are able to provide generalized trends and 
explanations, which is superior to having no explanation at all. “If and when 
we are able to insert the necessary parameters, system-theoretical 
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explanation 'in principle' becomes a theory, similar in structure to those of 
physics.” (Von Bertalanffy, 1973, p. 35)  
General Systems Theory pursues five goals: 
“(1) There is a general tendency towards integration in the various 
sciences, natural and social. 
 Such integration seems to be centred in a general theory of systems. 
 Such theory may be an important means of aiming at exact theory in 
the nonphysical fields of science. 
 Developing unifying principles running ' vertically' though the universe 
of the individual sciences, this theory brings us nearer to the goal of 
the unity of science. 
 This can lead to a much-needed integration in scientific education.” 
(Von Bertalanffy, 1973, p. 37) 
Von Bertalanffy gives a variety of concepts and developments that general 
systems theory has deployed. As some of these will be utilized by Luhmann 
later on, it is necessary to have a basic understanding of their meaning.   
7.1.1. Open and closed systems 
A closed system is one which does not have any interaction with its 
environment. For example, in physical chemistry one looks at the reactions 
and chemical equilibrium within a closed vessel. Based on our physical 
understanding of these closed systems, we know that all systems tend 
toward maximum entropy, which is maximum disorder. For example, putting 
a drop of ink into a glass of water will result in the ink particles to disperse as 
much as possible within the water. 
On the other hand are open systems, for example any living organism is an 
open system. There is continuous inflow and outflow, and the system never 
reaches any sort of chemical or thermodynamic equilibrium. It does however 
remain in a steady state. Thus, our physical understanding of the world may 
seem to be unable to explain this open system. However, Von Bertalanffy 
argues that there are several principles that an extension of physics to open 
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system has delivered. While in closed systems, the initial starting conditions 
(e.g. quantities of reagents) determine the final state, in open systems many 
different starting conditions can lead to the same final stage. This property is 
called 'equifinality' and according to Von Bertalanffy does not violate classical 
physics. Another principle that may seem to be incompatible with open 
systems is the push towards entropy in closed system. In living systems, it 
appears that instead of an even distribution of energy (which would result in a 
sterile world), the living world creates “higher order, heterogeneity, and 
organization.” (Von Bertalanffy, 1973, p. 40) But one has to take into 
consideration when looking at open systems that they do not only produce 
entropy but they also take up entropy from the environment, which can be 
negative. Thus may can avoid the accumulation of entropy and maintain a 
steady state without violating classical physics.  
7.1.2. Information and entropy 
Connected with systems theory is theory of communication. While it can be 
argued that communication theory deals with the flow of information, which 
may seem to correspond to the flow of energy, it is equally possible, and 
more advantageous, to measure communication in terms of decisions. Von 
Bertalanffy gives the example of the game of Twenty Questions, where one 
asks a yes/no question in order to identify an object. The information 
provided by one answer is a decision between two alternatives. After two 
questions we can decide on one out of four possibilities, after three questions 
one out of eight. This measurement of communication in terms of decisions 
leads to a decrease in disorder, or negative entropy.  
A second concept in communication is that of feedback. Feedback systems 
work in a variety of biological, technological, and social systems and they 
provide us with the information to make purposeful actions. The field of 
cybernetics has been developed in order to study this form of regulation. 
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7.1.3. Causality and teleology 
Unlike its scientific forefathers, modern science has started to understand 
and take interest in the concept that systems need to be understood in terms 
of the interplay of its elements rather than to split reality into ever smaller 
elements, which is the analytic method. This shift has given rise to the 
possibility that systems are not just probabilistic and a product of chance 
lacking any ability to pursue goals. Equifinality has already been discussed 
as one way to think about the possibility of a telos.  
7.1.4. What is ‘organization’? 
Just as the possibility of reality as goal-oriented has entered the worldview of 
science, the concept of organization has also appeared. In a mechanistic 
world, organizations are of no importance. However, as science has 
advanced we come to the understanding that nearly all things are 
organizations of some kind. Even protons and neutrons are formed from 
tinier particles. “Characteristic of organization, whether of a living organism or 
a society, are notions like those of wholeness, growth, differentiation, 
hierarchical order, dominance, control, competition, etc.” (Von Bertalanffy, 
1973, p. 46) While some of these concepts can be defined using 
mathematical models, not all organization can be explained using 
quantitative analysis. At best, we can provide 'explanations in principle', 
which is nevertheless better than no explanation at all. According to Von 
Bertalanffy, Boulding's work, The Organizational Revolution, can be seen as 
an example of the application of general systems theory to human society. 
Boulding postulates certain Iron Laws that hold for all organizations, e.g. that 
the growth of its population is larger than that of its resources: the Malthusian 
Law. Von Bertalanffy believed that theorems of this type could be enlarged 
and developed in a mathematical way.  
While these concepts and developments might be interesting in their own 
rights, what are their implications for the social sciences? The reminder of 
this chapter is devoted to explain the theory of social systems as developed 
by German sociologist Niklas Luhmann. While there are certainly differences 
133 
 
between Von Bertalanffy and Luhmann, it was the goal of this introduction to 
general systems theory to explain some of the basic ideas behind systems 
theory as well as highlight the thinking and intentions behind establishing the 
theory. 
7.2. Luhmann's basics I: System and function 
7.2.1. Why systems? 
For Luhmann, the question of systems is a question about reality. Not only do 
systems refer to reality, systems are part of reality. They therefore describe 
the world and themselves, which makes systems self-referential. From an 
epistemological view, systems come before any metaphysics, which is 
congruent with Latour and the neo-pragmatists. As such, an analysis of 
systems at the general level does not provide meta-truths and possibilities 
but works towards identifying problems. But Luhmann also thinks that it is not 
just mere analogy that social systems theory provides either. Luhmann works 
towards generalization and respecification in order to help identify concepts 
that formulate problems. So a general theory of social systems means that 
every social contact is understood as a system, including society that 
encompasses all possible contacts. As a universal theory, systems theory 
tries to go beyond the dualisms that classical sociological theories have 
discussed, e.g. structure versus process or static versus dynamic. The goal 
of universality, however, does not claim an 'exclusive correctness'. The 
reason is the aforementioned notion that systems are part of this reality. 
Systems theory is self-referential in that it analyses itself as “a research 
program of a subsystem (sociology) of a subsystem (science) of the societal 
system.” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 16) Luhmann's systems theory therefore does 
not present itself as a grand meta-narrative. In this regard, Luhmann does 
not differ from Latour's critique of social theory as discussed in chapter two.  
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7.2.2. System properties 
While there is no single unified field based on general systems theory, it does 
comprise a variety of research efforts that come across problems not 
encountered beforehand, as discussed by Von Bertalanffy. For Luhmann, the 
basic idea of systems theory is the difference between system and 
environment. (Luhmann, 1995, p. 16) Both exist due to their difference from 
each other, with the system being the boundary setting actor. Environments 
are unbounded, whereas the system excludes itself from the environment. 
These boundaries do not prescribe unbreakable barriers though but an 
exchange between system and environment is possible, e.g. exchange of 
energy or information. In terms of notions of power, while only the system 
can act, it is not the case that either system or environment control or 
dominate the other. There is no one-sided dependence. Between systems 
though, it is possible that a system determines the system/environment 
relations of another system, albeit it never fully dominates it. When thinking of 
systems, one “must distinguish between the environment of a system and 
systems in the environment of this system.” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 17)  Hence, 
any environment of a system is in itself a “confusedly complex structure of 
reciprocal system/environment relations.” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 18)   
To complicate matters even further, every system contains subsystems that 
contain their own system/environment relations. The higher system provides 
the entire internal environment for other systems. “This system differentiation 
is a process of increasing complexity.” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 18) One might 
think of a hierarchy – without any power inferences – within systems. Every 
system has further subsystems that again have further subsystems. 
However, while this concept might strictly apply to some organizational 
forms, it is not given that subsystems are only formed within subsystems. 
The environment of any subsystem may extend beyond the division of its 
hierarchically 'higher-up' system. For any observer, she may start to identity 
levels of hierarchy based on the self-simplifications of the differentiation of a 
system. However, she may have to beware that other chaotic differentiations 
are also possible and likely to emerge and survive.  
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The system/environment distinction also needs to be differentiated from the 
element/relation distinction. Any system contains elements and relations 
between these elements. This is a different separation than the 
subsystem/internal environment one. Luhmann uses the analogy of a house: 
if a system is a house, the individual rooms will be subsystems while the 
cinder blocks, beams, nails, etc. play the role of the elements/relations 
distinction. (Luhmann, 1995, p. 21) The former is the system differentiation 
whereas the latter denotes a system complexity.  
While elements in a system can certainly be quantified, Luhmann argues that 
it is the relations between the elements that give them any qualitative value. 
This notion mimics Von Bertalanffy's critique of the analytical method, which 
aims to understand the larger picture by just understanding their constitutive 
parts. This concept is actually very similar to Latour's theory of the actor 
networks and how actors are not just intermediaries but mediators that 
continuously shape and reproduce their network. Luhmann and Latour differ 
in one significant aspect though: For Latour, the main objective is to simply 
follow the actors as much and far as possible and identify all movements. For 
Luhmann, it is important to understand “how systems qualify as elements the 
elements that compose them.” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 21) Unlike Latour, 
Luhmann believes that “the unit of an element (e,g, an action in an action 
system) is not ontically pre-given.” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 22) For Latour, it was 
important that researchers realize that the elements, e.g. actors, have a 
metaphysics of their own. In systems theory, a relational structure of the 
system needs to exist in order to provide unity to actions or actors within that 
system. An example from quantum physics might exemplify the issue. Since 
the beginning of quantum physics, there has been a debate as to the true 
nature of the electron. In some types of experiments, an electron behaves 
like a particle whereas in other experiments it behaves like a wave. Being a 
wave and being a particle are mutually exclusive. So one might be interested 
to pose the question, what is an electron? This question presupposes that we 
can put an electron somewhere into empty space, away from all matter and 
energy, and then we should be able to indisputably determine the nature of 
an electron. However, we are unable to do so. We can only ever observe the 
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electron as part of a system. There is always an observation as well as an 
experiment going on when looking at the electron. In this sense, most of 
modern physics has given up trying to understand the 'real' nature of the 
universe. We simply have to deal with the fact that sometimes the electron 
behaves like a particle and sometimes it behaves like a wave. The system 
constitutes the nature or unity, in Luhmann's language, of its elements.  
However, Luhmann agrees that it may be disputed if the unity comes from 
the system in a top-down way or if it is created through its constituent parts in 
a bottom-up manner. He decides in favour of the top-down approach. This 
view has the consequence that systems of a higher order (hierarchy) can 
have less complexity then those of a lower order. Because at each 'level' the 
elements of a system become determined fully anew given their relevant 
environment. Complexity gets reconstituted anew at each level of system 
formation.  
But systems are not merely relations among elements, again pace Latour. 
Conditioning takes place, which means that there is a regulation of the 
connections, or relations, between elements. This is congruent with Von 
Bertalanffy's central idea behind general systems theory that we can identify 
concepts and, potentially, laws among very different types of systems that 
help to understand each other (see goal 4 of general systems theory above). 
Once a conditioning has been achieved, it acts as a constraint within the 
system.  
But let us go back to the concept of complexity and see how it shapes the 
entire field of systems theory. If the number of elements in a system 
increases, its complexity increases as well. As soon as it becomes 
impossible for any elements to have a link to every other element, the system 
is 'complex'. This is what we have seen earlier in Von Bertalanffy's 
discussion of Rapoport or the example of why a Go computer is unable to 
beat a decent human player. As soon as complexity steps over this 
threshold, the system needs to select. But which relations among its 
elements does a system choose? When Latour argued that following the 
actor is like mapping a new terrain where one simply discovers things and 
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then charts them on a map, Luhmann contends that there are too many 
elements and relations among elements to produce this map in the first 
place, or, if possible to produce it, it would not provide anyone with any 
orientation whatsoever. To put the simile further, Luhmann would demand of 
Latour, what in this landscape he will put down on the map? Is is individual 
trees and plants, or even flowers and flower petals? Or just the streams and 
the big mountains and large fields? What system is Latour looking at? There 
can be many systems that while looking at very similar units, constitute quite 
different systems. Of course, it is not any outside actors like the social 
scientists who actively decide what the system will select.  Rather, there is an 
evolutionary process in how systems form. Once a system is formed, 
conditioning takes place and the system will start a process of self-
regeneration. Thus, Luhmann's social analysis replaces the traditional actors, 
i.e. people, with systems. Instead of focussing on the actions of actors, the 
central element of analysis for Luhmann is how systems produce meaning 
and make sense of their environment. (Arnoldi, 2001)  
One of the central problems for systems is that their environment is always 
much more complex than the system. After all, if the system were to 
correspond to the environment one-to-one, there would be no reason to have 
a distinction between system and environment in the first place. As a 
reminder, the system constitutes elements that are no longer part of the 
environment. As such, there is both systems complexity, which is the 
complexity of having elements in the system that have relations with one 
another, and environment complexity, the complexity that arises because the 
elements in the environment have relations with one another. The need for a 
reduction of system complexity gives rise to one further problem: lack of 
information. As the system decides what relations to look at, it will leave out 
other relations between its elements. Therefore, there is always an unknown 
within the system that affects certainty, risk, planning, or decision. A system 
cannot grasp its own complexity, yet be able to problematize it. (Luhmann, 
1995, p. 28) Every unit, as it is composed of the difference between element 
and relation, is thus produced by the system itself and cannot be obtained by 
the environment.  
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However, while units are produced within the system and elements remain 
ardently within either environment or system, relations can still cross the 
boundary that separates the two. A result of the self-referential nature of the 
system and its boundary mechanism is that systems are indeterminable for 
one another, which leads to the creation of new system (communication 
systems) that regulates this indeterminability. (Luhmann, 1995, p. 29) How to 
draw a boundary is the second most important requirement, next to 
constitution of its elements, of any system. They are successful if the 
boundary can determine the question of where an event should be placed, 
i.e. inside or outside the system, can be answered. Boundaries are not static 
though because they shift due to system differentiation, i.e. the emergence of 
systems within systems. With the creation of new systems a boundary has to 
preserve its function, to demarcate outside/inside. However, the creation of 
systems within the system challenge old boundaries and the system may 
have to adopt new boundaries that improve its performance. 
In addition to the push from differentiation, systems also have to cope with 
their environments as well as their own complexity, i.e. their own lack of 
information and uncertainty. (Luhmann, 1995, p. 31) They have to cope with 
their own failures and develop better mechanisms to deal with them in the 
future, e.g. in order to reduce deviant behaviour.  
7.3. Luhmann's basics II: Autopoiesis 
In the previous section, basic elements and properties of systems have been 
discussed. In this section, two central elements, self-reference and 
autopoiesis, will be covered. The reason for singling out this concept is its 
importance to questions of how systems communicate, how systems form 
boundaries, and how systems change. Addressing these questions, which 
will be done in the next chapter, will help to understand why it has been so 
difficult to communicate between the three communities – security, 
neuroscience, neuroethics – as well as show limitations of a solution to the 
dual-use problem.  
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Luhmann derives the concepts of autopoiesis and self-reference of social 
systems from that developed by Maturana and Varela with regard to living 
things combined with the phenomenology of Husserl and Spencer-Brown's 
Boolean logic. (Buchinger, 2006; Arnoldi, 2001) In Autopoiesis and Cognition 
– The Realization of the Living the neurophysiologists Maturana and Varela 
discuss the concept of autopoiesis in order to “disclose the nature of the 
living organization.” (Maturana and Varela, 1980, p. 75) They postulate that 
unity in the form of autonomy, a maintenance of identity, and variation, “the 
origin of variation in the mode in which this identity is maintained” (Maturana 
and Varela, 1980, p. 73) lie at the base of biological systems. They are thus 
not interested in the relations between the system with anything outside the 
system, or even the constituent parts of the system, but rather how elements 
within the system are related, or more precisely, how the organization of the 
system manages the network or processes (relations) of production of the 
system's own components. An autopoietic system – or machine, in Maturana 
and Varela's terminology – “continuously generates and specifies its own 
organization through its operation as a system of production of its own 
components, and does this in an endless turnover of components under 
conditions of continuous perturbations and compensation of perturbations. 
Therefore, an autopoietic machine is a homeostatic (or rather a relations-
static) system which has its own organization (defining network or relations) 
as the fundamental variable which it maintains constant.” (Maturana and 
Varela, 1980, p. 79) One example of such a machine on a microbiological 
level is the cell. A cell maintains its own components continuously through its 
own operation via its metabolism, while it maintains the ability to 
communicate with the outside (the environment) through its semi-permeable 
boundary, i.e. the cell membrane. As such, the cell is not a closed system 
and is still dynamic, i.e. open to evolutionary change and variation. According 
to Maturana and Varela, four consequences follow from the autopoietic 
nature of organizations: 
1. Autopoietic machines are autonomous. All changes within the system 
are devoted to the continuous survival and reproduction of the 
machine itself. In comparison, allopoietic machines have the 
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production of something external as their primary goal. An example 
might be a car assembly line, where the only goal of the machine is to 
produce a car and all changes within the machine are directed 
towards achieving this external goal. Allopoietic machines are thus not 
autonomous. 
2. Autopoietic machines have an identity. As they keep their own 
organizational structure as their primary goal, they preserve an identity 
that is independent of their interaction with an observer. In contrast, 
allopoietic machines do not have an identity because their product is 
different from themselves. An observer determines their goal.  
3. Autopoietic machines are unities because they determine their own 
boundaries in the process of their self-production. Again, an allopoietic 
machine does not determine its own boundaries because an observer 
determines the input and output surfaces. 
4. Autopoietic machines do not have inputs and outputs. They change 
because of independent events and perturbations but all changes will 
be consistent with the reproduction of the machine organization itself.     
The appeal of the concept of autopoietic machines to Luhmann is quite 
apparent. As already discussed, it is important for Luhmann to show that any 
observation of a system is limited in that systems choose and select their 
own elements and particularly relations amongst their constitutive elements. 
Systems choose what relations among elements they look at. But just as the 
cellular membrane allows communication, systems boundaries are equally 
semi-permeable, which is a necessity for any change to happen at all. This 
semi-permeability is not only a nice feature but it is an actual requirement for 
any self-organizing feature. As Von Foerster has pointed out, it is impossible 
for any self-organizing system to exist as a closed system without violating 
the Second Law of Thermodynamics; only open system can be self-
organizing. (Von Foerster, 1960) 
However, while living things seem to display autopoiesis, is it possible to 
extend this concept to social systems and what does it do there? 
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7.4. Luhmann basics III: Meaning and communication 
7.4.1. On meaning 
One way to approach the question is via Luhmann's understanding of 
communication. According to Buchinger, which this section follows, Luhmann 
adopts Husserl's concept of meaning and fuses it with Maturana and Varela's 
autopoiesis to develop his theory of social systems. (Buchinger, 2006) As a 
phenomenologist, Husserl believes in the 'freedom from presuppositions', 
which implies that neither subjects nor objects are the unity of an 
investigation. Rather, it is psychic acts through which subjects represent 
objects within their consciousness. These psychic acts provide meaning 
using expressions, i.e. words, related to objects, e.g. concrete things, facts, 
characteristics. The psychic act is divided into two parts: the meaning-
intention, e.g. thinking of an expression, and the meaning-fulfilment, which is 
a reference to an object. Both acts combined form an act of experience or 
consciousness at a specific point in time. Consciousness is thus not an 
ethereal concept behind all communication but rather is a stream that is 
generated continuously through meaning processing activities. This stream 
constantly involves different experiences but at any one time there is always 
one active experience. Given this abundance of experiences that could 
determine meaning, for Luhmann, it is again complexity that lies at the heart 
of the issue. Meaning provides systems with a vast variety of alternatives 
available to the operations of psychic and social systems. (Luhmann, 1995, 
p. 60) When engaging in communication, the psychic act of meaning 
processing does not only involve one subject and one object, but it has to 
work with the psychic act of meaning processing of another subject. 
Communication can only be meaningful if the ‘alltägliche Lebenswelt’ 
(lifeworld – constituted by the individual's everyday experience) of two 
subject cohere sufficiently. The more it does the more reciprocal 
communication is. One can only understand the other's phonetic expression 
if one grasps the intention of the other. Instead of thinking of communication 
as the transmissions of something, generally taken as 'information', an 
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utterance is nothing more than a suggestion, which then needs to be taken 
up by the other. (Luhmann, 1995, p. 139)  
Buchinger argues that several features of Husserl's phenomenology align 
with Maturana and Varela's autopoiesis: 
1) Consciousness is autonomous because its organization aims “to 
perpetuate the stream of intentional experiences by producing 
successive psychic acts.” 
2) “Consciousness has individuality because its identity is maintained by 
its succession of intentional experiences independent of its interaction 
with an observer.” 
3) “Consciousness has unity because its boundaries are created in the 
production of psychic acts. 
4) Consciousness does not have inputs or outputs but works based on 
references to objects perceived by the senses. (Buchinger, 2006)  
 
Luhmann fuses Husserl's phenomenology with its meaning horizons, i.e. the 
abundance of potential meanings, with Maturana and Varela's idea of self-
organization. This fusion requires two steps: first, Husserl talks about psychic 
systems and not social systems, which requires Luhmann to discuss how 
these two are related. Second, living systems have membranes that allow for 
their metabolism and open-up the cell for interaction with the environment – 
how and to what are social systems semi-permeable?  
The answer to the first question is that the Luhmann considers meaning 
systems to be self-referentially closed systems. Meaning only refers to 
meaning and only meaning can change meaning. (Luhmann, 1995, p. 37) 
“Systems bound to meaning therefore cannot experience or act in a manner 
that is free from meaning.” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 62) If a system processes 
complexity and self-reference in the form of meaning, this meaning becomes 
“the form of the world and consequently overlaps the difference between 
system and environment.” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 61) The boundary of a social 
system is therefore permeable because it requires communication and thus 
meaning, which refers to both within as well as outside of the system.  
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Meaning system are able to access everything in the form of meaning. Any 
meaning within systems is not static though as we have seen in Husserl's 
phenomenology. Rather, we have to remember that any reference stands as 
one reference among many possibilities. Meaning systems select meaning, 
but yet the variety of meaning is found within the domain of both the system 
and the environment. Because meaning is temporally located it needs to be 
reproduced continuously. It does not exist independently outside of the 
meaning system. One may be reminded of Davidson's interpretation of the 
local native, where the interpreter continuously has to revise and reinterpret 
anything being said by the native. As there are infinitely many meanings that 
any phonetic utterance can have, the interpreter needs to develop or 
experience a shared lifeworld with the native. The more congruent the 
lifeworld the more likely the interpreter will understand the native.   
While Husserl focused on explaining psychic system, Luhmann extends the 
concept to social systems. These two differ in their mode of operation: 
psychic systems use consciousness elements to operate with meaning while 
social systems employ communication elements. Both are interdependent 
though because there can be no social systems without persons and there 
can be no persons without social systems. (Luhmann, 1995, p. 59) As 
Luhmann, and we, are interested in social systems rather than psychic or 
living systems, it is necessary to describe and explain this element 
'communication'.  
7.4.2. On communication 
According to traditional Action Theory, it is actors and actions that compose 
social systems. For Luhmann, “action is constituted in social systems by 
means of communication.” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 137) Communication, as it is 
tied to meaning, is the processing of selection: A selection from the 
referential meaning horizon. (Luhmann, 1995, p. 140) Any meaningful 
communication involves three elements: first the selection of an information, 
then the act of utterance, and third, understanding. Element one and two 
belong to the uttering person, whom Luhmann calls 'alter', and the third 
element belongs to the addressed person, or 'ego'. The choice of alter for the 
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uttering person and ego for the receiving person appear odd at first. 
Communication is normally conceived of as delivering information to another 
person and is should be the uttering person who wants to convey the 
information. Why is she not the 'ego'? Luhmann turns the relationship 
around. The act of communication is situated within the addressed person. 
The reason for this lies in Husserls concept of meaning and the referential 
meaning horizon. Because there is not a singular meaning horizon as it is 
constituted by the lifeworld of the uttering person, it is not possible to give 
information to another person. It is the understanding of the addressed 
person qua her lifeworld that determines the communication. While these 
three elements comprise the communication act, understanding is not 
entailed in it. Understanding can only come about in the next communication 
event between the two protagonists. The uttering person will only be able to 
confirm if his utterance has been understood once the ego becomes the alter 
and makes a new utterance herself. Of course, in trying to initially understand 
alter, ego will draw on her expectation vis-a-vis personal experience and 
knowledge of alter. Similarly though, alter will expect the expectation that ego 
will make. Luhmann refers to this as the expectation of expectations. 
(Luhmann, 1995, p. 305) The structure of expectations in system is useful in 
steering social systems.  
The communicative act between alter and ego is a one-time event. However, 
successive acts of communication are a communicative system that exist as 
long as communication takes place -  while focussing on actions and actors 
instead of communication, Latour comes to the same conclusion when he 
writes that “[i]f a dancer stops, the dance is finished.” (Latour, 2005, p. 37) 
Communicative systems do not suffer from tautology due to self-reference 
because communication selects meaning not just from the meaning 
referential horizon inherent in the communicative system, but it permeates 
the boundary of the system which allows for the acquisition of accompanying 
meaning references. So while it is possible to go beyond mere self-reference, 
the structure of the system still acts to limit complexity. Without limits to 
complexity, we end up unable to have any communication at all as the 
potential number of references in the meaning horizon is too vast. The initial 
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necessity of systems was after all to reduce complexity. “[S]tructure consists 
in how permissible relations are constrained within the system.” (Luhmann, 
1995, p. 283) These constraints work on information selection, 
accompanying self-reference and reference to the environment. Our 
understanding of these constraints shows itself in the expectation that we 
have in communication. For example, when talking to our physician, we 
understand that a negative result in a test is good news whereas in a 
different scenario, e.g. a football match, a negative result is not what we hope 
for. Ego and alter's have situation-specific expectations that are based on the 
structure of expectation determined by society and their respective personal 
histories. For sociology, according to Buchinger, there are various 
expectational nexus – “factors which are not themselves an event, but have 
duration” (Buchinger, 2006) and that order communication contributions: 
themes, persons, roles, programmes and values. It lies in understanding 
these nexus in the system of science that will help to understand the problem 
of addressing or 'solving' the problem of dual-use. The next chapter will 
specifically focus on how Luhmann's theory of social systems specifically 
plays out in the system of science. Specifically, what constraints does the 
system of science impose for change in the system? How has the system of 
science been conditioned? 
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Chapter 8: Presuppositions Unravelled: The Dual-Use Issue in a 
Luhmannian System of Science 
8.1. Introduction 
The preceding chapter summarized some of the key concepts of Luhmann's 
social systems theory. This chapter will explain how Luhmann’s theory of 
social system applies to the system of science and what its implications are 
for approaching the topic of the dual-use issue. The goal is to show why 
current approaches in tackling the issue have presuppositions about science 
that may not necessarily be the case. These presuppositions lead actors, 
specifically in the security community, to have unrealistic expectations of 
what can be accomplished with regard to dual-use. The chapter will 
challenge the notion that a solution to the dual-use problem can be found. 
This analysis will help to understand why scientists are so 'immune' to 
awareness and education initiatives, as was found in the empirical section on 
science in chapter five. 
Fortunately, Luhmann has written extensively on seemingly every single 
social system that exists, e.g. law, politics, economy, love, including science 
as well. His "Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft" (“The Science in Society” or 
alternatively “Society’s Science”; SiS will be used in the following to refer to 
the book) was first published in Germany in 1990. The following will draw 
heavily on this work. Unfortunately, it has not yet been translated into 
English, which has also limited its readership and thus influence and interest 
in his work in the English-speaking academic world. In what follows, all 
quotations are my own translations. 
8.2. Features of the system of science 
As we have seen in the last chapter, social systems are organisationally 
closed, self-referential system, which are autopoietic, i.e. their entire 
organizational structure only serves to assure the survival or continuation of 
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the system itself. However, while they are organizationally closed, these 
systems are nevertheless open to their environment because of their 
partaking in the communication system that spans both system and 
environment. So how does all of this pan out in science as a system? 
To Luhmann, science is a recursively operating system. Recursive means in 
this context, unlike in mathematics where it denotes a repetition of 
operations, that elements within the systems can only be created by the 
connections and relations between the elements in the system. This excludes 
the possibility of treating elements outside of the system as elements within 
the system. This stress of operational closure is nothing new as it is a central 
element of social systems theory. So science is operationally closed and 
elements are only created due to the network among elements within the 
system. This closure implies that changes within the system can only come 
through operations within the system and that the system can only make, and 
change, assumptions about its environment based on its own operations. As 
a result, any transformation from input to output is contingent on the internal 
states of the system itself. Any outside observer will be unable to determine 
according to what internal rules the system operates. Recursive systems are 
thus practically indeterminable. Von Foerster, whom Luhmann draws on in 
his understanding of recursive machines, uses an example of his work with 
W. Ross Ashby at the Biological Computer Laboratory to illustrate how an 
outside observer must feel when encountering such a machine (Von 
Foerster, 2003): Ashby had built a small machine with 4 inputs, 4 outputs, 
and 4 inner states. At the beginning of their studies, he would always ask his 
new graduate students to figure out how the machine works. Von Foerster 
recounts that whenever he visited the students in their research room, they 
would be feverishly working on the problem and always exclaiming that they 
had nearly found the answer despite his affirmations that they will never 
figure it out. Eventually, mostly in the wee hours of early next morning after 
they had been working on the problem for the entire night, Ashby would take 
pity and explain to them that there are 10126 possibilities. Even for such a 
small machine, an outside observer will never be able to understand how the 
machine works.  
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Of course, the primary element that determines the complexity of the system 
is its number of internal states – some machines may thus actually be 
predictable. However, psychic systems and communicative systems do not 
belong to this group though. But despite the complexity, it has to be 
understood that even these systems are determined by their structures and 
any operation is dependent on the preceding operation. “Due of their 
recursive nature, recursive systems factually operate in an unpredictable, yet 
structurally-determined way.” (Luhmann, 1992, p. 278, 279) This structural 
determination does not imply that all causes for change are to be found 
within the system itself, but that the way in which the system changes is 
dependent on the structures of the system. The transformation of the 
structures of the system are structurally-determined and while there can be 
several transformations at the same time, each individual transformation 
“converts one operand to only one transfer.” (Luhmann, 1992, p. 279) While 
all systems conform to this transformational constraint, the system of science 
is unique in that its operational object is other structurally determined 
systems. Science is a description of the transformational dynamics of 
structurally determined systems. Given this focus, science neither favours 
endogenous nor exogenous causes for change because any structural 
determination is continuously coupled with preconditions given by the 
environment, which in the case of scientific communication is the mental 
condition of the participating humans. (Luhmann, 1992, p. 281) But despite 
this coupling with the environment, the system can only ever change into new 
structures that comply with its old structures based on its own operations. 
System change is thus in coherence with the environment yet dependant on 
its own structures. 
But it is not the entire environment that can influence the structure of the 
scientific system. The scientific system is a communications system. It can 
only be challenged and pressured to change due to consciousness. Going 
back to Husserl, only consciousness can achieve change in communication 
because of the selection of meaning from the referential meaning horizon 
(see chapter seven). Yet, it is not a single consciousness (every 
consciousness is an individual one) that can dominate and determine what 
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happens in the communication system but rather only “block, restrict, disturb, 
confuse on a very punctual, local basis.” (Luhmann, 1992, p. 282) In addition, 
communication in the scientific system is scientific communication. All future 
communication is restricted by the prior communication within the system. In 
the case of science, communication will always be scientific communication, 
which may allow for infinite possibilities in the future, yet these have to be 
framed within the language of science. In order to understand the limitations 
of change in the science system, it is thus necessary to understand what 
scientific communication is. 
8.3. Communication in the system of science 
Luhmann approaches the question of how science communicates by first 
analysing what it is that science does. Luhmann’s answer is simple: science 
observes. And second, in case it produces a written product, it also 
describes. (Luhmann, 1992, p. 75, 2/III) The act of an observation always has 
to be done by an observer, which in Luhmann’s theory is a system. He 
distinguishes between two versions of observation. One is an observational 
operation, which is a requirement for any autopoiesis because any 
autopoietic system needs to continuously observe itself (e.g. communication 
is a self-observational process because it needs to be able to identify those 
communicating as addressee and as connecting agent), and the other is an 
observation. If one observes an operation, it is sufficient to simply describe 
what is taking place. However, it becomes more complicated if one tries to 
observe an operation as an observation. (“die Beobachtung der Operation als 
Beobachtung”, Luhmann, 1992, p. 77) According to Luhmann, the latter 
requires the introduction of a level containing self-referential components. But 
what are the advantages of this distinction and how does it actually play out? 
The distinction primarily has an epistemological consequence: it allows for a 
distinction between the reality and the objectivity of an observation. It thus 
cuts across classical epistemology with its distinction between subject/object 
dualism. Reality is a consequence of an observation. To do an observation 
means that there is something that can be observed and that there is an 
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observer who does it. As any observer is a system, this translates into that all 
observing systems are real systems that have real things with corresponding 
dependencies of reality. However, this says nothing about the objectivity of 
an observation or that which has been observed; we only know that they, 
observations, exist. According to Luhmann, it follows that the reality of an 
observation does not depend on the reality of that which has been observed, 
i.e. there is no external entity that is independent from the observers. 
Therefore, a convergence or agreement between observers does not give 
any information about the reality of that which has been observed. This 
convergence only indicates that a communication has taken place. “Any 
reference, to either the system or to its environment, is a construct of 
observation.” (Luhmann, 1992, p. 78) The subject/object dualism is thus 
replaced by a self-reference/external reference dualism, whose two sides are 
always a construct of the structure of observation. Whether or not an 
observation is correct or wrong does not have implications for the reality of 
the observation. Therefore, if an observation is incorrect, it is still a real, albeit 
incorrect, observation. One way to converge towards understanding the 
question of truth (although it will never be answered) is to observe the 
observer, which is a secondary level with self-referential components. This 
secondary observation allows for an understanding and recognition of the 
observer as a system within the environment. He ceases to be a subject. As 
a result, the traditional distinction between subject and object is replaced by a 
distinction between operation and structure. The latter, unlike the former, 
contains a temporal component. Structure (knowledge) guides the operation 
(cognition), which then in turn modifies or strengthens structure again. This 
cycle is continuously solved through time, whereas the older cycle of subject 
and object required a metaphysically predetermined ontological difference to 
‘solve’ the cycle.  
In order to have a continuity of the structure / operation cycle, any 
observation requires a structured system that distinguishes itself from its 
environment. This distinction between structure and environment, as we have 
seen in the last chapter, requires a border. A second feature is that any 
observer is a unique system because it itself draws its own boundaries. Other 
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systems may thus only observe how the observer observes, but never 
actually take part in the observations. But what exactly is this thing 
‘observation’? 
Any observation requires a distinction in order to make an indication. 
(Luhmann, 1992, p. 68ff) A distinction is the demarcation of a border within 
one form to split it into two sides. After the distinction, it is impossible to 
switch between the sides without crossing the border. The distinction is 
therefore the unity of the duality of the form. When observing the distinction, 
the question arises why the distinction drew, and conditioned, this specific 
border and not some other border. Any first distinction is an operation that 
actually cannot be observed in its operation. One can only observe the 
operation after the facts, i.e. after the border has been drawn. For Luhmann, 
the first distinction requires thus an operationally functioning autopoietic 
system. Once a distinction has been made, a border drawn, it requires the 
second step to name one side of it. After the distinction, one is always on one 
side of the border and not the other, and thus unable to designate or name 
both sides at the same time. Crossing the border takes time. An observation 
has to be understood as the unity of the two components of distinction and 
designation. Once the initial observation is made, a recursive iteration of the 
operation develops the system’s boundary, which limits what can be 
observed. Once this development has taken place, it is possible to talk about 
a system’s observer. This development then allows for the secondary 
observations to take place; to observe the observer. The system becomes 
able to observe itself. The recursive connections within the system also make 
the system resistant to the environment. In terms of the system of science, 
this secondary observation, or reflexion, allows for the development of a 
distinction of true/false, which the original observations were unable to do on 
their own. First order observations are thus naïve. Of course, even these 
secondary observations are only observations and are thus not immune to be 
observed again. Any observation suffers from a blind spot: an observation 
can only observe what it observes and cannot observe what it cannot 
observe. Or rather, any observation names one side of that which it has 
distinguished, and does not name the other side. There are no hierarchies in 
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observations though. Primary observations only differ in what they observe, a 
thing (symbol, concept) in reality, from ‘higher’ observations, which observe 
the observer. (Luhmann, 1992, p. 86) Primary observations ask ‘what’ 
questions in comparison to ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions of secondary observers. 
Both are the same in terms of their operation though because any 
observation is a recursively connected communication of observers, and only 
the distinction that these observers draw allows for the development of more 
complex architectures, e.g. a system of science or a system of politics. One 
good example to understand the difference between primary and secondary 
observer is a mirror. When looking into a mirror, it becomes possible to see 
oneself as an observer within one’s environment. The mirror does not just 
‘mirror’ reality but rather shows us in the context of our environment, our 
surrounding. The mirror helps us to remove ourselves from the immediacy of 
our own environment. We stop being part of the environment but see us as a 
system within the environment. (Luhmann, 1992, p. 97) 
While Luhmann’s theory of observations has interesting consequences for 
epistemology, i.e. questions of what is truth and what constitutes knowledge, 
the focus of the thesis is on understanding the construction of the system of 
science in order to analyse the possibility of change in the system, 
specifically with regard to the question of how the dual-use issue could be 
accommodated within the system of science. Therefore, it is important to 
remember thus far the difference between primary and secondary 
observations and how a system emerges as a recursive operation of 
observations. 
One feature of observation has not yet been incorporated into the theory: 
temporality. Any observation is always an immediate observation. It is 
temporally located. It is an operation of a system that consists of other 
temporally located observations, which are already in the process of 
disappearing. However, this observation can only be performed by a 
secondary observer who is also subject to this temporal condition. But how is 
there any consistency, particularly of knowledge, in this world? Luhmann 
argues that any knowledge exists only in the observations of observers. 
While primary observers observe everything, it is only part of these 
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observations that are retained. ‘Retained’ means that the observations are 
repeated with time-displacement. This repetition also achieves a double-
effect: Condensation and Confirmation. Condensation is the reduction of 
several observations to the identical, which can take place once one tries to 
excise something particular out of the wealth of observations in order to 
create something specific. This is a necessary step in order to be able to 
retain the specific. But alongside condensation, there is also generalised 
confirmation. Confirmation allows for the identical to be repeated and in this 
repetition enables it to incorporate something new, i.e. a new meaning. This 
only takes place if the repetition is not identical with the first instance of its 
use, but only if it is placed into a new event or situation. The continuation of 
this double-process allows for a development of meaning. Any new 
observation does not only create an immediate meaning but it retains the 
possibility to create a meaning that is taken from the referential meaning 
horizon, which was discussed in the section on Husserl’s theory of 
communication in the preceding chapter.  
Going back to the original question of this section of what scientific 
communication is, we now know that the scientific system starts with 
observations, which through the continuous double-process of confirmation 
and condensation create meaning. But two closely linked and very important 
elements of the scientific system have yet to enter the picture: knowledge 
and truth.  
8.4. Knowledge, coding, and autonomy 
Luhmann has dedicated one chapter to each the concept of truth and the 
concept of knowledge. While, again, Luhmann’s elaboration on this topic may 
have wider epistemological implications, the purpose of analysing his views 
is to understand the restrictions that it poses on changes in the system of 
science.  
To Luhmann, the concept of knowledge rests in communication. As explained 
in the last section, communication requires meaning, which has been derived 
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from the condensation/confirmation double process, which is always 
temporally located. Luhmann argues that knowledge, because it rests on 
communication and thus meaning, can be defined as the “condensation of 
observations.” (Luhmann, 1992, p. 123) However, this also implies that 
knowledge can be derived from any observations, even everyday 
observations that do not try to be scientific or try to be made with reference to 
truth values. Any everyday observation may thus potentially create 
knowledge, but scientific observations also require a set of terms that 
“determine how something can be distinguished, named, observed, 
described and eventually explained from something else.” (Luhmann, 1992, 
p. 124) While this feature does not fully constitute the language of science, it 
is still a requirement for it. Scientific communication is also different from 
everyday communication because it explores both sides of the distinction. It 
allows for distinctions to be made recognizable. While it is indeed knowledge 
if I know that I am living in Bradford, UK, it is not scientific knowledge. While 
scientific knowledge rests on descriptions, it needs one further feature: a 
code. If distinctions are made based on the code true/false, then one may 
speak of scientific communication. However, this true/false dichotomy should 
not be understood to be something that is external. Specifically, Luhmann 
argues against any corresponding or coherence theories of truth, much like 
Davidson as discussed in the methodology chapter of this thesis (Chapter 
two). For Luhmann, all true/false coding is still a component of the 
observations and thus temporally located. Knowledge can only exist within 
the specific operation of observation, which is always in existence in the 
present, while it is already about to disappear. (Luhmann, 1992, p. 129) As 
we have seen previously, structures emerge via the operations of observation 
and these structures, even though they also only exist within the present 
moment, allow for a reduction in possibilities of what will be observed next. 
Structures foster observations that are necessary for an autopoiesis of the 
system, which the structures constitute. “Speaking operatively, structures 
function as that which is used in the present operations in order to continue a 
next operation.” (Luhmann, 1992, p. 130) What rescues us from a constant 
disappearance of structures (and thus knowledge) is the secondary observer, 
who can attest a continuation of specific truths and knowledge through his 
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observations. This observer can argue that a specific knowledge has already 
existed in the past and thus create a temporal link. This observer then 
assures his own autopoiesis by developing mechanisms with which to check 
the temporal consistency of his knowledge.  
One implication of this theory is that science’s only concern is the verification 
of the truth-value of knowledge. All observations create knowledge and it is 
the explicit domain of the scientific system to check its truth-value. (Luhmann, 
1992, p. 134) This checking for truth creates a system in which the next 
communication falls within a limited processing of information. For example, 
the answer to the question if Pluto is a planet cannot be derived from the 
question if humans have evolved from monkeys. Every topic of 
communication directs the autopoiesis of communication in a specific 
direction that limits its scope. Any structure that employs such a 
communication that spawns further communication is subject to expectations. 
We can go back to Luhmann’s theory of communication with the ‘id’, ‘alter’, 
and ‘other’ components to clarify what expectations means. Whenever we 
communicate, we expect the other to respond within a certain area of 
expected answers. In case the answer falls outside of our expectations, we 
will clarify our initial question because we believe that there has been a 
misconception. For example, if I ask someone if he wants some chocolate, I 
expect an answer that falls within the realm of yes and no, or at least 
something similar that will allow me to conclude if he wants some or not. 
Should the other person respond in a completely different fashion, e.g. 
suddenly saying that the weather is beautiful, I presume that he misheard or 
misunderstood my initial remark. Within the system of science, we use a 
cognitive expectation pattern, which means that any knowledge could be 
subject to change if the expectations based on it are not fulfilled. In contrast, 
there are also normative expectation patterns, which one can still hold even if 
the expectations are not met. The latter are for example employed in the field 
of law. (Luhmann, 1992, p. 138) One implication of this feature of 
communication is that these systems are not subject to an adaptation to their 
environment or that their complexity is determined by their ability to better 
represent the complexity of their environment. Rather, “their own complexity 
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is endogenously induced through their own selection of the recurrent addition 
of operation to operation.” (Luhmann, 1992, p. 135, 136) The question if 
Pluto is a planet will simply spawn its own specific further questions.   
We have thus far described the characteristics and origins of recursively 
operating, self-referential, autopoietic systems. The last feature of the system 
of science is its autonomy. Autonomy means that the boundaries of the 
system are drawn by the system itself and not by the environment. This 
autonomy does not imply that the system is completely cut off from the 
environment. It only implies that the system is capable of continuing its 
operation through its past operations independent of the current state of its 
environment. When applying the binary code of true/false then the resulting 
system, i.e. the scientific system, becomes an autonomous system. And this 
autonomous system is the only system that can adopt the code of true/false, 
i.e. there are no other systems than employ the same code. (Luhmann, 1992, 
p. 292) Of course, within other systems one can talk of something being 
“true” – yet, it is only within the system of science that true is part of the 
binary code true/false. If one talks about truth, the only question to ask is 
under what conditions the true statement becomes false. Once this 
communication takes place, it is part of a scientific communication. 
(Luhmann, 1992, p. 293) Any communication that adopts the true/false code 
is part of the scientific system. “This system may be dependent on financial 
resources from the outside, freedom of speech and opinion may be politically 
regulated, the operations of the system may be regulated or completely 
terminated. Participating individuals may follow their own interests, for 
example interest in their careers or reputation. The organizations can shift 
their available time from research to teaching and vice versa. ‘Public opinion’ 
and, in its background, mass media may favour particular topics and thus 
withdraw public awareness of others. All of these factors may be important to 
the success of the scientific system (however it is measured) but they do not 
change the fact that science, if operating as a system, operates 
autonomously; because nowhere else but in science is it possible to 
determine with the same specific certainty what is true and what is false. 
Other functional systems may interfere with the scientific system when they 
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operate with regard to a fulfilment of their own functional operations and their 
own codes. But they can, at least not under the current conditions of modern 
society, not determine what is true and what is false (unless by usurping the 
terminology for their own purposes and with the most likely outcome of 
humiliating itself).” (Luhmann, 1992, p. 293)  
The coding of true/false does not imply that every sentence uttered within the 
system contains the words ‘true’ or ‘false. Yet, the coding enables a 
continuing communication within the system, which then gets determined by 
successive operations. The code thus becomes a medium. However, the 
focus of the system is on the distinction of the code into both aspects – 
true/false. Communication allows for the negation of either true or false, but 
communication cannot say anything about the value of either side. The 
scientific system cannot say anything about the difference between good or 
evil or between useful and harmful. (Luhmann, 1992, p. 309) The scientific 
system is only capable of adopting the binary code true/false because any 
interference with the code would result in inconsistencies. The code allows 
the system to close itself. This closure is necessary for the system to observe 
the environment because it creates a boundary between the system and the 
environment. Without this boundary, as discussed in the previous chapter, it 
would be impossible to say or observe anything at all (while first order 
observations merely make a distinction, a second order observation, i.e. the 
observation of the primary observer, shows how the first order observer has, 
in the process of making an observation, drawn a distinction between herself 
(system) and that which she observes (environment)).   
8.5. Consequences: Science and society 
The focus thus far was to understand the theoretical aspects of Luhmann’s 
theory of the system of science. The question now is what are the 
implications for society of having such a system of science? Luhmann 
discusses this topic in chapter nine, ‘Science and Society’. While the chapter 
is split into ten sections, there are two larger issues at stake. First, what are 
the expectations of society from this science and second, and this directly 
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pertains to the issue of dual-use, what are the consequences for society of 
having a system that uniquely determines the binary code of true/false? This 
section will focus on the second issue. 
Luhmann argues that modern science has changed our behaviour towards 
possible future damage. We have exchanged our perceptions from 
recognition and worry about danger to those of risk. (Luhmann, 1992, p. 661) 
One can speak of ‘danger’ if the potential damages derive from the 
environment, for example natural disasters or the attack of an enemy. And it 
is ‘risk’ if the damage is the result of one’s own behaviour and actions, 
including their lack. The more a system is able to influence its environment, 
and in the case of the scientific system this primarily, yet not uniquely, implies 
technological change, the more our future concerns shift from danger to risk. 
The distinction between risk and danger is one of attribution, i.e. who takes 
responsibility, or rather, who can be blamed, even though it may have been 
outside of the ability of those making the decisions to act and prevent. 
Responsibility simply increases because of casual relationships. Thus, any 
decision becomes ‘uncertainty absorption’ (March and Simon, 1993; cited in 
Luhmann, 1992, p. 662) and one will always, if wanted or not, be judged by 
future observers. Luhmann argues that “any decision is a transformation from 
risks to the decision-maker to dangers to others, which is a structurally 
imposed issue that cannot be avoided by simply making ‘better’ decisions, 
even though there can of course be better and worse decisions depending on 
the circumstances, i.e. one can err on the side of caution or on the side of 
carelessness.” (Luhmann, 1992, p. 662) This issue is particularly relevant to 
science because it produces truths, which, when used, may cause harm for 
society. Society cannot pre-empt or pre-integrate that which science 
produces. The operations of science therefore can cause problems to parts 
of society. But what if science were to be asked to distinguish according to 
different codes? For example, why can science not work with codes like 
benefit/harm, current/future, safe/unsafe? To Luhmann, replacing the 
true/false code with any other code would result in the end of science. 
Science is that system that uniquely determines if something is true or false. 
A system of science is a system of science if and only if it codes according to 
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the true/false binary. Its entire structure and organization, as a recursively 
operating, autonomous, autopoietic system, is based on the binary code 
true/false. By valuing a benefit/harm code more than a truth/value code, 
society would imply a preference for non-knowledge, to prefer not to have 
knowledge because of the potential harm that is not even assured and could 
even be avoided. Within a scientific system that works according to a 
true/false code there can be no rational approach to the question of risk 
avoidance. The entire question falls outside of the system of science. Any 
sort of benefit/harm code is orthogonal to the true/false code. Of course, 
systems of ethics and of law may argue for a ban of research. Law, a 
functionally differentiated, autopoietic system itself, may indeed be able to 
stop research. But as Luhmann continues, the problem is that it only makes 
sense to pursue a ban of research if it is universally upheld. If it is only 
broken once, the truth with its ensuing risks is out. One might remember the 
difficulties the papal inquisition had with suppressing scientific writing that 
contradicted biblical and thus the church’s truths. As a result of this near 
impossibility of banning truth, it may be more feasible to ban certain 
technological tools that are used to decide on true/false. Yet, even this 
‘solution’ suffers from the problem that this ban on technologies used for 
research needs to be upheld worldwide and given the difficulty of getting all 
countries to implement a law, chances are relatively low to achieve this goal, 
according to Luhmann. (Luhmann, 1992, p. 664)  
A result of this inability to ‘solve’ the problem of risk, any future risks are no 
longer part of the future but exist in the present. Luhmann argues that the 
future was of course always opaque, but this problem only really existed in 
the form of some potential future presents. But now, the problem of the 
opacity of the future has direct consequences for the present, its decision-
making processes in all of its functional systems. “The government is unable 
to initiate a new law reform because it is impossible to predict how the law 
will be changed in the ensuing discussions and the revision process. Any 
larger economic investment is a risk. Even one’s possession is at risk: Those 
who have, already only had. It is uncertain if an education or apprenticeship, 
even if successful, will lead to future employment.” (Luhmann, 1992, p. 664) 
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Risk pertains to all of society but science is affected more immediately. On 
the one hand, any research has become a risk factor, because it is 
impossible to predict what the costs of truth are. On the other hand, science 
is asked to make predictions about risk and mitigation, which requires 
science to show its own uncertainties. Modern science is unable to suffer 
through the interference of the future in the present. It can only resolve these 
paradoxes by withdrawing into its autopoietic, recursively operating system 
that follows its specific true/false code. Science can only legitimize itself as 
science. Yet, within the societal discourse, science is questioned and is 
asked to think about its ethical responsibility given the vast array of risks, i.e. 
the dangers that it could produce. Science is asked to contemplate the 
dangers of truth, which implies that truth may have negative connotations. 
But truth is the only positive guidance for the system of science. Science is 
put into the position by its critics that it has to take responsibility. But how can 
science take responsibility in the absence of a societal consensus, or an all-
encompassing societal agency, of what is ethically correct and rational when 
dealing with true knowledge. As Luhmann argues, the real problem may be 
that our society, as it is functionally differentiated into specific autopoietic 
systems, does not have the ability to have a representation of society in 
society. The system-unique coding of every system implies that there are no 
definite rational decision criteria. Our poly-contextural modern society has a 
vacuum in its logical reasoning. (Luhmann, 1992, p. 666) To Luhmann, poly-
contextural means that “society consists of a multitude of binary codes that 
spawn their own specific programmes and start to create contexts with very 
specific distinctions.” (Luhmann, 1992, p. 666; see also Günther, 2004) Any 
system utilizes its own code and thus rejects the codes of any other. And not 
only does it reject other codes but every system can only observe, and thus 
make a distinction (see earlier section on observation), what it observes and 
cannot observe what it cannot observe. For example, politics observes based 
its own code and cannot make a distinction based on the code true/false. 
However, this does not imply that every system is blind to the operations of 
other systems. To extend the politics example, politicians can understand 
and better should be aware of what the scientific system has deemed true 
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and false. But politicians simply cannot make that distinction true/false (even 
if they would maybe like to).  
The above certainly sets Luhmann apart from other social theorists. For 
example, Habermas believes that his idea of the public sphere may be able 
to take up the challenge of giving a representation of society in society. For 
Habermas, the solution lies in discourse, as set out in his Theory of 
Communicative Action. In a similar vein, Rorty believes that we somehow 
muddle through and take future challenges as they become actual problems 
in the present. He finds the answer in the democratic system, and believes 
that it is the combined forces of all of actors (poets as well as scientists, 
politicians as well as journalists) in modern democracies that will guide us 
and ensure our survival as well as actual progress (although Rorty, unlike for 
example Habermas, does not claim to know what progress will look like or 
even predict where we will end up, which frequently astounds his critics and 
makes them label him a relativist, which may be especially conflict-laden in 
ethics).  
8.6. Implications for the dual-use debate 
Chapter three already outlined some of the developments that initiated the 
BWC focus on the dual-use issue. However, the chapter did not address 
what specific solutions to the issue the international community has 
contemplated and initiated. This section will list these proposed solution and 
discuss how their underlying principles, i.e. their metaphysics and 
preconceived notions about the scientific system, hold up against Luhmann’s 
analysis of science as a social system.  
Concurrent with the workings of the Fink Committee, which eventually 
brought forth the issue of dual-use, the Fifth Review Conference in its 
adjourned session in November 2002 already contained one item in its final 
declaration that was to be seen as a panacea to the issue of dual-use: Code 
of Conducts for Scientists. Specifically, in the ‘Decisions and 
Recommendation’ section, State Parties agreed “to discuss, and promote 
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common understanding and effective action on … (v.) the content, 
promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists” during three, 
one week long, meetings of State Parties each year, beginning in 2003, until 
the Sixth Review Conference, which took place in 2006. (BWC, 2002) These 
meetings are referred to as the intersessional process in the following. As the 
development of codes of conduct for scientists was only one out of five items 
on the list for the intersessional process, it took until the third meeting in 2005 
for discussions to take place on what to do about it. In the report of the 
meeting of States Parties, 5 – 9 December 2005, they recognised that:  
“(a) while the primary responsibility for implementing the 
Convention rests with States Parties, codes of conduct, 
voluntarily adopted, for scientists in the fields relevant to the 
Convention can support the object and purpose of the 
Convention by making a significant and effective contribution in 
conjunction with other measures including national legislation, to 
combating the present and future threats posed by biological and 
toxin weapons, as well as by raising awareness of the 
Convention, and by helping relevant actors to fulfil their legal, 
regulatory and professional obligations and ethical principles.” 
(BWC, 2005) 
They recognised further that 
“(e) science should be used for peaceful purposes only but has 
the potential to be misused in ways that are prohibited by the 
Convention, and therefore codes of conduct should require and 
enable relevant actors to have a clear understanding of the 
content, purpose and reasonably foreseeable consequences of 
their activities, and of the need to abide by the obligations 
contained in the Convention.” (BWC, 2005) 
In Annex I, the purpose and benefits of such a code of conduct were further 
elaborated on. Codes of conduct can: 
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“1. ii. Raise awareness of the Convention and of the potential risks 
inherent in scientific activity, and promote the need for reflection, 
consideration and discussion of the possible security implications 
of scientific work; 
iii. Help build a culture of responsibility and accountability among 
the scientific community, and increase public confidence that the 
risks are being appropriately managed; 
iv. help scientists and other fulfil their legal, regulatory, 
professional and ethical obligations.” (BWC, 2005) 
At the Sixth Review Conference in 2006, States Parties confirmed their 
commitment to promote codes of conduct for scientists. In addition, States 
Parties also agreed to continue in the intersessional process, which now 
included four instead of three meetings each year, with this concept of a code 
of conduct and decided to “discuss, and promote common understanding and 
effective action on: 
(iv) Oversight, education, awareness raising and adoption and/or 
development of codes of conduct with the aim of preventing 
misuse in the context of advances in bio-science and bio-
technology research with the potential of use for purposes 
prohibited by the Convention.” (BWC, 2006) 
The new ideas focussed on education of scientists as well as oversight of 
advances in bio-science and bio-technology.  
In the following intersessional process, this section (iv) was taken up during 
the meeting of States Parties in 2008, 1 – 5 December. In terms of education, 
“States Parties agreed on the value of education and awareness 
programmes: 
[27] (ii) Covering the moral and ethical obligations incumbent on 
those using the biological sciences; 
(v) Addressing leading scientists and those with the responsibility 
for oversight of research or for evaluation of projects and 
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publications at a senior level, as well as future generations of 
scientists, with the aim of building a culture of responsibility.” 
(BWC, 2008) 
In 2011, at the Seventh Review Conference, the commitment to education 
and awareness raising, development of codes of conduct, and oversight 
mechanism was reconfirmed. In addition, States Parties agreed to continue 
the Intersessional Process for 2012 – 2015. One standing agenda item, i.e. 
something that is discussed at every Meeting of State Parties as part of the 
Intersessional Process, of interest to the topic of dual-use is the inclusion of a 
“(b) [r]eview of developments in the field of science and technology related to 
the Convention.” (BWC, 2011) In detail, the review is intended to pursue a 
variety of topics, of which the following are specifically aimed to deal with the 
issue of dual-use: 
“22. (a) new science and technology developments that have 
potential for uses contrary to the provisions of the Convention; 
(c) possible measures for strengthening national biological risk 
management, as appropriate, in research and development 
involving new science and technology developments of relevance 
to the Convention; 
 (d) voluntary codes of conduct and other measures to encourage 
responsible conduct by scientists, academia and industry;  
(e) education and awareness-raising about risks and benefits of 
life science and biotechnology; 
(g) any other science and technology developments of relevance 
to the Convention.“ (BWC, 2011) 
Each year will be devoted to a specific scientific topic, e.g. bioinformatics and 
systems biology in 2012, or “advances in the understanding of pathogenicity, 
virulence, toxicology, immunology and related issues” in 2014. (BWC, 2011) 
The above historical overview of the approaches/solution to the issue of dual-
use by the BWC serves to show that first, the issue of dual-use has been 
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approached by the international community for more than 10 years now, and 
second, it gives a good overview of the general trends to approach the dual-
use issue. Based on the list, it appears that the issue of education of 
scientists has been one of the central elements in the BWC’s efforts. 
Underlying this focus on education is the belief that scientists have a 
responsibility or as put in the words of the States Parties that actors “fulfil 
their legal, regulatory and professional obligations and ethical principles.” 
(BWC, 2005) In order to help the actors, i.e. primarily the scientists, codes of 
conduct are supposed to “enable them to have a clear understanding of the 
content, purpose and reasonably foreseeable consequences of their 
activities.” (BWC, 2005) These approaches indicate that the security 
community in the form of the BWC works under the presupposition that 
scientists are responsible for what happens to, or will be done with, their 
work. They also presume that scientists are able to act in accordance with 
their responsibility, that they are able to foresee, if only “reasonably”, the 
results of their work, and that they can actively do something to change the 
outcome of the impact of their work. At this point, the particular relevance of 
Luhmann to the dual-use issue has become more than apparent. Already 
writing in 1990 (the first publication of Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft) 
Luhmann cautioned against this understanding of science and against this 
treatment of scientists. As mentioned in his chapter, science works according 
to the binary code of true/false. What the security community is attempting is 
to replace this code with something like a beneficial/harmful code. Yet, this is 
not possible. If it were to take place, then science would cease to be science 
as we would have no system anymore that can give us truth. At worst, we 
would be left with mere opinions. At best, if true/false is only interfered with 
occasionally, it would hamper our communication process within science and 
result in inconsistencies and miscommunication. It is the duty of scientists to 
work according to the true/false code. Any other code is orthogonal to it and 
will lead to disruptions in the system. Maybe even more important though, 
being a recursively operating, autopoietic system, science simply cannot 
adopt a new code. Any new operation is determined by its prior operation 
and not by ripples and disturbances in its environment. Thus it is no surprise 
that so few scientists are aware of the problem of dual-use as seen in 
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chapter four. And chapter 4 only discussed awareness and did not even ask 
if they know how to deal with dual-use if the question of benefit/harm enters 
their research. The BWC may certainly engage in awareness-raising among 
scientists and relevant actors, even though it has not been successful thus 
far. But the question of what to do once a dual-use issue has been 
recognized is a completely different issue. When operating under a true/false 
code science can only recognize dual-use once it has already appeared in its 
truth-statements, i.e. in knowledge. Certainly, science can know about the 
risk to the public of its research and thus prefer to pursue certain projects that 
may be guided from the outside (political pressure, public opinion, law, etc.). 
However, the risks inherent in its research do not yield system rationality as 
not doing research because of potential risks is also risky. In any case, “truth 
and untruth are a result (or not a result) of the evolution of the recursive 
operations, and therefore does not depend on what one observes, describes, 
wishes, hopes or is afraid of, but only depends on what actually takes place 
due to the ‘structural drift’ (Maturana) of the structurally determined system.” 
(Luhmann, 1992, p. 670) 
8.7. A dim prospect for solving dual-use? 
Following Luhmann, any adoption of a code of conduct for responsible 
research is futile. Scientists can either produce knowledge or create opinions. 
But it cannot do both and given science’s autopoiesis it will continue the 
pursuit of knowledge as long as its system elements, i.e. scientists, libraries 
research institutes, science journals, universities, etc., are still in existence. 
So are we societally trapped by science and its progress? Well, there may be 
two options available that may slightly alter this judgement on science and 
dual-use: first, Luhmann discusses the difficult, and slightly nuanced, role of 
applied science and it might be possible to find a way to differentiate between 
applied and basic science that has implications for dual-use. And second, 
given that there is a code called beneficial/harmful, is there a societal system 
that could pursue this line of making an observation, i.e. making a distinction 
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according to this code? Who could be part of this system and what could it 
do? These two questions will be pursued in the final chapter of this thesis.  
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Chapter 9: Visions 
9.1. Introduction 
In the preceding chapters on Luhmann, the problem of why solutions to the 
dual-use problem have thus far been unsuccessful – unsuccessful in the way 
that the empirical chapters in the first section have demonstrated – has been 
discussed. In this final analysis chapter, before the conclusion, I will provide 
places of vision that may help the actors concerned or affected by the issue 
of dual-use to see dual-use using different perspectives. Some of these 
visions will have direct implications and could lead to specific policy or 
strategy changes whereas others might only ask readers to pause and reflect 
on their own perspectives. As vision is reliant on one’s place and light, it 
should be clear that none of them should be taken to be a definite answer or 
solution to the issue of dual-use. 
As we have seen in the last chapter, the system of science stands orthogonal 
to any questions of harm/benefit analysis. Any confrontation with these types 
of questions needs to be answered by a withdrawal into the true/false code 
by the scientists. The implications of this behaviour for any education on 
codes of conduct and discussions of the responsibility of scientists with 
regard to the results of their research have already been discussed in the 
final section of the preceding chapter. Based on this analysis, it might be 
concluded that any educational initiatives, e.g. those advocated by the BWC, 
will not prove useful at all. And not just not useful, but they may distract 
scientists from their actual work of naming true/false distinctions. Yet, the 
exclusive right to determine true/false liberates science and might enable it to 
work with politics in approaching the problem of dual-use. First, science is not 
just science but rather incorporates the classical science alongside its 
modern partner, which Luhmann labels application-directed science. In 
addition, science also gives rise to technology. These three elements of 
science, classical science, applications-directed science, and technology, 
may be uniquely affected by the dual-use problem. Second, even though 
scientists are elements within the system of science, they may not be 
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exclusively elements within this system. It is possible for other systems to 
partially overlap with the system of science, i.e. to use its elements, without 
sharing the same boundary.  
After a discussion of the ramifications of Luhmann, the chapter will use 
Heidegger’s questioning of technology and its essence to show how the 
political may benefit from further places to stand on and gaze at technology 
and its accompanying dual-use characteristic. 
9.2. Basic research and application-directed research 
Luhmann argues that science typically differentiates itself according to basic 
science and to application-directed science. This view of a differentiation of 
science is a result of a trinity of relations that all systems in modern society 
display. These three relations are: first, the relation of the system to the entire 
system ‘society’; second, the system’s relations to all other systems; third, 
the system’s relationship with itself. (Luhmann, 1992, p. 635)  
The first relation between the functional system and the unity of society, i.e. 
the orientation towards society, is called function. Every system is uniquely 
‘responsible’ for a single function. It claims universal competence for its 
specific function and uses its own unique code for differentiations. All 
functional systems have a monopoly on their function. For example, science 
works on true/false differences and does not stand in competition with the 
system of art or religion. It only becomes possible for competition to take 
place once it is established that it is the only system that works on its own, 
unique code. Competition then comes in the form of several companies 
operating in one market, the existence of several political parties, or a variety 
of research centres. In our case, anything and anyone working according to 
the code true/false works within the system of science, and this ‘anyone’ can 
work within a research laboratory or behind the walls of a monastery. 
Everything that happens, happens in dependence with the system, happens, 
or does not happen, as a consequence of the autopoiesis of the system. 
(Luhmann, 1992, p. 636) 
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The second relation of systems is that with other functional systems. 
Luhmann calls “this orientation within society performance.” (Luhmann, 1992, 
p. 636) The performance of the system is a “complex web of input and output 
relations.” (Luhmann, 1992, p. 636) Any system is dependent on the function 
of other systems. For example, the system of science depends on the ability 
of the political system to provide a safe environment, it depends on the 
system of economics to provide money for research, it depends on the 
educational system to produce qualified young scientists, and on the judicial 
system to provide ways to solve and handle disputes. (Luhmann, 1992, p. 
637) In terms of output, the system of science produces a variety of goods: it 
fosters technology development, which may be useful for economic 
purposes; it produces material for the educational system; it observes and 
interprets public opinion, which may be useful to politics; it produces 
knowledge about diseases or directly produces medicine to cure them. 
Following this line of input/output model, it can be seen how communication 
between the systems takes place. Luhmann argues that the “mere possibility 
of this intersystemic communication using the medium of the transmitting 
system taking place and being understood (although quite often not without 
difficulties) documents the existence of society and contribute to the 
continuous reproduction of society with distinction to its environment.” 
(Luhmann, 1992, p. 637) Yet, a reduction of systems as mere input/output 
machines is limited because it does not take into account the internal 
behaviour of functional systems as self-referential, operatively-closed, 
autopoietic entities. What it does explain though is why outputs are always 
transferred in the language of the transmitting system, e.g. “a money transfer 
remains an economy-specific operation (that is: limited to the subsequent use 
of money as money) even if it is used to pay for research. The system of 
science is unable to use money because it cannot use the decision of 
payment or non-payment to determine truth/non-truth values.” (Luhmann, 
1992, p. 638) It is important to realise the implications of this communication 
between systems for the scientific system. Any science politics is politics and 
thus belongs to the political system and not to the science system. Science 
politics may try to create recommendations for science, for example what 
fields of research might be useful to pursue. However, none of these 
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initiatives constitute science. Of course, communication between systems is 
normal, and indeed many successful research development programmes 
developed by politics may have had their origin in the scientific system. Yet, 
none of these intersystemic communication changes the fact that “a system 
can only operate under the conditions of the continuation of its own 
autopoiesis and all operative and structural coupling can only influence which 
concrete structures, expectations, topics the system will activate.” (Luhmann, 
1992, p. 639)  
Getting back to the difference between functional expectations and 
performance expectations, the system of science has used the distinction 
between basic and application-directed research to deal with these two 
expectations. Yet, the distinction between the two should not be understood 
as a distinction that is warranted by the system itself. The reason why 
Luhmann writes about application-directed research instead of applied 
science is the fact that either type of research still takes place within the 
system of science. It is not the case that the results of this type of application-
directed research are used outside of the system of science but it is research 
that takes place within the system of science and just happens to thinks 
about and potentially simulate the possibilities of the application of research, 
which is research that still takes place in the system of science.  
Luhmann argues that there are a variety of problems that the system of 
science faces when it engages in application-directed research. Any 
application-directed research needs to take into consideration the values, 
norms and interest of the applying sector, i.e. the sector that utilize the 
research for its own specific purposes. Yet, when science opens itself up to 
this sort of inquiry, this contact with other functional systems, its façade of 
security tends to crumble. As demands for the development of technologies, 
for answering questions of risks and prognosis of ecological consequences 
have increased because of political interest of basing their decisions in 
science, science has lost some of its apparent invulnerability as questions 
are asked of the system that have not been asked before. Suddenly, the 
security of scientific knowledge becomes unstable. One example from 
Wynne about the Challenger mission in 1986 helps to better understand 
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Luhmann’s insight that science has started to lose its authority. (Wynne, 
1988)  
In 1986, the NASA Challenger blew up shortly after its lift-off. In the aftermath 
of the incident, the inquiry into the reasons for the disaster provided a picture 
in which the science of these sorts of missions was less one of truth but 
rather one of acceptable standards that were not rooted in prior scientific 
understanding but in acceptable behaviour. Wynne uses the example to 
argue that norms about technology are not established before the 
implementation of technology but rather come after the facts. In the case of 
the Challenger missions, it was quickly discovered that the explosions was 
due to leaky O-ring seals in the solid rocket boosters, which then led to the 
leakage of fuel and the eventual explosion. From a naïve point of view, one 
that presupposed what Luhmann contests, i.e. that we know how technology 
works in advance because of our security of scientific knowledge, it might be 
argued that these O-rings should not have been used if they were indeed 
leaky. Yet, as the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the accident 
discovered was that the O-rings had not behaved perfectly in various earlier 
flights and experiments. Yet, it was ok to use them because as Morton 
Thiokol, the shuttle contractor, had argued, the O-ring design was maybe “not 
desirable, but is acceptable.” (Wynne, 1988) It was easy to make this 
statement, because even though they were prone to abnormal behaviour, 
they performed their task up until the accident. However, should NASA have 
not been more concerned about the O-rings? Well, presumably yes, 
however, a space shuttle is a complex technology that consists of many 
parts, all of which display their own behaviour, which may not be desirable. 
Luhmann cites the problem when discussing the early stages of the 
production of trains, when investors asked the scientists if it is not possible 
that the wheels of the train will simply spin on the ground when the train is 
heavily loaded. Science did not have an answer; one would simply have to 
try it out. Science can never be certain about technology. So what are the 
implications for dual-use? First, as discussed earlier, research itself cannot 
be questioned about its risks. Yet, when we discuss technology, science may 
actually be able to say something about it.  
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While science may be unable to say anything about risks, or if it does, it is 
merely hypothetical because assessment of risks can only come about after 
the facts as discussed in the last paragraph, it may still be possible to ask 
science about technology. In dual-use, the question put to science cannot be 
how likely technology can be misused, but rather ask if it is possible to 
misuse the technology: Can you misuse this technology? Does it have a 
dual-use character? And if the question is yes, it is possible for science to 
point out how one can misuse the technology. The answers to these 
questions may inform the political system to judge, which technologies need 
to be monitored and are prone to misuse. So while the system of science is 
unable to work with charges raised against it in terms of its responsibility for 
its output, scientists may be asked to discuss, point out, and help the political 
system on what technologies the political system needs to work on in order to 
minimise the risk of misuse. The issue of dual-use is thus not an issue for the 
system of science but for the political system. With regard to biology, the 
BWC has simply shifted the blame from itself to the scientists if things should 
go wrong, i.e. a dual-use item is misused. It cannot be scientists who 
regulate technology; regulation has to happen within the political system. Yet, 
the political system, e.g. the BWC, should engage in a dialogue with the 
scientific system on what, how, and to what effect technologies can be 
misused. Unless the political system does so, it runs the danger of regulating 
past the danger and missing the key issues. Dual-use ethics education could 
therefore rasie awareness among the scientists to work together with the 
security community. Unfortunately, the current trend to shift responsibility and 
thus future blame onto the scientists hides this possibility of collaboration.  
But there is an additional reason why ethics education for scientists could be 
useful. As pointed out earlier, there is a concern that neuroscience could be 
subject to an arms race. In addition, current initiatives to strengthen the 
BWC, e.g. resuming talks about the establishment of a regime, have been on 
hold since 2001 as pointed out in chapter 3. To recap quickly, in 2001 at the 
Fifth Review Conference the Chairman presented a protocol that laid out how 
a verification regime to the BWC could be established. However, at the end 
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of the Review Conference, the US completely withdrew their support for the 
idea of establishing any such regime.  
If neuroscience were to engage in a security discourse it could open new 
doors in terms of asking questions of political responsibility. For example, 
why has so little progress been made in strengthening the BWC? But for 
scientists to be able to engage with and challenge the current status quo in 
the security system, they need to be able to understand the problems with 
the BWC. They need to become elements within the science system. This 
interaction could specifically help to mitigate the risk that states engage in a 
militarization of biotechnology, and specifically neuroscience. Not only does 
the ethics education of scientists therefore allow scientists to compete in this 
struggle on the issue of dual-use but it also allows them to generate a new 
struggle through their engagement with the issue of international regulation of 
bioweapons, i.e. the BWC, which may break up fossilized positions and 
calcified dialogues. Yet, as the next part of the chapter will show, it is not just 
scientists who may become elements within the security system to help 
improve ensure our safety in the future. 
9.3. Heidegger’s questioning of technology 
The task seems enormous for the political body. In fact, it might be 
impossible to achieve this reflection on technology for society, given, 
following Luhmann, there is no such one thing as society but rather only its 
functional systems that comprise society. Yet, the political system needs to 
make decisions regarding technology, which it can make with help from 
science as outlined above. Yet, is this all the help that the political system can 
hope for? Well, there may be help from unexpected systems. Specifically, as 
tis section will argue, art might become an unlikely ally for reflections. The 
following analysis will draw from Heidegger’s discussion of the essence of 
technology, its origins as technē in ancient Greece with its link to poiēsis and 
eventually art.  
 
As is generally the case when reading Heidegger, one has to be prepared to 
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venture forth together with him onto a journey. Heidegger explicitly makes 
this point in the beginning of ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, in which 
he remarks that “[I]n what follows we shall be questioning concerning 
technology.” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 3) Which to him means to “build a way” and 
thus we need to “pay heed to the way” rather than to ponder on “isolated 
sentences and topics.” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 3) The first steps on this journey 
concern the difference between technology and the essence of technology. 
While technology may be readily apparent in our everyday lives, its essence 
is actually hidden and cannot be found in any particular technology. 
Heidegger argues that “everyone knows the two statements that answer our 
question” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 4), i.e. the question of what technology is: 
“Technology is a means to an end” and “Technology is a human activity.” 
(Heidegger, 1977, p. 4) While Heidegger thinks these statements are indeed 
correct, he does not believe them to get us any closer to the true essence of 
technology, which once we understand what it is allow us to enter into a free 
relationship with technology. If technology is an instrument, Heidegger 
argues that we need to understand its cause in order to get at its essence. By 
way of an analysis of the four causes (causa materialis, causa formalis, 
causa finalis, causa efficiens) that philosophy has “for centuries… taught” 
Heidegger arrives at the question of responsibility. Each of the four causes, 
while different, still belongs together in their responsibility to “bring something 
into appearance.” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 9) To be responsible means to set 
something on its path towards presence, towards its arrival. All four causes 
combine to “let what is not yet present arrive into presencing.” (Heidegger, 
1977, p. 10) This step into presencing from that which is not presencing is 
poiēsis. Poiēsis brings forth. For Heidegger, poiēsis manifests itself in physis, 
where that which is coming forth is already imbedded in itself, for example a 
blossom starting to bloom, as well as in the activity of the artisan and the 
artists. Of course, that which comes forth into presence has already be in the 
thing itself. “Bringing forth comes to pass only insofar as something 
concealed comes into unconcealment.” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 11) Revealing in 
Greek is aletheia, which has been translated by the Romans as veritas and 
we call “truth”, which Heidegger assumes to mean the “correctness of an 
idea.” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 12)  
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In typical Heideggerian fashion, at this point he stops to wonder about how a 
discussion of the essence of technology has led to aletheia. What is the 
relation between technology and aletheia? For Heidegger: everything. 
“Technology is a way of revealing.” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 12) It reveals truth. 
Technology comes from technikon, which is that which belongs to technē. For 
the Greeks, technē included the activities of the craftsmen as much as those 
of the mind and the fine arts. Going back to Aristotle, Heidegger explains that 
technē, as a mode of aletheuin, “reveals whatever does not bring itself fourth 
and does not yet lie here before us, whatever can look and turn out now one 
way and now another.” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 13) The importance of technē is 
not the production but in the revealing. However, one contention that 
Heidegger takes seriously is that this understanding of technē may only apply 
to the craftsmen in Ancient Greece, yet may not apply to modern technology. 
The craftsmen indeed employed technology in his craft to bring forth that 
which is hidden. A carpenter uses carpentry tools to make chair and in doing 
so reveal that which is the truth of the chair. This logic can hardly be applied 
to modern power plants for example. For Heidegger, this question is exactly 
the question concerning technology.  
Modern technology, unlike in Greek times, depends on science for it to work. 
Modern physics enables progress and allows us to build new machines (for 
Heidegger, writing in the 40s, physics was still the main science that enabled 
progress; currently, it might be more than just physics that enables this sort of 
progress and enable technological progress). In what way can modern 
technology then be understood as a revealing? Heidegger argues that the 
modern revealing of technology is a challenging. It challenges nature, and 
demands something from it. For example, a modern power plant demands 
and stores the energy of nature in a way that a windmill was never capable 
of. Modern technology unlocks the hidden energies of nature (e.g. coal) and 
exposes them. Eventually, Heidegger comes to the intermediate conclusion 
that the essence of technology lies in Enframing. (Heidegger, 1977, p. 23) 
Enframing, Ge-Stell in the original German, is “that challenging claim which 
gathers man thither to order the self-revealing as standing-reserve.” 
(Heidegger, 1977, p. 19) The challenge claim is the challenge of nature as 
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discussed earlier. Standing reserve, Bestand, is part of the ordering that 
comes to be in technology, e.g. how a hydroelectric plant orders nature to 
always be ready to provide power. The standing reserve is the 
“fundamentally undifferentiated supply of the available.” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 
xxix) In ordering things in this way, they also lose their status as objects 
because now they are merely seen as the provider of this intangible 
standing-reserve. The river Rhine, the example Heidegger uses, is both 
“dammed up into the power works” yet also an art work as in the poem “The 
Rhine” by Hölderlin. (Heidegger, 1977, p. 16) Technology thus reveals the 
being as that which is ordered to be always available. Objects lose their 
character as objects and become mere standing-reserve to be utilized. This 
process is Enframing. However, even if we now know what the essence of 
technology is, the question concerning technology is yet untouched. We may 
know the essence of technology, yet nothing about this essence, do not know 
“the essence of what is being asked about.” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 23) 
But what is Enframing actually about? Enframing is nothing technological. It 
is not a machine. “It is the way in which the real reveals itself as standing-
reserve.” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 23) It neither happens exclusively through or 
in humans nor does it happen beyond human activity. Certainly, Enframing 
challenges man by putting him into the position to order as standing-reserve. 
To Heidegger, linking it back to poiēsis, aletheia and destining, two 
possibilities for man emerge: First, if man continuously pushes only that 
forward, which is an ordering, she will derive all her standards on this basis. 
This prevents the emergence of the second possibility, which is that man gets 
closer to the essence of that which is unconcealed, which would help him 
“experience as his essence his needed belonging to revealing.” (Heidegger, 
1977, p. 26) As the former holds sway, man is endangered because he will 
no longer be able to regard objects as objects but only as standing-reserve, 
which he orders. To Heidegger, man thus loses the ability and, more 
importantly, will to understand her own essence. Man is deluded by the 
Enframing of technology. By regulating and securing every thing as standing 
reserve, Enframing also does not allow for the thing to display its 
fundamental characteristics in its revealing. As we have seen in the Greek 
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technē, it was truth that came to pass within poiēsis. It is this truth that 
becomes impossible to unconceal in Enframing. Yet, Heidegger does not 
leave us without hope. Putting faith in the poet, as usual for Heidegger it is 
Hölderlin, he cites: 
 “But where danger is, grows  
The saving power also.” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 28) 
So within the danger that is man’s drive to order through Enframing with 
technology and thus the blocking of man’s relation to the essence of truth, 
also, his own essence, something grows alongside that will be man’s saving 
power. Heidegger argues that this saving power manifests itself in a granting. 
In the coming to presence of the essence of technology, man recognizes his 
own essentiality of being part of revealing. Man is necessary to any revealing 
of truth. While technology poses the danger to force upon us an ever more 
increasing ordering, against this danger we can hope for the growth of a 
saving power as well. But how does this saving power come about? 
Heidegger thinks it lies in the works of the artists to help us see. Going back 
to Ancient Greece again, Heidegger reminds us that it was not only 
technology as we understand it today that comprised technē. Technē was 
“the bringing-forth of the true into the beautiful.” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 34) 
“[T]he poiēsis of the fine arts also was called technē.” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 
34) So Heidegger concludes: 
 “Because the essence of technology is nothing technological, 
essential reflection upon technology and decisive confrontation 
with it must happen in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to the 
essence of technology and, on the other, fundamentally different 
from it.  
 Such a realm is art. But certainly only if reflection on art, for its 
part, does not shut its eyes to the constellation of truth after which 
we are questioning.” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 35) 
But where does this analysis of Heidegger leave us in regard to the question 
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of dual-use? It is a bit premature to ask the question, yet I will get to it 
eventually. First, as we will shortly see, it is necessary to reread Heidegger in 
a pragmatic fashion using Rorty. 
9.4. The pragmatism in Heidegger 
When reading Heidegger, and particularly his emphasis on essence and 
truth, one may get the impression that he appeals to some earlier ideas of 
Platonic forms. Specifically, Heidegger is concerned with our focus on 
technologies rather than the essence of technology. He believes that this 
concentration results in the aforementioned danger of being unable to 
unconceal, to find truth and find the essence of man, and rather taking the 
revealing as a challenging and ordering, i.e. Enframing, as the essence of 
technology. Yet what sort of thing is this essence? Unlike Plato, Heidegger 
believes this essence to be permanent. He asks “[d]oes the essence of 
technology endure in the sense of the permanent enduring of an Idea that 
hovers over everything technological, thus making it seem that by technology 
we mean some mythological abstraction?” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 31) It is not 
the permanent enduring of essence that endures but rather technology lets 
Enframing permanently endure. Since Enframing is the challenging forth as 
standing reserve and lets man order, Enframing grants man with a 
permanent enduring. Enframing lets man endure. It is within the permanent 
enduring of man that it only becomes possible for man to glimpse behind the 
mere ordering quality of technology and see truth. The artist is because man 
can endure because Enframing grants man enduring. “Enframing comes to 
pass for its part in the granting that lets man endure – as yet unexperienced, 
but perhaps more experiences in the future – that he may be the one who is 
needed and used for the safekeeping of the coming to presence of truth.” 
(Heidegger, 1977, p. 33) Going back to dual-use, we may wonder what 
happens if in that challenging forth as standing reserve, man loses the 
means to control that standing reserve. It is dual-use after all and not just a 
mono-use as control use. Technology thus may today also be said to 
inherently threaten that permanent enduring of man that Heidegger finds 
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within technology. While this thought might be interesting in its own right, I do 
not think that it will get us any further in a pragmatic way towards 
understanding or helping the question of dual-use. I think Heidegger’s claim 
that the artist can find that higher essence behind technology, that thing that 
essences. “Once there was a time when the bringing-forth of the true into the 
beautiful was called technē. And the poiēsis of the fine arts also was called 
technē.” (Heidegger, 1977, p. 34)  
Getting back to the initial question of this section, did Heidegger not just 
introduce a Platonic idea once again when he says that the fine arts can 
bring forth the true into the beautiful? Is this ‘true’ not some lofty thing that 
floats above all? This is now where one may read Pragmatism into 
Heidegger. While Okrent’s ‘Heidegger’s Pragmatism’ (Okrent, 1988) might be 
the more acknowledged interpretation of Heidegger as a pragmatist, I will 
follow the neopragmatism of Richard Rorty, thus completing a circle between 
the beginning and now the end of this thesis, and his reading on Heidegger. 
The reason why it matters if Heidegger is a pragmatist is not that I need to 
attach the label to him but rather the following concern: If there is such a 
thing as an essence of technology that is primordial then all discussion of 
technologies will be subsumed by this original understanding of technology. It 
does not allow for a free understanding and reflection of technology. As 
pointed out in the methodological chapter, I do not think that ontology gives a 
primacy over method. There are no conceptual schemes as Davidson has 
pointed out. So now the question is: how does a neopragamtist read 
Heidegger? 
The key text for working on this question is Rorty’s article Heidegger, 
Contingency, and Pragmatism published in his Essays on Heidegger and 
Others. (Rorty, 1991d) While Rorty believes that Heidegger may indeed be 
read as a Pragmatist, he is certainly not a happy one. To Heidegger, western 
philosophy with its origin in Plato necessarily leads to a nonmetaphysical 
technocratic pragmatism. His critique of this sort of pragmatism, which is 
intend on its will to master, we have already seen in his the Questions 
Concerning Technology as his fear of Enframing being the essence of 
technology. To anyone familiar with Plato it might seem surprising to read the 
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claim that pragmatism is the logical conclusion of Plato. For Heidegger the 
road goes as follows: Plato asked how we and the world need to look like in 
order for us to have certainty, evidence, and clarity. (Rorty, 1991d, p. 29) 
Eventually we have come to the conclusion that the only thing we can have 
certainty of are our beliefs and desires. The meaning of life becomes our will 
to master. Once we have imposed our beliefs onto the world, we can be sure 
of its cosmology. Nietzsche may be seen as an epitome of this acceptance of 
what thinking is good for: mastering. Rorty adds that it is ironic that Plato, 
who wanted to go beyond the marketplace, e.g. the cave analogy, eventually 
leads philosophy towards the marketplace. (Rorty, 1991d, p. 31) While Plato 
started with questions of “How can you know?” and “What is your evidence?” 
he actually paved the road for scepticism. By granting the sceptic power, he 
eventually pushed philosophy away from looking at truth in a representational 
view as correspondence with reality to less ambitious claims. Via Kant and 
eventually Nietzsche, we arrive at Dewey who asks us to replace “truth” and 
“rationality” with “satisfaction” and “growth.” Remembering Heidegger’s 
contempt for Enframing and the danger it poses, what can he do? Rorty 
believes that Heidegger, despite his disregard, realizes his place within this 
tradition and subscribes to its suppositions. If pragmatism is the final 
outcome, then one may as well be a “self-conscious, rather than a repressed 
and self-deceived, power freak.” (Rorty, 1991d, p. 32) The choice is between 
Platonism, the self-deceived, and pragmatism, the power freak: Heidegger 
chooses the latter.  This choice for pragmatism Rorty, alongside Okrent 
whom Rorty draws on in his analysis, finds in Heidegger’s Being and Time.  
Being, unlike Plato’s eternal, for Heidegger only exists as part of Dasein, the 
Being-in-the-world or more literally, the Being-there (somewhere or in some 
place in the world). Thus, there is no power relation between the two (Being 
and Dasein) but it is a “fragile and tentative codependence.” (Rorty, 1991d, p. 
33) In Heidegger’s own words: “Being (not entities) is something which ‘there 
is’ only in so far as truth is. And truth is only in so far and as long as Dasein 
is. Being and truth ‘are’ equiprimordially.” (Rorty, 1991d, p. 33) To Rorty, this 
Heidegger is the same as the standard pragmatist arguments against any 
conceptual scheme. The conceptual scheme that, for example, positivism 
182 
 
finds in a unified science which would then grant us certainty and truth. In the 
absence of such a scheme, all that we have is contingency. The contingency 
of our human projects as situated in time. Yet, as philosophy has tried to 
capture this eternal essence, or rather, has asked us to try to do so, we 
consider the fleeting and transitory as negligible. For Heidegger in particular, 
he wants to defend words against thought. Philosophy does not pay tribute to 
words but its efforts are targeted towards thoughts and concepts, which are 
supposed to capture truth. Words have become mere vehicles. As Rorty 
writes: “Philosophers know that what matters is literal truth, not a choice of 
phonemes, and certainly not metaphors. The literal lasts and empowers. The 
metaphorical… is impotent.” (Rorty, 1991d, p. 34) Heidegger believes he 
needs to defend the poet against the philosopher. To him, words do matter. 
We of the West have been using the metaphor that led us down the path to 
the philosopher and her quest for certainty to be found in thought. Yet there 
was no more need to use that metaphor instead of another one. There is no 
“external choreographer” (Rorty, 1991d, p. 36) who determines the moves of 
our projects. Just us. There is only our contingency and with it we have to 
accept Heidegger’s claim that “Only as long as Dasein is… is there Being.” 
(Rorty, 1991d, p. 36) But what is Being if it is not like Plato’s Ideals? Does it 
fulfil any function? 
Rorty believes that Heidegger actually never gives a proper account of what 
Being is. Sure enough, he uses it frequently (it is one of the three words in 
the title of his major work: Being and Time), yet he never fully explains it. 
Rorty thinks that Being is something beyond our ability handle, something 
that resists “the technical interpretation of thinking.” (Rorty, 1991d, p. 36) 
Heidegger uses it to point towards the “difference between inquiry and 
poetry, between struggling for power and accepting contingency.” (Rorty, 
1991d, p. 36) Rorty argues that “What is Being?” cannot be answered 
correctly just like the question “What is a cherry blossom?” To extend the 
analogy further, for Heidegger the West, or rather the Wests understanding of 
the world, cherry blossom among many other blossoms. (Rorty, 1991d, 37) 
One “cluster of “understanding of Being” alongside other clusters.” (Rorty, 
1991d, p. 37) Going back into the realm of language, any Being is one form 
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of a final vocabulary, which we need to use. We are subjected to final 
vocabularies because there is no metalanguage with which to understand all 
other vocabularies. Being is therefore never “the same thing under all 
descriptions, but something different under each.” (Rorty, 1991d, p. 38) But if 
Being is not the same under all descriptions, then why make the claim that it 
is the poet who will understand the essence behind technology, the essence 
and truth of man? Why favour the vocabulary of the poet over the one of the 
scientist?  
9.5. Heidegger and the solidarity of Rorty 
As we have seen thus far, Heidegger reluctantly agrees that Plato’s 
questioning needs to be overcome. At the same time though, he is nostalgic 
for the Greeks’ ability to see poetry and the arts as disclosing truth. 
Heidegger thinks that they enjoyed a sort of special relationship with Being, 
i.e. that they were better at being ontological and understanding Being in 
their time. Rorty takes issue with this nostalgia of Heidegger. This nostalgia 
explains Heidegger’s positive predisposition towards poetry as helping us 
towards understanding our Being and his rejection of technocracy, which is 
so pre-eminent in his Question Concerning Technology. He sees salvation as 
contained within poetry not because poetry gives the true account of Being 
bur because it opens up the possibility of Being as multifaceted. Technology 
is just one metaphor but Heidegger fears that it dominates and denies the 
existence of alternative metaphors. As Rorty puts it: “No petal on a cherry 
blossom is more or less a petal than any other.” (Rorty, 1991d, p. 39) But is 
our age really as forlorn and devoid of alternative possibilities of metaphors 
as Heidegger believes it to be?  
The two charges that Heidegger makes against our current age are its 
contingency and its belatedness. The West’s – it is primarily our West that 
Heidegger and Rorty discuss – contingency manifests itself in its basic 
presupposition that our final vocabulary is so obviously and inescapable. We 
have become self-deceived. But what does it mean if this vocabulary is 
belated? Rorty argues that this judgement is normative and the only 
184 
 
normative sense that he can find in Heidegger is that “an understanding of 
Being is more primordial than another if it makes it easier to grasp its own 
contingency.” (Rorty, 1991d, p. 43) By this analysis, the Greeks were less 
belated because “their understanding of Being in terms of notions like arche 
and physis was less self-certain, more hesitant, more fragile, than our own 
supreme confidence in our ability to manipulate beings in order to satisfy our 
own desires.” (Rorty, 1991d, p. 43) The result of this would be that we have 
become less able to hear words differently, less able “to imagine alternatives 
to themselves.” (Rorty, 1991d, p. 43) For Heidegger, a step towards less 
belatedness would be to willingly suspend verficiationism. We should stop 
asking questions like “What is Being?” or “What is a cherry blossom?” (Rorty, 
1991d, p. 44) Stop the urge to ask question about the truth or finding the right 
answer. As long as we retain these questions we subject ourselves to a 
single final vocabulary that we do not dare or dream of questioning. For 
Heidegger, it is the questioning of the Thinkers and Poets that allows for a 
freeing up of Dasein and the creation of open spaces that surround present 
day social practices. This latter thinking is supposed to let Being be, which 
creates freedom. Yet Rorty asks: “Do you not utilize language when you let 
beings be? Is this disclosing not achieves only in language? And since this is 
the case, how can any “language-user be less free, less open, less able to let 
Being and being be, than any other?” (Rorty, 1991d, p. 45) “[H]ow can any 
understanding of Being be preferable to any other, in the mysterious sense of 
being “more primordial”?” (Rorty, 1991d, p. 45)  
As we have already seen, Heidegger thinks it is the progression of technical 
mastery that makes us less primordial. However, do we really need to fear 
that technology silences all other questioning? Rorty thinks that Heidegger is 
afraid because it is the ease with which we can hear the words of the 
technological vocabulary – words of mastering and Enframing. The poet and 
the artists have become merely aesthetics and are not given the benefit that 
they can open up Being, open up new vocabularies and create new beings. 
But are we really faced with an either/or? Rorty does not think we have to 
choose and will be caught in a final vocabulary but that we our modern 
Western society allow us to understand and hear the original silence which 
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we then fill with our vocabularies. We can be aware of the silence and our 
filling of it. We can do so as Dewey has suggested. In Rorty’s words: “He 
wanted to combine the vision of a social democratic utopia with the 
knowledge that only a lot of hard work and blind luck, unaided by any large 
nonhuman power called Reason or History, could bring about that utopia into 
existence. He combines reminders that only attention to the daily detail, to 
the obstinacy of particular circumstance, can create a utopia with reminders 
that all things are possible, that there are no a priori or destined limits to our 
imagination or our achievement. His “humanism” was not the power mania 
which Heidegger thought to be the only remaining possibility open to the 
West. On the contrary, it put power in the service of love – technocratic 
manipulation in the service of a Whitmanesque sense that our democratic 
community is held together by nothing less fragile than social hope.” (Rorty, 
1991d, p. 48)  
9.6. Art, ethics, and technology 
Reflecting on the dual-use debate in a Heideggerian fashion, one cannot help 
but realize that the debate within the political community is very much 
entrenched in their use of their final vocabulary. A vocabulary that puts faith in 
a technocratic approach with its goals of solving the dual-use problem. Dual-
use has been characterised as a science problem, and it is to be solved by 
the science community. Yet, as we have already seen earlier in the 
discussion of Luhmann, the scientific system is rather ill-suited to ‘solve’ the 
problem. Dual-use is a political issue and concern. The exclusive focus on 
using a technocratic vocabulary, which presupposes the ability to solve the 
problem, that there is a solution to it, is reminiscent of Heidegger’s fear that 
we are increasingly unable to get out of our own final vocabulary, to be 
primordial, and hear the silence that any vocabulary attempts to fill. “To be 
primordial is thus to  have the ability to know that when you seize upon an 
understanding of Being, when you build a house for Being by speaking a 
language, you are automatically giving up a lot of other possible 
understandings of Being, and leaving a lot of differently designed houses 
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unbuilt.” (Rorty, 1991d, p. 46) There are no other vocabularies engaged in 
the dual-use issue but the techno-political one. We have not questioned this 
language as it appears obvious that we simply need to master this problem of 
dual-use, to find a technocratic answer to it. It appears absurd to even ask to 
consider other vocabularies as beneficial to the discussion. Yet, specifically 
dual-use, which is inherent in any technology and research, might be very 
well-suited to be talked about in different vocabularies. But how exactly would 
it look like if the arts, following Heidegger’s belief that it is the arts that may 
constitute the saving power that Hölderlin believes inherent in any danger, 
were to utter a word. It is art as non-aesthetic that might provide a glimpse 
into this future – this future filled with a Deweyan social hope. A few 
examples might be helpful.  
One of the fields where it has been tried to include the arts into actual 
curricula is in medicine. Medical Humanities focuses on using the arts to 
confront medical students with their presumptions about the profession. 
These presumptions usually include the view that medicine is a facts oriented 
science with little room for interpretation. While teachers of medical 
humanities claim that the humanities are well-suited to improve 
professionalism and improve doctor’s performance, students tend to dismiss 
this topic as useless. The responses that Shapiro et al. cite, e.g. 
overcrowded curricula, lack of interest of students, does not expand medical 
knowledge, are exactly the same as those cited by scientists in chapter five 
of this thesis. (Shapiro et al., 2009) And again similar to science ethics 
education, the proponents argue that the skills acquired in medical 
humanities will make better doctors. As Shapiro et al. write: “systematic 
integration of humanities perspectives and ways of thinking into clinical 
training will usefully expand the range of metaphors and narratives available 
to reflect on medical practice and offer possibilities for deepening and 
strengthening professional education.” (Shapiro et al., 2009) Yet this notion 
that the arts will be useful as a means to an end, i.e. to make better doctors, 
is contested as Macneill points out. (Macneill, 2011) If the arts are just means 
to an end, they lose their ability to be critical. (Rees, 2010) The arts become 
a tamed animal that has already succumbed to the mastery of science-based 
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knowledge, reminiscent of Heidegger’s concern about the enframing of 
technology. In order to show that art can do more than just be a tool, Macneill 
uses the examples of the performance artists Stelarc and Orlan to question 
one of the fundamental tenets of modern medicine: the body as a machine 
where the machine breaks down and the doctor’s duty is to restore it to its 
prior state and function. (Macneill, 2011) Both Stelarc and Orlan have 
subjected their body to technological or surgical augmentation. By doing so, 
they confront our concept that “individual corporeality is intrinsic to identity.” 
(Macneill, 2011) Stelarc’s projects comprised the attachment of a prosthetic 
arm to his biological one, which could then either be remotely controlled via 
the internet (project title: THIRD ARM) or the machine itself prompted the 
movement of his body (project title: MOVATAR). His body thus became the 
agent of an external entity. Orlan has had her physical appearance surgically 
altered in operations that were broadcast live and where the surgical room 
was transformed into a baroque theatre stage. Medical assistants were 
dressed in designer costumes, poetry readings and music was performed, 
and the room was draped with large bowls filled with grapes. For Jane 
Goodall, these performances are scandals. Scandals understood as 
providing “a trap or stumbling block, metaphorically interpreted as a moral 
snare causing perplexity and ethical confusion.” (Goodall, 2000) Similarly, 
Zylinska and Hall point out that the performances are good because they are 
both controversial and raise a debate and also fail to offer a grand and 
totalizing narrative with which to understand them. (Zylinska and Hall, 2002) 
Stelarc and Orlan’s work both offer variations of the theme of the body and 
the posthuman body. As Macneill points out though, it is not just the particular 
controversy about the body that makes them interesting as cases for art that 
is critical. One can look at their work and discuss the pain that is included in 
these bodily modifications. Thus it is not the concept of the post-human, the 
obsolete body, but the “meaty and suffering body” that can equally raise a 
debate. (Macneill, 2011) While Stelarc and Orlan are primarily interested in 
the body, other modern artist are equally challenging in other areas. For 
example, Macneill cites the work of Eduardo Kac, who developed the 
transgenic GlowBunny Alba, which is a green fluorescent bunny made with 
DNA from jellyfish. (Macneill, 2011) Or the work of Julia Reodica, who 
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cultivated her own vaginal cells to produce a series of hymen in order to 
create a debate about modern sexuality, the female body and the emphasis 
placed on women’s virginity. (Macneill, 2011)  Macneill and Ferran positively 
discuss the interplay of bioethics and bioart in their article on art installations 
at the World Congress of Bioethics in Rijeka, Croatia, in 2008 and the 2010 
World Congress on Bioethics in Singapore. (Macneill and Ferran, 2011) 
These ensuing relationships can be seen as part of a trend towards a 
bioculture as envisioned by Davis and Morris already in 2007. (Davis and 
Morris, 2007) Their hope is to have the humanities and the sciences share in 
a more thorough exchange on their respective forms of interpretation and 
allow for an easier bridging between these two hitherto disparate cultures, as 
C. P. Snow claimed in his analysis of The Two Cultures. (Snow, 1959) Of 
course, these examples are not exhaustive of the works in modern art, and 
bioart. But they show that concerns of the use of technology and that they 
can raise question and lead to debates among society, art, ethics, and 
politics. It may thus be presumptuous to assume that only the security 
community and the scientific community may have something to add to the 
question of dual-use. Art and related fields like literature and poetry might 
help to create awareness and create novel understanding where educational 
programs and political debates are only marginally effective.  
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Chapter 10: Conclusion 
10.1. Introduction 
This chapter marks the end of the journey through the fields of dual-use, 
neopragmatism, theory, and praxis. At the beginning the original point of 
entry for this study was the question of how the security community, 
specifically those that work on the BWC, have engaged and tried to manage 
the issue of dual-use, i.e. the danger that scientific research and technology 
could be misused for malign purposes. In the course of the thesis, this inquiry 
looked at the different groups that are involved in the dual-use issue: the 
security community, the scientific community, and the ethics community. This 
final chapter will give a short review of the findings of the study and review 
some of the developments that have taken place in the course of the thesis. 
It will also address the question, to what degree the methodological approach 
of neopragmatism has actually made a contribution to this thesis.  
10.2. Dual-use: Empirical reflections 
The issue of dual-use first came to the attention of the BWC after the failed 
negotiations on a legally binding protocol and verification regime in 2001. 
These failed negotiations created a void into which the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
as well as the anthrax letters fell. The anthrax letters sparked the debate if 
and to what degree the freely available information of biological knowledge 
and the ease to acquire and use biotechnology present a risk to society. 
Could biological research be misused by terrorist to attack states? If yes, how 
could the international community respond and curb this threat? The 
proposed solution to the issue comes in the form of raising awareness 
among scientists and developing Codes of Conduct to encourage and 
support responsible conduct of research. These initiatives are supposed to 
have scientists either refrain from research that is prone to misuse or to only 
publish journal articles with abridged information in order to make it more 
difficult to replicate the experiments. Another initiative is to promote 
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education and develop dual-use bioethics programmes that are to be 
incorporated in existing bioethics education. One of the problems identified in 
chapter 3 of the thesis is that there has been very limited input from the 
scientific community in these debates. Thus, it is not surprising that the issue 
of dual-use is hardly mentioned at all in the education of scientists. As 
chapter 4 shows, it is not even assured that all science students get an ethics 
education, let alone one that incorporates dual-use bioethics.  In addition, as 
can be seen in the regulation when publishing in the Journal of 
Neuroscience, one of the premier neuroscientific journals, authors are 
required to make their research equipment and material available to other 
researchers. The only limitations are when there are commercial interests at 
stake. On the other side though, the publishers of several major scientific 
journals agreed to review future articles in light of their security implications 
and potential dangers. Yet, when the first actual case turned up, which was 
the H5N1 research by Fouchier, it became evident how complicated the dual-
use issue really is. The research showed how H5N1 had been made 
transmissible between mammals, in the specific research ferrets, as well as 
how it had been made airborne. Science had received the article for review 
for publication held up its commitment to check articles for any security 
implications and asked the US National Scientific Advisory Board for 
Biosecurity, who had established by the US in 2005 and tasked with making 
recommendations on dual-use policies and research, for their 
recommendation. What followed was a heated debate between and among 
politicians, security experts and scientists. (Enserink, 2011) If not earlier, at 
least at this stage is has become clear that the limited interaction with 
scientists, including for example the lack of scientists in national delegations 
to the BWC as shown in chapter 3, poses a problem to the current 
approaches to dual-use.   
In chapter 5, the thesis looked at the involvement of the bioethics, and 
particularly the neuroethics community, in this debate. The research 
suggests that dual-use bioethics is hardly debated in bioethics and 
neuroethics. Only a few articles have thus far been published on the issue. In 
terms of the more general issue of the weaponization of the biological 
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sciences, the thesis particularly explored the weaponization of neuroscience. 
The former may be less interesting to ethicists given that the production, 
stockpiling, and research of all biological weapons is prohibited by the BWC. 
The latter however, particularly given the interest of the military in 
neuroscientific research, e.g. inducing fear neurophysiological, increasing 
mental awareness of soldiers, or developing better interrogation and torture 
techniques, may indeed be of interest to neuroethicists. If dual-use is not only 
understood as concerns about the misuse of research by non-state actors 
but also by states, these topics should also pertain to the debate on dual-use.  
Yet, the neuroethics community has only been interested in these issues on 
the periphery as discussed in chapter 5.  
Taking into consideration the findings in the three empirical chapters, the 
preliminary conclusion drawn in chapter 6 is that there is very limited 
interaction between the security, the scientific, and the ethics community on 
the issue of dual-use. Of course, this limited interaction may only pose a 
challenge rather than be a Gordian Knot. While the scientific community has 
only been marginally involved up to the Fouchier experiments, the issue has 
certainly sparked interest in the aftermath. Educational initiatives are on the 
way to adjust curricula to include dual-use. Of course, the success of these 
initiatives is hardly assured, as it will depend on the political will and the 
willingness of the science community to push for education reforms. 
Similarly, the ethical community may have thus far not been interested in the 
topic of security and ethics, yet there is no reason why the research could not 
be done and spark further interest within the community. For example, as 
part of my research I interviewed a neuroethicist in Germany. During the 
interview, which focussed on the question of why the ethics community has 
shown a lack of interest in dual-use, I was offered the opportunity to edit a 
section labelled Weaponization of Neuroscience for his upcoming Springer 
Reference Handbook of Neuroethics. It is unclear if this work will spark more 
interest in the community but there are no fundamental reasons why it could 
not happen. However, even if all of the problems are successfully tackled, do 
these intiatives, especially the dual-use education, actually address dual-
use? What underlies all the discussion of the security community is the idea 
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that it is science that has to deal with the issue. The development of codes of 
conduct and the stress of ethics education puts the burden on the scientists. 
It appears that only scientists are responsible. It is this putting of 
responsibility by the security community onto the science community that 
may explain why there has been relatively little progress in the education of 
science. After all, the dual-use discussion was started in 2001, and now, 12 
years later, it has hardly made an impact in science education and the 
behaviour of the scientific community. The second part of the thesis explores 
the topic of the responsibility of science and why the interaction between 
science and security community has been so limited.  
10.3. Dual-use: Theoretical reflections 
The entry point for a discussion of interaction between societal systems is 
systems theory. Initially in the form of general systems theory as first 
explained by Von Bertalanffy and then in form of the theory of social systems 
as developed by German sociologist Niklas Luhmann. For Luhmann, society 
only consists in the interaction between specialised subsystems that each 
fulfil a specific function, e.g. the system of science is uniquely responsible to 
work on the binary code of true/false. Each subsystem is autopoetic and 
organizationally closed. This means that each system reproduces itself 
continuously without determination from the outside. It is this organizational 
closure that only allows the system to be open to communication with other 
systems. This has several implications for the interaction between the 
political (security) and the science system as discussed in chapter 8. 
Specifically with regard to dual-use responsibility of scientists, scientists are 
certainly responsible for the outcome of their research. However, at the same 
time they are also responsible for not doing the research. This double-bind 
puts science in a position it cannot answer and deal with. The only ‘solution’ 
to this dilemma is for science to fall back into its operation, which is the 
production of knowledge and work according to the true/false binary code. 
The question of the risk of research is not a scientific question and thus 
cannot be determined in the scientific system: Research politics is politics. 
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Pushing the burden of responsible conduct of research by the political 
community can thus be seen as a mere defensive move on part of the 
political system. It is a defensive because the responsibility would otherwise 
be located in their domain. If dual-use is indeed an issue of research politics, 
it is a problem for the political system. Yet, science can nevertheless 
contribute to the debate and help the political system. After all, it is the 
communication between the subsystems that generates society. Without this 
communication, there would be no society. What science can do is to answer 
scientific questions. In terms of dual-use, these questions could be how 
scientists would use research and technology for malign purposes. What 
would be needed and what harm can be caused. These are scientific 
questions unlike the demands currently put to scientists such as to consider 
the possible and likely misuse of their research and technology before 
producing articles. As discussed in chapter 9, science is ill-suited to deal with 
questions of risk, which are inherently probabilistic. The implications for the 
current dual-use debate and initiatives that the security community should not 
expect education and codes of conduct to work as a panacea for the dual-
use issue. Science needs to be engaged in a way that science can actually 
handle. Politicians can use the expertise of science to understand harm, yet it 
has to be the political body that proposes policies to deal with these potential 
harms on continuous level. There is no solution to dual-use, only constant 
debate, discussion, review, and decisions. 
This is not quite the end of the story though. The debate has only involved 
the political and scientific actors, and to a degree ethicists. Yet, as the 
discussion of Heidegger’s questioning concerning technology has elucidated, 
is may be presumptuous to assume that it is only these two societal systems 
that can be drawn upon to help with the issue of dual-use. For Heidegger, as 
for the proponents of dual-use, science and technology pose threats. For 
Heidegger, technology undermines our ability to be primordial, which is to 
recognise that the language we speak is only one language to fill the void. He 
argues that the technocratic language with its mastering of the world, clouds 
our ability to step outside of it and appreciate that we as human beings are 
more than just slaves to the technological drive for mastering. For those 
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arguing for the threat science and technology because of dual-use, the 
danger is more mundane as it is about the physical security of people. But 
while the analysis is quite different, there is no reason to presume that 
Heidegger’s ‘solution’ may not have positive implications for the dual-use 
issue as well. For Heidegger, it is art that allows people to be able to step 
outside of the spell of mastery cast by technology. Maybe art can help the 
security community to step outside the technocratic discourse that dominates 
the debate on dual-use research and technology? At the end of the last 
chapter, a developing discourse on bioart, biology, and ethics is discussed 
and how modern bioartists may be instrumental in breaking up preconceived 
concepts in bioethics and biology. While it is especially difficult to determine 
the impact of art, Goodall’s claim that the work of Stelarc and Orlan provide 
scandals, which need to be understood as stumbling blocks that cause 
perplexity, might imply that these sort of art works and performances could 
create novel understandings on science and technology for both the security 
specialists and the scientists involved in the dual-use debate. 
10.4. Neopragmatism and the social sciences 
It may appear slightly odd that the longest chapter in a thesis that is 
supposed to follow a pragmatist or neopragmatist approach is its 
methodology chapter. Yet, this may not be such a surprising given a lack of 
actual neopragmatist studies in the social sciences. Due to this absence the 
thesis had to discuss some of the underlying principles and arguments within 
neopragmatism and how methods could be compatible with this approach. 
Latour’s Actor Network Theory (ANT) was identified as one method that 
shares a majority of its underlying ontological and epistemological 
foundations with neopragmatism. Thus, the methodology section analysed 
ANT and how it is applied in practice. Yet, ANT always had to be understood 
as just one carrier to be employed rather than be the single method of 
neopragmatism. The concept of a single, true method is incompatible with 
neopragmatism. Thus, while the first part of the thesis, i.e. the empirical work, 
tried to adhere to the method of ANT, it was never the case that this will be 
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the only way to understand the issue of dual-use and the problems 
surrounding it. The reason why empirical data were gathered was to be sure 
that there is actually something there, i.e. a problem or some thing to be 
differently understood, and not fall into a conceptual scheme that already 
presupposes what will happen and what will be the correct way to understand 
or interpret a phenomenon. The danger to guard against is tautology. Out of 
the empirical work, theory was eventually used. However, the use of theory 
was driven by a neopragmatist directive of putting the use-value of theory 
before any epistemological truth content of these theories. What this means 
is that theories do something instead of being accurate representations of 
how things are. Theory understood in this way implies that for example 
Luhmann’s social systems theory is not useful because it is true but rather 
because one can do something with it. In the present case, Luhmann’s 
analysis of the scientific system challenges the preconceived notions 
adhered to by the security community that the scientific system is able to deal 
with dual-use. Luhmann challenges this conception and therefore makes us 
pause and wonder. Similarly, Heidegger’s questioning of technology 
challenges our view that dual-use is surely only pertinent to the fields of 
science and security. The ability to help us understand an issue from a new 
perspective and cherish the multiplicity of views does not depend on a 
theort’s claim to truth. Maybe Heidegger is wrong that the being of 
technology is Enframing. But would this make his argument for being more 
primordial, to be aware of the void that we fill with our distinct language, less 
insightful? I do not think so and I hope that the use of such diverging theorists 
and thinkers as Latour, Luhmann, and Heidegger makes the case that theory 
does more beyond any immediate claims to represent reality.  
What is a surprise to myself is that the thesis eventually completes a full 
circle and advocates the ‘applied’ theories, rather than the metaphysical 
deliberations, of Rorty and Dewey, when it argues for the inclusion of more 
groups of actors in the dual-use theatre. Initially, the thesis only called for the 
adoption of Rorty and Davidson’s ontological, epistemological, and 
methodological approach. Rorty’s call for contingency and solidarity among 
society’s groups did not factor into these concerns. The actual inclusion of 
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these later thoughts might even question the original claim of the thesis that 
one should not buy into a particular conceptual scheme. So is the adoption of 
the ‘Rorty writing on practice’ in chapter nine a violation of the ‘Rorty writing 
on theory’ in chapter two? In Method, Science, Social Hope Rorty writes the 
following: 
When the notion of knowledge as representation goes, then 
the notion of inquiry as split into discrete sectors with discrete 
subject matters goes. The lines between novels, newspaper 
articles, and sociological research get blurred. The lines 
between subject matters are drawn by reference to current 
practical concerns, rather than putative ontological status.” 
(Rorty, 1982, p. 203) 
It is Rorty’s hope that the lines between the subjects get broken up and it is 
this sort of solidarity that he advocates. Yet, he does not say anything about 
solidarity when it comes to the ‘current practical concerns’. In this study, the 
particular concern has been dual-use. Or rather, the thesis tried to get a 
better understanding of dual-use and what is taking place among the actors 
that are involved in the debate about dual-use. The conclusion of the thesis 
that the problem of dual-use cannot be solved by the scientific community but 
that it needs to be continuously discussed among the political (security) 
community with the assistance of the scientific and the arts community is a 
conclusion with regard to the particular problem and not with regard to the 
conduct of general approaches with problems. The first sentence about my 
‘surprise’ about the full circle in the thesis is thus maybe slightly ill-phrased. 
The two Rorty’s, theory and practice, are a result of the same philosophical 
thinking and go hand-in-hand. What is surprising is that within the particular 
topic of concern, i.e. dual-use, the thesis makes a call for solidarity among 
scientists, politicians, and artists. This call for solidarity and communication is 
not a result of any neopragmatist theoretical framework, which does not exist, 
but a result of the empirical and theoretical work carried out within the thesis.   
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
The method for analysing the quantitative weight of the topics of the journal 
articles was the same for both journals, i.e. Neuroethics and The American 
Journal of Bioethics – Neuroscience (AJOB-N). For Neuroethics, the journals 
volumes included for analysis are from Volume 1, Issue 1, to Volume 5, Issue 
2. For AJOB-N the volumes included are Volume 1, Issue 1, to Volume 3, 
Issue 2. For both journals, an article had to be a primary research article, i.e. 
not a book review or a commentary. This had the unexpected result that in 
AJOB – Neuroscience there were only very few actual articles per volume; 
mainly only 3 articles. The entire rest of the volumes generally consist of 
commentaries of these articles. This was the case in nearly every volume 
except in a few cases where this strategy was not followed and every article 
was a research article without the general mass of commentaries. Therefore 
in order to reduce the potential bias towards the topics of the journals in 
these specific volumes, every volume was given the same total value. So if x 
is the number of total volumes of the journal, every individual volume was 
given a value of 1/x. The specific research articles were then given a further 
value 1/y, where y was the number of journal articles per volume. Combining 
these value 1/x * 1/y then gave the individual value attributed to the specific 
journal article. Adding all the values of all the articles together therefore 
yields a total value of 1. This method was used for both journals.  
Appendix B 
An initial Google search was done in order to get an overview of 
neuroscience courses within the countries. Table 13 lists the specific 
websites for each country. Table 14 lists the number of universities, and 
distribution of courses according to undergraduate and postgraduate studies.  
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Country Website  
Australia http://www.australian-universities.com/list/ 
http://www.hotcourses.com.au/australia/all-neuroscience-
neurobiology-bachelor-degree-courses-australia/j-aus-all/dc-
rh.364/order-cd-1/kw/courses.html 
Canada http://braincanada.ca/en/Academic_Programs 
http://www.canadian-
universities.net/Universities/Programs/Doctorate-
Neurology_and_Neuroscience.html 
Germany http://www.neuroschools-germany.com/ 
http://www.gehirn-und-geist.de/alias/dachzeile/949219 
UK http://www.uk-
universities.net/Universities/Programs/Neurosciences.html 
http://www.uniguru.com/studyabroad/undergraduate/uk-university-
degrees/uk-neuroscience-neurobiology-
courses/i/rh.364/all210/2/programs.html 
US http://education-
portal.com/articles/Best_Neuroscience_Undergraduate_Programs
_List_of_Top_Schools.html 
http://grad-schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-
graduate-schools/top-science-schools/neurosciences-rankings 
http://www.gradschools.com/search-programs/campus-
programs/neuroscience/united-states 
Table 13. Websites used to identify neuroscience programs in countries. 
 
Country # of 
universities 
# of courses 
(total) 
# of courses 
(undergraduate) 
# of courses 
(postgraduate) 
Australia 8 9 5 4 
Canada 16 23 11 12 
Germany 13 15 1 14 
UK 19 26 14 12 
US 31 33 12 21 
Table 14. Distribution of courses by country and level of study. 
 
The next step entailed checking each course listed on these websites for the 
following information: 
a) Is the course still offered? 
b) Does the course include any ethical training based on the online 
curriculum or similar information? 
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c) Is this training mandatory? 
d) Is dual-use or the dual-use problem mentioned anywhere for the 
course? 
e) Identify a contact person for follow up; these people included 
course administrators, people who teach an ethics module within 
the course, program directors, or just general contact person.  
After these preliminary information were gathered, a questionnaire consisting 
of quantitative and qualitative questions was sent to the contact person. The 
questionnaire looked like this: 
Survey (please respond with yes/no) 
1) Do you give mandatory bioethics training in any of the 
modules in the course? 
2) Do you have a mandatory, dedicated ethics module? 
3) Does your ethical teaching cover the topics of dual-use 
bioethics, biosecurity or the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention? 
Questionnaire 
[If a bio/neuroethics module is a mandatory component of the 
course please feel free to skip ahead to question 3] 
1a) In your view, why is there no mandatory ethics module in the 
course?  
b) What would be the obstacles to the introduction of such a 
module?  
2) If an ethics module was required as part of the curriculum, 
how would you deal with it? 
3) Have students asked for further training in ethics? 
4) What ethical issues (e.g. each chapter of ‘On being a scientist’ 
lists an issue) do you think your graduates will be able to identify 
and deal with in their future careers? 
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Reference:  
Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy, US 
National Academy of Sciences, US National Academy of 
Engineering, and US Institute of Medicine of the National 
Academies (2009) On being a scientist: a guide to responsible 
conduct in research, 3
rd 
ed. Available for free at:  
http://www.scribd.com/doc/18458024/On-Being-a-Scientist-Third-
Edition  
or  
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12192 
All responses will be handled with confidentiality. 
 
The e-mail sent to the contact explained the purpose of the study – gather 
data about what ethical training is given to students – and my position as a 
PhD student. After the initial request e-mail, two reminders were sent with the 
last one including a statement that it is the final e-mail.  
The only exception to the above method was the initial survey conducted in 
the UK. It was the pilot study and differed in a few minor details. First, after 
the initial websearch, the survey was conducted in a stand-alone manner 
without the additional questionnaire. The survey included only two questions 
and respondents were not asked to just reply with yes/no, which resulted in 
some (7 out of 12) respondents giving also additional information about their 
course: 
1) Do you give mandatory bioethics training in any of the 
modules in the course?  
2) Does this teaching cover the topics of dual-use bioethics, 
biosecurity or the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention?  
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After the initial survey, the questionnaire was sent to those contacts who had 
replied to the survey. The questions were the same as in the final 
questionnaire.  
All respondents were given confidentiality.  
 
